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In this thesis, I discuss the basic theoretical hypotheses and models of Lacanian psychoanalysis, taking 
into consideration Martin Heidegger’s critique of science and modernity, and his arguments against 
(Freudian) psychoanalysis.  
I begin by presenting certain key aspects of Heidegger’s phenomenology in connection with his 
central problem, the question regarding the meaning of “being”—i.e., the source of intelligibility of the 
world for the human being. I follow Heidegger in his argument that there is a rupture between the 
ancient and modern worldviews, and in his claim that modern science fails to question its foundations. 
Heidegger’s philosophy allows for a deep understanding of the human condition, without having to 
resort to tacit assumptions about what is subject, object, truth, reality, and the world. 
Heidegger’s work helps bring out the uncritically accepted presuppositions of psychoanalytic 
theory, and challenges them. In reviewing the efforts by thinkers like Ludwig Binswanger and Medard 
Boss to apply Heidegger’s insights to psychiatry and psychotherapy I find that they generally fail in 
their attempts to present compelling theories that can also show their clinical relevance.  
I turn to the work of Jacques Lacan, a psychoanalyst deeply influenced by Heidegger’s thought. 
With his rereading and reformulation of Freud’s original insights, Lacan presents a post-Freudian 
metapsychology that can, as I show, respond confidently to Heidegger’s critique of psychoanalysis, and 
reach beyond it. Lacan offers a conceptualisation of the human being as a sexed “speaking being”, a 
being under the sway of jouissance and the signifier. I follow Lacan in his argument that meaning is 
always floating, unstable, and retroactively established, and discuss his efforts to reach an “ideal” of 
discursive mathematic formalisation. 
This discussion paves the way for an exploration of the basic themes of a possible theoretical 
exchange between Heidegger and Lacan. I formulate this exchange as a conceptual synthesis, which I 
provisionally label Discourse Ontology of the Speaking Being. In bringing this thesis to an end, I explore 
five basic themes of this conceptual synthesis—they are: speaking being; truth; language; body; 
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It has become a journalistic cliché to speak of Freud as one of the revolutionary founders of modern thought and to 
couple his name with that of Einstein. Most people would however find it almost as hard to summarize the changes 
introduced by one as by the other. Freud’s discoveries may be grouped under three headings—an instrument of 
research, the findings produced by the instruments, and the theoretical hypotheses inferred from the findings—
though the three groups were of course mutually interrelated. 
James Strachey1 
They were indeed revolutionary, but even so—or perhaps precisely because of this—Freud’s 
discoveries have not been met with unreserved acceptance. Psychoanalysis has been—and is still 
being—attacked on all fronts: its assumptions, its methods, its theoretical hypotheses, its conclusions. 
One of its most serious and penetrating critics was Martin Heidegger, who saw Freud as a 19th-century 
thinker and argued that Freud’s theories are marred by the limitations and restrictions of modern 
science when it studies the human being. 
Jacques Lacan, one of the most important post-Freudian psychoanalysts, claimed that the true 
spirit of the Freudian discovery had been forgotten or misconstrued and he set out to reformulate it 
in such a way that would be faithful to its originality and subversiveness, as well as secure from attacks 
such as Heidegger’s or others’. In the process, Lacan—drawing on work that was being done in diverse 
fields such as anthropology, linguistics, philosophy, and mathematics—created his own version of 
psychoanalysis, which he insisted on calling Freudian but that could, perhaps, be better described as 
Lacanian. 
In this thesis, I intend to discuss the basic theoretical hypotheses and models of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, taking into consideration Heidegger’s philosophy of being, his critique of modernity, 
and his arguments against (Freudian) psychoanalysis. It is not intended to be read like a thesis of 
Heideggerian or Lacanian scholarship, but rather as an attempt to use Heidegger’s questioning in order 
to secure a foundation for Lacanian psychoanalysis. This is a task of fundamental importance to me, a 
reader of Heidegger but also a practitioner of psychoanalysis. As I intend to show, Heidegger’s work is 
vitally important because it reveals the historicity and limitations of any scientific endeavour, and helps 
bring out the uncritically accepted presuppositions of psychoanalytic theory. In many ways, I see 
Heidegger as propaedeutic to Lacan. 
I will approach my subject matter from different angles: How pertinent can Heidegger’s 
philosophy be to the study of human suffering as attempted by psychoanalysis? How vulnerable is 
Freud’s discovery to Heidegger’s questioning? Did Lacan manage to shield it from Heidegger’s attack? 
                                                          
1 James Strachey, ‘Sigmund Freud: A Sketch of his Life and Ideas’ [1962] in James Strachey and Angela Richards (eds.), New Introductory 
Lectures on Psychoanalysis (Pelican Freud Library, 2; Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1983), 11-24, p. 17. 
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Is their thinking compatible with each other’s? Is a conceptual synthesis at all possible and, if yes, what 
would be its main themes?  
 
A philosophical challenge 
In the third decade of the 20th century, Heidegger challenged philosophy to rethink the question of 
being, a rather obscure philosophical question that had traditionally been thought of as having been 
settled for good.2 Not so, in Heidegger’s view. 
Heidegger’s insight was that by picturing human beings as cognitive observing agents who act 
within an environment, we fail to recognise that initial moment when being, as he called it, is itself 
“unconcealed”. It is this unconcealment that makes possible a human being’s comportment—
cognitive, observatory or manipulative—towards the beings it encounters. Heidegger set out to outline 
what this means and how it happens in Being and Time, published in 1927.3 Heidegger claimed that in 
order to demonstrate the origin of our basic ontological concepts, it is necessary to deconstruct the 
history of ideas, or—to use his own words—to destroy the history of ontology: 
We understand this task as one in which by taking the question of Being as our clue, we are to destroy the traditional 
content of ancient ontology until we arrive at those primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of 
determining the nature of being—the ways which have guided us ever since.4 
Heidegger’s work shows that epistemology is preceded by ontology; still, ontology is mediated by 
language. It is in this circle of understanding, as he would call it, that the key to grasping the essence 
of the human being in its ‘being-human’ lies. 
Heidegger’s work represented a major challenge to any other philosophical or scientific attempt 
to study the world in general and the human condition in particular, and it exerted an enormous 
influence on the course of 20th-century philosophy, to the extent that he has been called “the last 
universally recognisable philosopher.”5 It gradually became clear that its repercussions were much 
more far-reaching than immediately thought, with its impact especially felt in other disciplines that 
were also taking the human being as their subject matter—such as psychiatry, psychology, and 
psychoanalysis. 
In Heidegger’s view, sciences of the human being fail to grasp the totality of the phenomena 
they study; they miss their essence and almost unavoidably distort them. This stems from a major 
limitation of modern science in general, which, according to Heidegger, not only confuses what can be 
measured and studied objectively with what is real but also remains oblivious to this confusion. 
                                                          
2 For the term being see below, p. 7n1. 
3 Being and Time exists in two different English translations, one by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, (Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishing, 1962) and one by Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996). Both have their respective merits, but 
sometimes differ in terms of readability and clarity. I will be using mainly the former, as it was the first to be published, and has been more 
widely used than the other, with a lot of secondary literature conforming to its terminological and translation choices. If I need to use the 
Stambaugh translation, this will be explicitly noted. To facilitate cross-referencing, references to either edition, will also include the German 
original page number after a slash. 
4 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time [1927], trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1962), p. 44/22. 
5 Alain Badiou, Being and Event [1988], trans. Oliver Feltham (New York: Continuum, 2005), p. 1. 
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Medical science, psychology, and psychiatry are trapped in the conceptual framework of modern 
science, which rests on the picture of a scientist qua observer who focuses objectively on his or her 
subject matter, and studies its objects. In contrast, Heidegger held that the relation of man to the world 
is not one of subject to object, or observer to observed, as people (and scientists) are accustomed to 
believe. He argued that any such conceptualisation is an interpretative abstraction founded on a more 
primordial unity, which he designated with the combined term being-in-the-world: the world concerns 
us and becomes intelligible to us because we human beings-in-the-world are already opened up to, 
and comported towards, being. The inaugurating event of opening up to being is lost for each and 
every one of us, in the sense that we have lost awareness that it ever happened. This opening up is 
mediated through language, and entails, as such, an implicit but all-pervasive worldview, which, in 
itself, is not questioned. The very method of science predetermines what it can speak about; science 
is not in a position to question itself or its subject matter as such. Such a task is for philosophy. 
 
A science for the psyche? 
Freud did not share Heidegger’s view. He was a scientist, and envisaged psychoanalysis as a proper 
science that studies psychic or mental phenomena. In Freud’s work, psychoanalytic theories—its 
metapsychology, as he called it—are constructed, tested, revised, extended, and even abandoned in 
much the same way as any other scientific theories. He never claimed that psychoanalysts enjoy any 
kind of infallibility. Psychoanalytic theorising advances carefully, hesitantly and slowly—quite unlike 
philosophy, which, in Freud’s view at least, seems always to need to have the answer to every question. 
Freud stressed that psychoanalysis is a science and, as such, very tolerant of temporary ignorance and 
contradiction. He insisted that it is equipped with all the tools it needs to proceed on the path it sets 
out to take. 
The question regarding the scientific status of psychoanalysis, of major importance for Freud, 
has been—and still is—debated. Consensus has not been reached, but most thinkers who are friendly 
to psychoanalysis would agree that psychoanalysis—even if it does not become the hard science that 
Freud envisaged—can at least be thought of as a rational, interpretative endeavour. Heidegger’s 
questioning could be seen as forming part of the same debate. His philosophy directly calls into 
question Freud’s optimistic and straightforward conception of science. In Heidegger’s view, Freud was 
a thinker who was operating solidly within the limited and naïve conceptual framework of the 19th-
century natural sciences. As such, the various claims of psychoanalysis—the claim, for example, that it 
has the concepts and tools that allow it to reach beyond what is immediately apparent and study the 
human psyche (or mental life) in its totality and in all its manifestations—are completely baseless, if 
not absurd, in Heidegger’s view. For Heidegger, psychoanalysis not only fails to study the human being 
in his or her suffering; it actually distorts phenomena in its effort to make them fit within what he 
considers an incongruous and mechanistic conceptual framework. 
This is where Jacques Lacan enters the picture. Lacan, one of the major post-Freudian 
psychoanalysts and theorists, explicitly acknowledged the influence Heidegger’s ideas had had on his 
own work, at least at the early stages of his teaching. He believed that the spirit and radical nature of 
Freud’s discovery were being misconstrued by psychoanalysts who paid more attention to a supposed 
biology of instincts, to phylogenetic inheritance, or to physiological development and adaptation to 
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the demands of life. Freud’s discovery, in Lacan’s view, consisted in recognising the extent to which 
human suffering is dependent on, and subject to, language. Lacan remained for a long time true to his 
pledge to “return to Freud” by reading Freud’s texts closely and referring to them again and again. 
Lacan’s reading of Freudian theory led him to the development of an entirely new psychoanalytic 
theory, one whose regional ontology—to use one of Heidegger’s terms—was very remote from 
Freud’s. 
 
Aims and scope of this work  
While I do not agree with all of Heidegger’s criticisms, I hold that psychoanalysis cannot remain silent 
before the challenge he represents. I think—and in what follows I will try to show—that Heidegger’s 
philosophy allows for a deep understanding of the human condition, without resorting to tacit 
assumptions about what a subject is, what an object is, what truth is, what the real and the knowable 
are, and what knowledge is. As I will argue, the elucidation of such concepts is of paramount 
importance for psychoanalysis; taking Heidegger’s ideas into consideration and responding to them 
rather than blissfully ignoring them is imperative if psychoanalysis intends to establish its own 
philosophically robust foundation, one that would support the justification both for its theoretical 
formulations and for its clinical practice. 
I will also argue that psychoanalysis, especially in the Lacanian orientation, allows a deeper 
understanding of the phenomena that are part and parcel of the human condition, and that it too can 
complement, enrich, or better Heidegger’s understanding. The Lacanian reading and reformulation of 
Freud’s original insights, with its emphasis on language as world-disclosing (but also alienating), 
parallels, as I will show, both Heidegger’s philosophy and his view of language as the “house of being”.6 
It is my opinion that however insurmountable their differences—in terminology, scope, and method—
Heidegger and Lacan meet in more than just trivial ways.  
At a cursory glance, French philosopher Alain Badiou’s work—an oeuvre in which he explicitly 
refers to Heidegger’s re-positing of the ontological question and to Lacan’s post-Cartesian 
conceptualisation of the divided subject—seems to largely overlap with this point of view. As Badiou 
has argued, we are now  
the contemporaries of a third epoch of science, after the Greek and the Galilean. We are equally the contemporaries 
of a second epoch of the doctrine of the Subject … [and the] contemporaries of a new departure in the doctrine of 
truth … [which] crosses the paths of Heidegger (who was the first to subtract it from knowledge), the mathematicians 
(who broke with the object at the end of the last century, just as they broke with adequation), and the modern 
theories of the subject (which displace truth from its subjective pronunciation).7 
Badiou purports to construct a fully-fledged philosophical system in an attempt to respond to the 
challenges of what he conceives as a new epoch of science, the subject, and truth. Badiou’s 
understanding and use of crucial terms such as “being”, “event”, “truth”, and “subject” appears to be 
highly idiosyncratic and largely incompatible with the ways in which Heidegger and Lacan employ 
                                                          
6 Martin Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’ [1947], trans. Frank A. Capuzzi, in William Mcneill (ed.), Pathmarks (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1978), 239-276, p. 239. 
7 Badiou, Being and Event, p. 3. 
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them. He is not interested in Heidegger’s critique of Freudian theory or in the intricacies of Lacan’s 
understanding of the speaking being. These are precisely the issues that interest me. 
While a full correspondence between Heideggerian and Lacanian ideas may be neither possible 
nor useful, my aim in this thesis will be to examine whether there is any merit in attempting a 
theoretical exchange between some of their respective positions and discussing points of contact and 
divergence. I will also endeavour both to outline the themes of a possible conceptual synthesis and to 
indicate some further lines of discussion thus opened up. 
The first two chapters will focus solidly on Heidegger. I will begin, in the first chapter, with his 
question regarding being. I will introduce his method—phenomenology—and set out the framework 
of his Analytic of Dasein. I will discuss the crucial “ontological difference”, i.e., the difference between 
beings (as entities of this world) and being as such, and introduce concepts such as being-in-the-world, 
being-with-others, equipment, language, historicity, time, event of appropriation and death. I will also 
show how Heidegger's exploration of the question of being allowed him to discern its historical 
character. 
This general outline will allow me to proceed, in the second chapter, with Heidegger’s critique 
of science, and especially with his views on medical science, psychiatry, and psychology, all as 
presented by Heidegger himself during his so-called Zollikon Seminars, delivered regularly to a group 
of doctors, psychiatrists, and psychologists over a period of more than 10 years. I will present 
Heidegger’s argument that there is a rupture between the ancient and the modern worldview, as well 
as his claim that modern science fails to question its implicit assumptions and is unable to acknowledge 
its major shortcoming, namely the confusion between what is measurable and what is real. I will focus 
on Heidegger’s critique of sciences that study the human being, such as medicine, psychiatry, 
psychology, and, of course, Freudian psychoanalysis. I will argue that psychoanalysis is vulnerable to 
this critique and cannot afford to ignore it.  
In the third chapter, I will review how Heidegger’s ideas and concepts were taken up by thinkers 
such as Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss, and then applied to contemporary psychotherapy and 
psychiatry. They were implicitly or explicitly claiming that their work was a direct application of 
Heidegger’s insights, and for this reason I will examine their ideas from a Heideggerian point of view, 
focusing on questions such as their conceptual coherency or their clinical relevance. After revisiting 
Heidegger’s critique of psychoanalysis, I will present some elements from the work of Hans Loewald 
and William Richardson, two psychoanalysts whose thinking was informed by Heideggerian ideas.  
My focus, from that point on, will move to Jacques Lacan, a psychoanalyst who called for a return 
to the original spirit of Freud’s discovery, which, in Lacan’s view, consisted in recognising the extent to 
which human psychic suffering is dependent on, and subject to, language. Lacan was especially 
influenced by Heidegger’s thought and this, I will argue, is evident in his rereading of key Freudian 
concepts such as the unconscious. I will also give an outline of some of Lacan’s own contributions, such 
as the mirror stage, the signifier, jouissance, the three registers of experience (real, symbolic, and 
imaginary), and object a. 
Lacan’s conceptualisation of the human being as a being subject to the law of the signifier will 
lead in the fifth chapter to the discussion of Lacan’s theory as a post-Freudian “metapsychology”. By 
using this term—which Lacan himself largely avoided using in connection with his own work—I am 
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referring to the fundamental concepts of Lacan’s theory and the questions opened by them. I will 
discuss Lacan’s understanding of language as a network of interconnected signifiers and present his 
thinking about issues such as “signifierness”, temporality and historicity, psychic structure, discourse, 
and sexuation. Special attention will be given to Lacan’s critique of traditional ontology and 
metaphysics and to his efforts to reach an “ideal” of mathematic formalisation. 
In the sixth and final chapter of this thesis, I will explore the possibility of a theoretical exchange 
between Heidegger and Lacan. Having discussed the ways in which psychoanalysis is vulnerable to 
Heidegger’s critique, as well as Lacan’s strategies to address this critique in his own re-reading of Freud, 
I will present five themes of a potential conceptual synthesis between Heidegger and Lacan, which I 
provisionally label as Discourse Ontology of the Speaking Being. These themes are: speaking being, 
language, body, world, and truth. In bringing this discussion to an end, I will briefly touch upon some 
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Chapter 1: Heidegger’s question of being 
Heidegger’s Being and Time begins with a quote from Plato’s Sophist. In this dialogue, a character 
called Stranger is speaking with two other characters, Theaetetus and Theodorus, and attempts to 
show them how people (philosophers and non-philosophers alike) talk about being without really 
knowing what that means.1 We should invite them to explain, Stranger says to his interlocutors. We 
need to tell them that we do not understand and that we are in a difficulty. Please do explain, we 
should tell them, “for manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the 
expression ‘being’. We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become perplexed.”2 
For Heidegger, this very question has long been pushed aside and forgotten, and needs to be 
raised anew; moreover, the question remains as difficult and perplexing as ever, but people have 
forgotten even this.  
We, human beings, conceive of ourselves as subjects present in a “here and now”, each one of 
us in our observing individuality, turned towards a world that lies “objectively” out there. And when 
we ask ourselves about the world and the beings we encounter in it, we are readily able to refer to an 
explanation—or to an explanatory attempt—about how they found themselves in front of us. Now 
and again we allow ourselves to wonder at the miracle of existence, but we do this only temporarily, 
only in as far as we contemplate life, the past, the future, creation, and so on and so forth. Soon we 
change our stance and resume our ordinary comportment—that of taking things for granted, acting as 
agents engaging with a world which is open to us and available for our inspection. For Heidegger, this 
picture is problematic because it is limited and misleading. It is limited because it tends to overlook 
many aspects of our being human; and it is misleading because it obscures this very fact of overlooking. 
This is the task Heidegger sets himself: “Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the 
question of the meaning of being and do so concretely.”3 
In what follows I will outline Heidegger’s strategy to tackle this task. Finding myself in agreement 
with Thomas Sheehan’s radical new reading of Heidegger’s philosophy,4 I will approach Heidegger’s 
work as a work “about one thing only: sense or meaning … both in itself and in terms of its source”, 
and I will explain how, for Heidegger, our picturing human beings as cognitive observing agents within 
an environment fails to take into consideration the ways, and the extent to which, our comportment 
                                                          
1 In what follows, and whenever is necessary for reasons of clarity, I will be contrasting the term being (i.e., the italicised gerund of the verb 
“to be”), which will be taken to represent the German form Sein (i.e., the infinitive of the verb “be”), to the term being without any formatting, 
which will be taken to mean “entity”, or something that “is” (in German: seiend). Quoted passages of Heidegger or others will be changed as 
needed, in order to conform to this convention and help retain some uniformity in this text. 
2 Plato, quoted in Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 17/1. 
3 Being and Time, p. 17/1.  
4 See Thomas Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015). 
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toward things bespeaks, i.e. shapes, “their meaningful presence within the worlds of [our] interests 
and concerns”.5 Starting with Heidegger’s method, phenomenology, I will focus on Dasein, i.e. the 
human being in its concernful comportment towards beings, and will discuss Dasein’s fundamental 
structure of engagement as being-in-the-world. I will show how this line of enquiry allows one to see 
being as disclosed by its temporal horizon (i.e. presence), and leads to a conceptualisation of truth as 
unconcealment, rather than correspondence (of statements to states of affairs). As I will show, for 
Heidegger, Dasein’s access to being is always mediated through language and in this sense being itself 
is only revealed in its historicity. As Sheehan puts it, “underlying the whole of Heidegger’s philosophy 
is the fact that we cannot encounter anything outside the parameters that define us as human—as a 
thrown open, socially and historically embodied λόγος [logos].”6 It is for this reason, I argue, that 
Heidegger’s thinking is crucial for probing the limitations of any philosophical, scientific, or 
psychoanalytic enquiry. 
 
Reactions to a puzzling question 
Much has been written in an attempt to explicate not only the question of being, as such, but also 
Heidegger’s insistence on the need to return to it. Both are puzzling. Why is such a thing necessary? 
Why is it so important in our era of modern science, philosophy, mathematics, technology, and 
computers to preoccupy ourselves with such ruminations? Is it not the case that they have already 
been tacitly answered? Are the collective intellectual and material achievements of humanity not 
evidence enough that, really, there is no puzzle to solve? 
Many scholars, commentators, and philosophers saw this question as a mystical question 
beyond the horizons of human understanding, a question pertaining more to religion and theology. 
Many were, and some still are, tempted to dismiss Heidegger’s efforts as obscure, mystical, or even 
plainly nonsensical. As an example one can take Paul Edwards, an American philosopher, belonging to 
the school of analytic philosophy, who has written a short book titled Heidegger’s Confusions. His aim 
was stated clearly in the preface: “Until fairly recently, Heidegger was not taken seriously by 
philosophers in Great Britain and the United States. Unfortunately this is no longer the case. One goal 
of the present study is to stem this tide of unreason.”7 
 For the British logical positivist A. J. Ayer, the problem was not just that of unreason. In his view, 
Heidegger had displayed “a surprising ignorance” and engaged “in an unscrupulous distortion” which 
could be “fairly described as charlatanism.”8 
Other writers thought they discerned in Heidegger’s philosophy the suffering of a troubled 
personality. An example would be American psychiatrist and psychoanalyst Richard Chessick, who 
drew something like a psychological profile or “psychogram” of Heidegger. Chessick described him as 
                                                          
5 Making Sense, p. xii. 
6 Making Sense, p. 209. 
7 Paul Edwards, Heidegger's Confusions (New York: Prometheus Books, 2004), p. 9. Edwards’s arguments reveal a deep hostility to, but also 
a deep misunderstanding of, Heidegger’s project, as I will have the opportunity to show later in the text. 
8 Alfred J. Ayer, Philosophy in the Twentieth Century [1982] (London: Orion Books, 1992), p. 228. 
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a “pathological narcissist” who had suffered a “narcissistic regression” because of his alleged 
disillusionment with Hitler. For Chessick, Heidegger’s philosophy was “the philosophy of a despairing, 
aging, and disappointed man.”9 Another example would be an assessment by the much more kindly 
disposed George Atwood and Robert Stolorow: they claimed that a “psychobiographical” reading of 
Heidegger’s Being and Time would unveil 
the ontology of Dasein … as a symbol of Heidegger’s own anguished struggle and individuality and grounded 
authenticity in a world where he felt in perpetual danger of absorption in the pressures and influences of the social 
milieu.10 
Stolorow was unconvinced with regard to the radicalism of Heidegger’s question of being, as is evident 
in passages like the following: 
We believe that the progressive reification and even deification of being in Heidegger’s later philosophy … is a 
distinctively Catholic one. The turn in Heidegger’s later philosophizing was thus actually a re-turn to the Catholic 
heritage of his childhood, a self-restorative dream of returning to being-at-home once again.11 
Misunderstandings and hostility aside, the actual meaning of Heidegger’s question remains 
obscure. According to Herman Philipse, the various interpretations can be seen as falling somewhere 
along an axis with two extremes, one which he calls a unitarian interpretation, according to which 
“there is one more or less precise meaning of Heidegger’s question that remains the same throughout 
his philosophical career,” and one which he calls a patchwork interpretation, according to which “there 
is no substantial meaning of Heidegger’s question of being. The formula of the question of being is an 
empty one, or at best a chameleon that changes its meaning from passage to passage.”12 
But even if we decided to focus on the opinions put forward by adherents of the unitarian 
interpretation—presumably friendlier, or at least not overtly hostile, to Heidegger’s project—we 
would not be able to find any consensus. 
An example of a careful, not overtly critical attitude, can be found in D.W. Hamlyn’s History of 
Western Philosophy. As Hamlyn writes, for Heidegger “the fundamental metaphysical question is why 
there is anything rather than nothing. … So, his starting-point is what he takes to be a fundamental 
distinction between Sein (being) and Dasein (being there, being in the world).”13 
Now, asking why there is anything rather than nothing is indeed a metaphysical question that 
has troubled philosophers for centuries. For Leibniz, it was directly related to questions about the 
origins of the world, space, matter, and, ultimately, God.14 Nowadays, it would be thought of as a 
                                                          
9 Richard D. Chessick, ‘The Effect of Heidegger's Pathological Narcissism on the Development of His Philosophy’ in Jeffery Adams and Eric 
Williams (eds.), Mimetic Desire: Essays on Narcissism in German Literature from Romanticism to Post Modernism (Drawer, Columbia: Camden 
House, 1995), 103-118, p. 118. 
10 George E. Atwood and Robert D. Stolorov, Structures of Subjectivity: Explorations in Psychoanalytic Phenomenology and Contextualism 
(Hove: Routledge, 2014), p. 20. For the question of social milieu and the links between Heidegger and Nazism see below, pp. 15-17. 
11 Robert D. Stolorow, World, Affectivity, Trauma: Heidegger and Post-Cartesian Psychoanalysis (New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 100. 
12 Herman Philipse, Heidegger's Philosophy of Being: A Critical Interpretation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 68, 71. 
13 D. W. Hamlyn, The Pelican History of Western Philosophy (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1987), p. 323.  
14 See Daniel Garber, ‘Leibniz: physics and philosophy’ in Nicholas Jolley (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 270-352. 
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question of cosmology rather than one of metaphysics or philosophy. “What is the nature of reality?” 
asks Stephen Hawking. “Where did all this come from? Did the universe need a creator? … Traditionally 
these are questions for philosophy, but philosophy is dead. Philosophy has not kept up with modern 
development in science, particularly physics.”15 
Heidegger does indeed bring this question up in his Introduction to Metaphysics: “Why are there 
beings at all instead of nothing? That is the question. Presumably it is no arbitrary question. ‘Why are 
there beings at all instead of nothing?’—this is obviously the first of all questions.”16 
He discusses the question at length and concludes that what we really are doing is 
asking about the ground for the fact that beings are, and are what they are, and that there is not nothing instead. We 
are asking at bottom about being. But how? We are asking about the being of beings. We are interrogating beings in 
regards to their being.17 
Clearly, this is a very different question from the one asked—and responded to—by 
cosmologists. Consider, for example, Hawking’s conclusion: 
Because there is a law like gravity, the universe can and will create itself from nothing … Spontaneous creation is the 
reason there is something rather than nothing, why the universe exists, why we exist. It is not necessary to invoke 
God to light the blue touch paper and set the universe going.18 
Hawking takes the question as a question regarding the possibility of establishing a causal chain. He 
reassures us that we do not need to invoke God; instead he invokes the law of gravity and the process 
of spontaneous creation. The assumption that the universe operates according to laws that are 
knowable is taken for granted. Hawking believes that philosophy has not kept up with science, but the 
only justification for his belief is the fact that he chooses to ignore philosophy. It’s not that his 
assumptions are necessarily wrong—they may not be—but rather that he thinks he can proceed 
without examining them. Heidegger’s project is an invitation to examine them. 
Still, many scholars remained unconvinced. Ayer, for one, was not impressed at all. “Why is there 
anything at all and not rather nothing?” he asked. “This should be treated … as the senseless querying 
of an absolute presupposition. At least, if it is treated as a question, there is no way of answering it. … 
Perhaps the question is deliberately drafted in order to be unanswerable.”19 
 
                                                          
15 Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow, The Grand Design: New Answers to the Ultimate Questions of Life (London: Bantam Press, 2010), 
p. 5. 
16 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics [1935], trans. Gregory Field and Richard Polt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 
1. 
17 Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 31. 
18 Hawking and Mlodinow, Grand Design, p. 180.  
19 Ayer, Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, p. 229. 
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Making sense of the problem 
In his Commentary on Being and Time, Hubert Dreyfus writes that “Heidegger’s primary concern is … 
to make sense of our ability to make sense of things.”20 Dreyfus believes, that is, that Heidegger’s main 
focus is our understanding of being, presumably something of which sense can be made. 
Richard Polt, in his Heidegger: An Introduction, sees things differently: “When we ask, ‘What is 
the meaning of being?’” he explains, 
we are trying to enhance our understanding of being itself. Being plays a role in our lives, but we understand it only 
darkly and vaguely. In order to reveal being more clearly, we have to place it within the appropriate context or 
horizon.21 
Polt thinks, in other words, that Heidegger’s focus is being as such, and not just our vague 
understanding of it. 
In disagreement with both, philosopher William Richardson reads Heidegger’s problematic as a 
questioning regarding the grounding of philosophy, i.e., metaphysics. If philosophy is 
a tree whose roots are metaphysics … what, Heidegger asks, is the ground in which metaphysics is rooted? The 
unequivocal answer: being. Being can be called, then, the ground on which metaphysics, as the root of the philosophy 
tree, is held fast and nourished. To interrogate the ground of metaphysics, we must pose the ‘ground’-question, the 
question about the sense [or meaning] of being.22 
A somewhat different interpretation is suggested by Walter Biemel, a student of Heidegger: 
“Heidegger’s inquiry into the meaning of being is presented as fundamental ontology … intended … to 
offer an analysis of the mode of being of the inquirer … distinguished from all other entities by the fact 
that he builds a certain relationship to himself.”23 
For his part, Rüdiger Safranski, author of an important biography of Heidegger, believes that 
Heidegger’s question about being can be understood through time: “The meaning of being is time,” he 
writes. “But time is not a cornucopia of gifts, it gives us no content and no orientation. The meaning is 
time, but time ‘gives’ no meaning.”24 Time is also at the centre of Otto Pöggeler’s interpretation of 
Heidegger’s project in Martin Heidegger’s Path of Thinking: 
If metaphysics thinks of being as constant presence, does it not then conceive of it from a specific mode of time, the 
present? … If this equation, being is constant presence, is no longer accepted as a matter of course, then the question 
about the sense of being can emerge as a question about being and time.25  
All these views have something in common but are also quite dissimilar. Thinking about our 
“understanding” of being is similar, but not identical, to interrogating the ground of metaphysics; 
                                                          
20 Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1991), p. 
10. 
21 Richard Polt, Heidegger: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 25. 
22 William J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought [1963] (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), p. 7. 
23 Walter Biemel, Martin Heidegger: An Illustrated Study, trans. J. L. Mehta (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 30. 
24 Rüdiger Safranski, Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil, trans. Ewald Osers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 153. 
25 Otto Pöggeler, Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking [1963], trans. Daniel Magurshak and Sigmund Barber (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: 
Humanities Press, 1987), pp. 33-34. 
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focusing on the mode of being of the inquirer is not clarified if we say that the meaning of being is 
time. What they have in common is the human being. There would be no “understanding” of being 
without an agent capable of understanding; there would be no metaphysics as such if there were no 
human beings engaging with such questions; indeed, any discussion about the “meaning” of being 
always, and necessarily, involves the supposition of a human being capable of discerning, or perhaps 
just wondering about, this meaning.  
As I see it, when Heidegger invites us to rethink the meaning of being, he is not concerned with 
formulating a scientific (or, for that matter, philosophical) explanation for how or why things “are” or 
how things came to “be” as such; the Kantian Ding an sich, or thing-in-itself, is not the focus of his 
questioning,26 nor is the question of the traditional metaphysics of existence versus inexistence. He is 
not concerned with the workings of nature, or with the deep structure or origin of the universe—at 
least not in the way a cosmologist would be concerned. Heidegger’s question is not why there is 
anything rather than nothing; rather, it is what does it mean when we say that there is something. This 
is the question about the sense (or meaning) of being, a question that, as Pöggeler reminds us, “is 
placed before the question about the manifold expressibility of being,”27 i.e., before the question 
about the various ways things, or entities, or beings present themselves to humans. 
This is Heidegger’s starting point—the observation that we, humans, are concerned with and do 
things with entities we come across in our world: other human beings, animals, plants, natural 
phenomena, objects, tools, artefacts and so on. All these we call “beings” and we may be observing 
them, talking about them, talking to them, talking with them, remembering them, forgetting them, 
handling them, studying them, manipulating them, creating them, destroying them, modifying them. 
Human beings comport towards beings in thousands of ways, and tend to think that this state of affairs 
is self-evident and transparent. As Heidegger writes, 
There are many things which we designate as ‘being’, and we do so in various senses. Everything we talk about, 
everything we have in view, everything towards which we comport ourselves in any way, is being; what we are is 
being, and so is how we are. Being lies in the fact that something is, and in its being as it is.28  
The question of being, then, is a question that only makes sense to humans, i.e., it is a specifically 
human question. However abstract or elaborate our thinking, the whole issue is specifically human and 
involves or concerns humans, and humans alone. We humans cannot even arrive at the question of 
being unless we have already an understanding of entities as beings. Being is that on the basis—and 
because—of which entities present themselves to us and concern us. Strictly speaking, there would be 
no such a thing as being if there were no humans concerned with it: Being is the product—and, as will 
be shown, the prerequisite too—of the concerned comportment of humans towards what they 
encounter, i.e., beings. Or, in the words of Heidegger: “What is asked about is being.” Namely “that 
which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which entities are already understood.”29  
                                                          
26 For the Kantian thing-in-itself see, for example, Wihelm Windelband, A History of Philosophy: With Especial Reference to the Formation 
and Development of Its Problems and Conceptions, trans. James Hayden Tufts (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1901), p. 541. 
27 Pöggeler, Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking, p. 34. 
28 Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 26/6-7. 
29 Being and Time, pp. 25-26/6 (emphasis added). 
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As Thomas Sheehan points out, Heidegger’s work “both early and late, was not about ‘being’ as 
Western Philosophy has understood that term in over twenty-five hundred years, but rather about 
sense itself: meaningfulness and its source.”30 In order to be able to observe, conceive, understand, 
describe, or contemplate our dealings with the world and its objects—with beings in general—we, 
human beings, already employ a tacit understanding of what being is. It is not meant by this that we 
have an understanding of each and every entity or being we encounter, but rather that we are open, 
in some fundamental way, to beings as such. Sheehan explains: “Human being is the ‘open space’ or 
clearing within which the meaningful presence of things can occur.”31 
This task, to enquire about our tacit understanding of being, is a necessary one insofar as we are 
interested in what it is to be human, what the horizon of human engagement with, and understanding 
of, the world is, and what the domain of human knowledge is. 
One could contend here that this argument involves some kind of circularity. For Heidegger, 
however, the contention is beside the point: 
Formal objections such as the argument about ‘circular reasoning’, which can easily be cited at any time in the study 
of first principles, are always sterile when one is considering concrete ways of investigating.32 
In the question of the meaning of being there is no ‘circular reasoning’ but rather a remarkable ‘relatedness backward 
or forward’ which what we are asking about (being) bears to the inquiry itself as a mode of being of an entity.33 
The ‘circle’ in understanding belongs to the structure of meaning, and the latter phenomenon is rooted in the 
existential constitution of Dasein. … An entity for which, as being-in-the-world, its being is itself an issue, has, 
ontologically, a circular structure.34 
So, for Heidegger circularity cannot be—and should not be expected to be—avoided in any study of 
first principles.35  
Heidegger used the term “Dasein” to denote this human being “which in each case I myself 
am,”36 and used the compound expression being-in-the-world to denote the fact that Dasein—or 
human beings in general—are primordially in a world. We will return to these two terms, but let us 
now say, as a rough indication, that for Heidegger it is nonsensical to conceive of the world as a kind 
of container that might contain (or might not contain) human beings. Dasein, the world, and the 
fundamental configuration of Dasein as being-in-the-world are disclosed at the same time—
equiprimordially, as Heidegger writes, meaning that neither of them takes precedence over the other.  
Paul Edwards is rather ironic with regard to this point: 
                                                          
30 Sheehan, Making Sense, p. xi.  
31 Making Sense, p. xv.  
32 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 27/7. 
33 Being and Time, p. 28/8. 
34 Being and Time, p. 195/153.  
35 For the circle of understanding see Being and Time, p. 195/153. See also the discussion on the use of circle and circular thought in Erasmus 
Schöfer, ‘Heidegger's Language: Metalogical Forms of Thought and Grammatical Specialties’ [1962], trans. Joseph J. Kockelmans, in Joseph J. 
Kockelmans (ed.), On Heidegger and Language (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1972), 281-301, pp. 281-287. 
36 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 78/53. 
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Heidegger’s teaching that man is the Da of Being, the ‘site of openness’ and ‘the clearing of Being’, is supposed to 
constitute a great discovery. I do not see that it is anything of the kind. When the metaphors are eliminated, his 
assertion comes to no more than that of all known entities human beings are the only ones who are reflectively 
conscious of the world, who not only see, hear, touch, and taste objects but also think about them and ask questions 
about their meaning and value. The ‘world’ is here used broadly so as to include human beings themselves. Calling 
this a platitude is not quite right, but it hardly qualifies as a discovery.37 
Edwards misses Heidegger’s point entirely: Heidegger draws our attention to the fact that when 
humans think and ask about the world, they think and ask about something (i.e., being) that has been 
opened to them, and that the world they think and ask about is only that world that they do think and 
ask about. How does this happen? What does this mean? The question of being is exactly this; and 
Heidegger re-draws our attention to it, claiming that it has been forgotten—this precise forgottenness 
that, unbeknownst to Edwards, his own argument exemplifies. 
At the heart of Heidegger’s enquiry we find a verb used to denote being in its various senses—
namely the verb “to be”. All the distinct uses of the verb—for example, when we say “the cat is on the 
mat,” or “the cat is grey,” or “the cat is a cousin of the tiger,” or “the cat is mine,” or “the cat is looking 
at you,” or “the cat is pleasant,” or “the cat is in my mind”—denote different aspects of being of that 
entity known as “cat” without reference to any specific or necessary reality. I speak about the “cat,” 
but I could very well be speaking about a unicorn, a squared circle, a ghost, or a golden mountain. 
When I use the verb “to be”, I make it possible for a specific state of affairs to become part of 
my world. It is this sense of Heidegger’s problematic which escapes of his critics. We see for example 
Edwards writing 
To begin with, Heidegger totally fails to distinguish between the ‘is’ of predication (‘the sky is blue’), the ‘is’ of identity 
(‘a triangle is a plane figure bounded by three straight lines’) and the ‘is’ of existence (‘there is God’). … Although 
serious, this confusion is not the main trouble here; the main trouble is Heidegger’s totally uncritical assumption that 
is-ness or Being must belong to or be ‘in’ things.38 
The error here lies with the critic. Heidegger does not assume that is-ness belongs or is in things. Rather 
he claims that is-ness makes it possible for things to become parts of Dasein’s world. How? What does 
this mean? Admittedly this is hard to say, but then this is exactly what Heidegger’s enquiry is about. 
He asks about the meaning of being. That is the primary question. The differentiation between the ‘is’ 
of predication, identity, existence and the like is not primary. It comes after. 
My utterances allow the world, beings inside this world, and being in general to reveal 
themselves to me, and to become an issue for me. Whether they are “true” or not—in the traditional 
understanding of truth and truth values—is irrelevant.39 As Heidegger puts it, “Language is the house 
of being.”40 This, of course, does not mean that I, as a speaking human being, create the world—or the 
whole of reality, for that matter—in any factical or tangible sense, merely by using language: 
                                                          
37 Edwards, Heidegger's Confusions, p. 25. 
38 Heidegger's Confusions, p. 37.  
39 On Heidegger’s conception of truth see below, pp. 23-26. 
40 Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’, p. 239. 
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Only as long as Dasein is (that is, only as long as an understanding of being is ontically possible), ‘is there’ being. When 
Dasein does not exist … even entities within-the-world can neither be discovered nor lie hidden. In such a case it 
cannot be said that entities are, nor can it be said that they are not.41 
In other words, a sunset on an exo-planet around Alpha Centauri cannot seriously be said to 
have been “created” by human beings. Yet it can only be (i.e., be beautiful, spectacular, frightening, 
boring) in the eyes of human beings—those beings who comport themselves towards being, and for 
whom being is an issue. 
 
Heidegger, Nazism, anti-Semitism  
A discussion about the importance of Heidegger’s thought would be incomplete without reference to 
those who have claimed that Heidegger’s connections with Nazism would be enough to discredit his 
whole philosophy once and for all. The debate forms a major part of the field of Heidegger studies, a 
“Heidegger affair” of sorts, as Jeff Malpas has it.42 Works such as Victor Farías’s Heidegger and Nazism 
offer a thoroughly negative presentation of Heidegger’s Nazi links, while others present a more 
moderate picture, such as the one advocated by Hugo Ott in his Martin Heidegger: A Political Life.43 A 
more recent and rather damning addition to the debate is Emmanuel Faye’s Heidegger: The 
Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy in Light of the Unpublished Seminars of 1933-1935.44 
Even though some (but not all) of the many anti-Heideggerian arguments in this context have 
been rebutted or exposed as ad hominem,45 I too am of the opinion that one should certainly be very 
concerned if Nazi ideals could be shown to be unambiguously discernible in Heidegger’s philosophy as 
such. Such a claim does not seem to be so easy to substantiate. In the words of Richard Rorty, 
Heidegger’s thought 
was, indeed, essentially anti-democratic. But lots of Germans who were dubious about democracy and modernity did 
not become Nazis. Heidegger did because he was both more of a ruthless opportunist and more of a political 
ignoramus than most of the German intellectuals who shared his doubts.46 
If anything, Heidegger can be readily accused, with regard to Hitler and the Nazi ideology, of having 
been unequal to the occasion. According to Jorge Alemán and Sergio Larriera, Heidegger “did not 
                                                          
41 Being and Time, p. 255/212. 
42 Jeff Malpas, ‘On the Philosophical Reading of Heidegger: Situating the Black Notebooks’ in Ingo Farin and Jeff Malpas (eds.), Reading 
Heidegger's Black Notebooks 1931-1941 (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2016), 3-22, p. 3. 
43 See Victor Farías, Heidegger and Nazism, trans. Paul Burrell and Gabriel R. Ricci (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989); and Hugo 
Ott, Martin Heidegger: A Political Life (London: Fontana Press, 1994). 
44 Emmanuel Faye, Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy in Light of the Unpublished Seminars of 1933-1935, trans. Michael 
B. Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). 
45 Farias’s book, for example, has been deemed “dishonest” by David Farrell Krell in his Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life-Philosophy 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 157; while, reviewing Faye’s book Thomas Sheehan wonders “whether Faye is a fraud or 
simply incompetent”. Thomas Sheehan, ‘Emmanuel Faye: The Introduction of Fraud Into Philosophy?’ Philosophy Today, 59/3 (2015), 367-
400, p. 367. 
46 Richard Rorty, ‘Philosophy as Science, Metaphor, Politics’ [1986], Essays on Heidegger and others: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 9-26, p. 19n27. 
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measure up to his own philosophy; in effect he betrayed his project.”47 Similarly, Edwards has written 
that 
none of this … should make the slightest difference to our judgement of Heidegger’s philosophy … We simply have to 
realise that, whether we like it or not, greatness in philosophy can no more be correlated with decency and kindness 
than greatness in mathematics or microbiology.48 
The debate is far from over, and after the recent publication of the first batch of Heidegger’s 
Black Notebooks, called like this after the black oilcloth booklets into which Heidegger transcribed his 
thoughts, it will certainly be rekindled.49 These Black Notebooks —full as they are of anti-Semitic 
slander—span, as Ingo Farin and Jeff Malpas explain, the years from 1931 to 1941. It is believed that 
there are in total some 34 to 36 such notebooks, the last of which were written in the early 1970s.50 
An English translation of the texts covering the years 1931 to 1938 has just been published.51  
Writing in 1992 about Heidegger’s silence in connection to Nazism’s crimes and the Holocaust, 
David Farrell Krell was unequivocal: 
His silence concerning the fate of European Jewry between 1933 and 1945 is a failure of thinking, ein Versagen des 
Denkens. More than that, worse than that, yes, but at least that. … Failure to break the silence concerning the 
Holocaust or Extermination implies a failure of the thinking itself.52 
After the publication of the Black Notebooks, Krell returns to this very question: 
To say the least, there is something about Heidegger’s silence even after the War that reflects an astonishing 
mindlessness. … The militancy of Heidegger’s nationalism which seems to be responsible for much if not all of the 
oblivion, is truly disconcerting. … No reader of Heidegger can or should be able to make his or her peace with 
Heidegger’s (or their own) nationalism, militancy, and decisionism.53 
Krell might be onto something when he notes that the “odd alternating current of piety and polemic” 
sometimes evident in Heidegger’s work of the period needs to be understood in what he calls  
                                                          
47 Jorge Alemán and Sergio Larriera, Desde Lacan : Heidegger (Málaga: Miguel Gómez Ediciones 2009), p. 10 (my translation). 
48 Edwards, Heidegger's Confusions, p. 15. For a similar conclusion see T. Sheehan’s remarks in Sheehan, Making Sense, pp. 272-275. 
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Heidegger’s paranoetic thinking. Not paranoid thinking, inasmuch as there here there is no being, no Seiendes, to be 
feared and hated. … Not paranoid thinking inasmuch as in Heidegger’s case there is no being that can be sought out 
and blamed for the unspeakable catastrophe that is about to advene.54 
This is a situation “worse than paranoia,” Krell argues, in which “no one and no thing is to blame, but 
only beyng.”55 Whether he is right, I cannot say. But I find myself in agreement with his conclusion:  
The perplexing, and even disconcerting fact is that Heidegger did an extraordinary amount of serious work precisely 
at the time he was jotting polemics, lamentations, and pieties into his Black Notebooks. … It would be a terrible thing 
were this kind of serious work to lose its standing because of the Notebooks.56 
The case remains that Heidegger has done an extraordinary amount of serious work. As Joshua 
Rothman concedes, “it’s impossible to disavow” this work; “it is too useful, and too influential, to be 
marginalized.”57 
 
The method: Phenomenology 
At the end of the 19th century, the German philosopher Franz Brentano was studying the human mind 
in the context of its intentionality. For Brentano, psychology’s focus of study should not be the mind’s 
contents but rather its acts. He thought that in any psychical phenomenon there is a direction of the 
mind to its objects, and he considered this to be the mind’s inherent intentionality.58 One of Brentano’s 
students, Edmund Husserl, took the idea of intentionality and made it the starting point for a 
philosophy of consciousness that would be structured with scientific rigorousness. According to 
Husserl’s maxim, “we must go back to the things themselves”59; by this he meant that any philosophy 
of consciousness cannot but focus on the objects that this consciousness is intending towards and to 
its ways of operation. For Husserl, the objects that appear to consciousness (a thing, a memory, a 
feeling, a desire) are “phenomena”; accordingly, their study should be called phenomenology.60 
The term “phenomenology” came to prominence because of Husserl, but he did not invent it. It 
had started appearing in philosophical texts in the 18th century and was used by philosophers such as 
Kant, who has given the title “Phenomenology” to a section of his 1786 book Metaphysical Foundations 
of Natural Science, and Hegel, who had used it in the title of Phenomenology of Spirit written in 1807.61 
The method of Husserl’s phenomenology was to arrest consciousness at its intentional acts by putting 
in “brackets”, as he described it, both the intentional acts as such and the intended objects. He called 
                                                          
54 Daimon Life, p. 199. 
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this adopting the phenomenological attitude. The condition of being bracketed was called epoche (in 
Greek: εποχή), i.e., suspension (in this case, suspension of intentionality).62 
Heidegger was one of Husserl’s students and was, for a period, thought of as his successor. 
Heidegger had come to Husserl through Brentano. His thought was oriented to questions of ontology 
and, more specifically, to the question of being. As he explained, he was introduced to the question by 
reading Brentano’s 1862 dissertation, On the Manifold Sense of Being in Aristotle.63 He understood 
that the concept of a consciousness which tends itself towards objects was not adequate to answer 
the questions in which he was more interested. He realised that, by focusing on consciousness and its 
intentional acts, one is inadvertently presupposing a basic structure of comporting towards entities 
that involves the assumption of a distinction between subject and object. He thought that such a 
distinction cannot withstand serious scrutiny, and, taking Husserl’s maxim—To the things themselves—
to the extreme, argued that consciousness is but one aspect of the human being’s engagement with 
the world. 
Heidegger’s phenomenology was not identical to Husserl’s. Like Husserl, Heidegger too called 
for a return to the things themselves, but for him this call meant a return to Dasein’s primordial 
understanding of being. He disagreed with Husserl’s phenomenology, which takes consciousness and 
its objects as its starting point. For Heidegger, consciousness is not—and cannot be—a primary 
concept. 
To highlight this different understanding, Heidegger dedicated a specific section of Being and 
Time in order to introduce it properly.64 He took the two terms that comprise the term, “phenomenon” 
and “logos”, and traced them back to their ancient Greek origins. Phenomenon (in Greek: φαινόμενον) 
is that which shows itself, the manifest. And far from being what we cursorily call “discourse”, “ratio”, 
“reason”, etc., logos (in Greek: λόγος) in its original sense means, according to Heidegger, to make 
manifest that what is being talked about.65 Thus, for Heidegger, the term “phenomenology”, instead 
of being simply the name of one school of philosophy amongst many, was taken to mean “to let that 
which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself.”66 The 
phenomenological method of investigation was, for Heidegger, an attempt to observe and study (“to 
let be seen”) what is there to observe and study (“that which shows itself”) in an unmediated way 
(“from itself”) without any presuppositions such as the existence of an observing, subjective position, 
or a differentiation between a subject and an object (“in the very way in which it shows itself”). 
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Ontological difference 
In contrast to Husserl’s phenomenology, which was concerned with the study of consciousness in its 
various intentional acts, Heidegger’s variety purported to study nothing less than the comportment of 
human being—Dasein—towards being, the historicity and meaning of being, and the difference 
between being as such and the various beings that Dasein might encounter in its world. Heidegger 
dubbed it ontological difference and explained: 
Ontic and ontological truth each concern, in different ways, beings in their being, and being of beings. They belong 
essentially together on the grounds of their relation to the distinction between being and beings (ontological 
difference).67  
The ontological difference is of crucial importance, as Heidegger’s whole project depends on it: 
The possibility of ontology, of philosophy as a science, stands and falls with the possibility of a sufficiently clear 
accomplishment of this differentiation between being and beings and accordingly with the possibility of negotiating 
the passage from the ontical consideration of beings to the ontological thematisation of being.68 
Heidegger distinguished between a narrow and a wider sense of the ontological difference: The 
narrow one is related to the difference of beings from their own being, i.e., in terms of their whatness 
and howness, and is equivalent in some way to the traditional questions of metaphysics; the wider 
one, Heidegger’s original contribution, so to speak, is related to discerning the difference of beings, 
and their own being, from being as such.69 It is this wider sense that makes it possible to see what is at 
stake when the question of being is considered: namely, the passage from an ontic engagement with 
entities which vaguely concern us to a proper thematisation, as he calls it, of this engagement as an 
ontological question of being as such and it is in this sense that it is regularly misunderstood. 
The confusion might be accentuated by the fact that some entities, or structures can be seen as 
both ontic and ontological. These are either entities which Dasein encounters as ontic entities, but 
which indicate the ontological structure in which they belong, forming part of a circle of understanding, 
as Heidegger puts it, such as signs; or structures of Dasein’s engagement with entities, which have both 
ontic and ontological aspects, such as care.70 The ontological difference is not a difference in degree of 
some quality—say a difference in the degree of abstraction. There is no continuum between the ontic 
and the ontological aspect of an entity or structure. One could picture it more like a rupture between 
two levels of engagement (or involvement, or reference), each of the two facilitated by the other, but 
with no continuity or communication between them. 
 
Dasein and being-in-the-world 
Heidegger’s exploration of the question of being begins with the observation that even though this 
question seems to be crucial, its importance slips away as soon as we stop keeping it clearly in focus. 
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However, we humans do have an understanding of being even before it occurs to us that there is a 
question at all; if that was not so—i.e., if we did not have such an understanding—we would be 
oblivious to the whole issue. In fact, we don’t even have a choice in that matter, because for as long 
as and as soon as we find ourselves in the world, being has already made itself understood by us. It is 
revealed to us in a most intimate and yet elusive way: in our dealings with other humans and with the 
other entities in the world, in our bodily existence, in our conception of ourselves and of others, in all 
aspects of our life, being is already there. But being is not a being, it’s not an entity (ontological 
difference); it is that which makes our comportment to entities, to other beings—human or not—
possible. “The question of the meaning of being becomes possible at all only if there is something like 
an understanding of being. Understanding of being belongs to the kind of being which the entity called 
‘Dasein’ possesses.”71 In other words, this question is tantamount to the question of explicating this 
originary understanding of being. 
In his study, his “analytic”, as he called it,72 Heidegger employed two crucial concepts. The first 
was Dasein, which we have already encountered. The term comes from the German adverb “da”, 
there, and the infinitive “Sein”, to be, or being. It was sometimes translated as there-being, but 
nowadays it is commonly left untranslated, written as a single word (Dasein) or hyphenated (Da-sein) 
to stress the original, spatial sense of the term.73 Dasein is sometimes understood as a synonym of 
“human being”, and in a way it is; it is, however, a human being seen in its being-human, i.e., not a 
specific human being, but a human being as such, in its bodily existence, in its engagement with the 
world, in its history. In Being and Time Heidegger introduces Dasein as “this entity, which each of us is 
himself, and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its being.”74 He does not use the 
term to denote some special kind of human engagement with the world. “Dasein” is just a technical 
term that describes what we are, each and every one of us, at any given moment.75 
The second concept was being-in-the-world. For Heidegger, the notion of a world conceived 
somehow as a container of entities—the earth, the sky, rocks and rivers, plants and animals, human 
beings—is nonsensical. The world does not contain things; the world is all these things and all these 
things are the world, in a fundamental sense. The human being qua Dasein cannot but be-in-the-world. 
As Heidegger explains, “The compound expression ‘Being-in-the-world’ indicates, in the very way we 
have coined it, that it stands for a unitary phenomenon. This primary datum must be seen as a 
whole.”76 Dasein cannot but be conceived in its being-in-the-world. We are in the world in the most 
complete sense of the verb “to be”. We are in the world and this cannot but be so. The world is 
revealed to us in our purposeful engagement with it, not as something that we choose to inhabit, nor 
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as something that we may choose to observe: “Subject and Object do not coincide with Dasein and the 
world.”77 
Dasein and being-in-the-world are equiprimordial. Both of them reveal themselves to be 
relevant to our investigation when we attempt to consider our engagement with the world as it is. One 
might choose to subscribe to a “scientific” point of view, according to which the world can be thought 
of as an environment of objects that a human being approaches as an observing subject; but as soon 
as one tries to question these concepts a bit further, one can see that terms such as “subject”, “object”, 
“consciousness”, and “observation” already include a primordial understanding of what is at stake—
here, that a world of subjects, and objects, and observations has already been revealed before one can 
even conceive of or subscribe to a “scientific” point of view. As Hubert Dreyfus points out, we should 
not make the “Cartesian” mistake, which many readers of Heidegger make, of thinking “of Dasein as a 
conscious subject.”78 Heidegger, too, refers to this explicitly: “One of our first tasks will be to prove 
that if we posit an ‘I’ or subject as that which is proximally given, we shall completely miss the 
phenomenal content of Dasein.”79 
Dreyfus emphasises that “Heidegger holds that all relations of mental states to their objects 
presuppose a more basic form of being-with-things that does not involve mental [i.e., conscious] 
activity.”80 It is only because Dasein has a primordial openness to being that concepts such as 
consciousness can be formulated. Similarly, the structure described as being-in-the-world is 
understood as more primordial to “world” or to “beings” of this world.81 
In connection to this, Richard Polt writes that “the question of being is deeper than the question 
of knowing. Ontology precedes epistemology.”82 But this, strictly speaking, is not the case: both 
concepts, epistemology and ontology, belong in, and obtain their content from, a tradition of 
metaphysics that Heidegger wants to “destroy”. Traditional ontology—which can be defined as the 
study of being—studies beings in their respective regions, rather than in the fundamental manner that 
Heidegger demands. Neither ontology nor epistemology would be possible without the primordial 
revelation of being that Heidegger postulates. “Phenomenology is our way of access to what is to be 
the theme of ontology, and it is our way of giving it demonstrative precision. Only as phenomenology, 
is ontology possible.”83 And elsewhere he clarifies further: “Fundamental ontology, from which alone 
all other ontologies can take their rise, must be sought in the existential [i.e., ontological] analytic of 
Dasein.”84 
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Existence, concern, care 
Heidegger used the term existence to denote “that kind of being towards which Dasein can comport 
itself in one way or another, and always does comport itself somehow,”85 and constructed two 
adjectives that pertain to this term and reflect the ontological difference: The term existential pertains 
to existence as Dasein’s way of being (i.e., its scope is ontological), while the term existentiell pertains 
to some particular Dasein’s ontical issues (i.e., its scope is ontic).86 Dasein 
takes priority over all other entities in several ways. The first priority is an ontical one: Dasein is an entity whose being 
has the determinate character of existence. The second priority is an ontological one: Dasein is in itself ‘ontological’, 
because existence is thus determinative for it.87  
The term “existence” is understood here in a far narrower sense than in traditional metaphysics, where 
the existence of an entity is contrasted to its essence. The Heideggerian term applies only to Dasein: 
“The term ‘existence’, as a designation of being, will be allotted solely to Dasein. The essence of Dasein 
lies in its existence.”88 To stress this, and to highlight Dasein’s openness to being, Heidegger sometimes 
writes “ex-sistence” or “ek-sistence”. As Joseph Kockelmans explains, 
this term, [ek-sistence] is to be understood to mean ‘to ek-sist’: ‘to stand out’. Man … is an ek-sisting subject that 
places itself outside itself in the world; he ‘stands out toward’ the things in the world and the world itself. … Ek-sistent 
man is essentially a worldly reality that ‘gives meaning’.89 
So, Dasein, finds itself involved in a world that is opened to it by its comportment towards beings. 
For Dasein, to exist is to be-in-the-world; upon this primordial “concerned dwelling”, Dasein founds its 
knowledge and belief.90 But establishing knowledge and forming beliefs are not our primary attitudes 
towards the world. The primary one is our concernful comportment towards the beings we encounter. 
Heidegger uses the term “care” (in German: Sorge) to denote exactly this: “Being-in-the-world is 
essentially care.” And further down in the text: “Care, as a primordial structural totality, lies ‘before’ 
every factical ‘attitude’ and ‘situation’ of Dasein, and it does so existentially a priori; this means that it 
always lies in them.”91 
For Heidegger, it is very important to stress that the term “care” should not be understood in 
connection to something that Dasein is concerned about or “cares” for. 
Existence’s basic kind of being is to be concerned for its being, and this basic kind of being is understood as care. 
Insofar as existence is essentially being-in-the world, care is co-originally concern. And insofar as existence is being-
with-others, existence’s basic of being is likewise concern-for. Being concerned about and being concerned-for are 
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constitutive of care, and when we abbreviate and use just the term ‘care’ in our explanations, it must be properly 
meant and concretely understood as care that is concerned about and concerned-for. … This makes it clear that the 
basic structure of our existence, which we abbreviate as ‘care’, encompasses a multitude of phenomena and that we 
have not come up a simple phenomenon with a simple structure on which the rest are built. Rather, just as being-in-
the world, being-with-others, and being-concerned-for-ourselves are all constitutive of existence, so too the 
ontological meaning of these comportments are co-original.92 
Admittedly, care is one of those of Heideggerian concepts whose ontological aspect can be easily 
overlooked or misconstrued. The word care itself, especially in English, has connotations of affection 
and compassion, and leaves room for an ontic reading according to which Dasein’s comportment to 
the world is somehow dependent on a human being’s regard or sympathy for others.93 Such a reading 
would be very far from Heidegger’s intention, failing, as it does, to heed to its primarily ontological 
focus; perhaps unsurprisingly, however, it is rather common. 
 
Truth as unconcealment  
The Heideggerian conceptualisation of the human being as “the ‘open space’ or clearing within which 
the meaningful presence of things can occur”94 and of consciousness as a corollary of a primordial 
openness to being brings the question of truth to the fore. According to Heidegger, traditional views 
concerning truth are characterised by three “theses”:  
(1) that the ‘locus’ of truth is assertion (judgment); (2) that the essence of truth lies in the ‘agreement’ of the judgment 
with its object; (3) that Aristotle, the father of logic, not only has assigned truth to the judgment as its primordial 
locus but has set going the definition of ‘truth’ as ‘agreement’.95 
Using slightly more up-to-date language, we could say that traditional views concerning truth 
always involve an observing intellect; one or more observable states of affairs; some kind of language 
in which statements can be pronounced; and a procedure for deciding the truth value of a valid 
statement in that language by assessing the degree of correspondence between the statement and a 
given state of affairs. 
In effect, this is a somewhat simplified form of Alfred Tarski’s theory of truth. Tarski, a Polish 
logician and mathematician, had developed this semantic conception of truth by drawing on Aristotle’s 
insights, and also on the medieval view of truth as the correspondence of a thing to the intellect.96 
Tarski introduced a distinction between an object language (containing statements where some state 
of affairs is described or postulated) and a metalanguage, which contains statements about the first.97 
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So, to give an example, one might have a statement such as, for example, “the cat is on the mat,” and 
one can decide its truth value by checking its correspondence to “reality”: Is the cat on the mat? Yes: 
Then the statement is true. No, it’s not: Then the statement is not true. In short: “‘The cat is on the 
mat’ is true if and only if the cat is on the mat.” 
How can one judge whether a cat is on a mat? Or, more generally, how can one wonder about 
any state of affairs if the state of affairs in question is not already available to one’s observing powers? 
And who or what can reassure us that one’s judgements about a state of affairs are faithful and 
correct?  
These are the questions that interest Heidegger: a question regarding observation, and a 
question regarding certainty. Addressing the second one, he observes that there are two possibilities 
here. It’s either our intellect, which is conceived as a subject vis-à-vis objects and has the ability to 
judge if knowledge conforms to objects; or a divine Creator, who has created all worldly matters 
according to preconceived ideas in its divine intellect—which are thought as gauges of correctness or 
truth. Heidegger points out that the latter corresponds to the medieval conception of truth as 
correspondence (“veritas est adaequatio intellectus ad rem”—truth is the correspondence of intellect 
to thing); while the former is the Cartesian conception of truth, in the form given to it by Kant.98 
With regard to the first question, it pertains to our being able to observe the state of affairs in 
question and to wonder about it. Taking up again the example of the cat on the mat, one would need 
to know beforehand what a cat is, what a mat is, and what it is for a cat to be on a mat. Moreover, one 
needs a meaningful language in which these observations can be expressed as statements. As Mark 
Wrathall writes, 
there is a necessary connection between our understanding of truth and the way beings are present to our 
understanding. But … the relationship between being and truth cannot be explained by existing correspondence 
theories because we only recognise the correspondence relation between a statement and things in the world 
posterior to our relating the statement to the world through our ‘comportment’.99 
In other words, the veracity or truth value of statements is indeed judged by probing their 
correspondence to the state of affairs that these statements pertain to, but there must have been 
something in place already. For Heidegger, that “something” is a primordial disclosure of being. He 
asserts that the foundation of “truth” is not the correspondence of statements to a state of affairs, but 
what he calls the disclosure (or uncovering) of being to Dasein: 
‘Truth’ is not a feature of correct propositions that are asserted of an ‘object’ by a human ‘subject’ and then ‘are valid’ 
somewhere, in what sphere we know not; rather, truth is disclosure of beings through which an openness essentially 
unfolds.100 
Heidegger draws our attention to the fact that the term “truth” (in Latin: veritas) is a misled 
attempt to translate the original ancient Greek concept of aletheia (in Greek: αλήθεια). He argues that 
the ancient Greek philosophers, at least before Plato, were able to see that “truth” qua aletheia is 
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founded on the removal (α-) of lethe or forgetfulness (in Greek: λήθη).101 This conception of truth 
implied that there was an initial state where things would present themselves as they are, followed by 
a state where this understanding of how things are has been concealed or forgotten; a-letheia would 
be a state of unconcealment, where forgetfulness is removed and things present themselves again as 
they are. 
Dasein, as constituted by disclosedness, is essentially in the truth. Disclosedness is a kind of being which is essential 
to Dasein. ‘There is’ truth only in so far as Dasein is and so long as Dasein is. Entities are uncovered only when Dasein 
is; and only as long as Dasein is, are they disclosed.102 
This conception of truth captures more concretely the phenomenon of Dasein’s openness of 
comportment towards being. Things present themselves to Dasein as they are insofar as Dasein has 
already had a primordial understanding of being. Truth qua a-letheia is much more basic (in the sense 
of fundamental) than truth thought of as correspondence between a statement and a state of affairs: 
“If the correctness (truth) of statements becomes possible only through this openness of 
comportment, then what first makes correctness possible must with more original legitimacy be taken 
as the essence of truth.”103 According to Heidegger, this insight of the Greeks has been disregarded. In 
Wrathall’s words, “[Heidegger’s] account of unconcealment is meant not as a definition of truth, but 
rather as an explanation of what makes it possible for propositions to point to the world in just the 
way the world is.”104 
Rorty reads Heidegger’s conception of truth qua aletheia as Heidegger’s attempt to overcome 
the doctrines of Plato and Descartes, who sought to find certainty and clarity in one’s “powerful, 
penetrating, deep insights or arguments—insights or arguments which will put [one] in a commanding 
position vis-à-vis something or somebody else.” According to Rorty, Heidegger is attempting to show 
that truth, i.e. being, “is there only as long as we are here. The relations between it and us are not 
power relations. Rather, they are relations of fragile and tentative codependence.”105 
It might appear here as if Heidegger’s problematic echoes the problematic of modern 
mathematics—whereby truth, in the sense of the truth value of statements (i.e., their veracity or 
correctness), is distinguished from truth in the sense of the framework in which statements can have 
a truth value (i.e., what Heidegger understood as aletheia). This would be a version of Tarski’s theory 
of truth, which in turn draws on medieval and Aristotelian concepts. For Heidegger, however, both 
truth qua correctness and truth qua aletheia are seen as being on the same level of comportment, and 
not on different levels, as in Tarski’s theory—in which the one is the meta-level of the other. In other 
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words, the ontological difference does not correspond to the difference between language and meta-
language. 106 
The question, however, is now this: if the essence of truth is that of unconcealment or 
revelation, and not of correspondence, what is the origin of this revelation? For Heidegger, this is but 
another form of the question of being. Discussing truth (qua aletheia) as revelation is tantamount to 
discussing Dasein’s comportment to being. “Being-true, as being-uncovering, is in turn ontologically 
possible only on the basis of Being-in-the-world. This latter phenomenon, which we have known as a 
basic state of Dasein, is the foundation for the primordial phenomenon of truth.”107 It follows from this 
that “being (not entities) is something which ‘there is’ only in so far as truth is. And truth is only insofar 
as and as long as Dasein is. Being and truth ‘are’ equiprimordially.”108 Heidegger’s question, then, takes 
this form: How is it at all possible for Dasein to have a primordial understanding of being? 
 
The world, and beings in the world 
In its everyday concernful dwelling in the world, Dasein encounters a multitude of entities. This is not 
a matter of choice: it’s a fundamental structure of being-in-the-world. As Heidegger explains, “we 
understand ourselves and our existence by way of the activities we pursue and the things we take care 
of. We understand ourselves by starting from them because the Dasein finds itself primarily in 
things.”109 
The entities that Dasein encounters are of different kinds. Dasein may encounter other human 
beings; it may encounter animals, plants, or other living creatures; it may encounter entities of the 
physical world that can perhaps be touched, held, and observed closely; it may also encounter other 
entities of the physical world that can only be observed from a distance, such as the sun, the moon, 
the stars; it may also encounter intangible entities, such as a sound; or entities of human origin, such 
as a tool, a piece of cloth; or intangible (or immaterial) entities, such as a feeling, a sentiment, an 
illusion, or a memory. The list could go on and on, because it must contain anything and everything 
that is encounterable by Dasein in the world. From this alone, namely the vast multitude of the beings 
that can be encountered by Dasein, it follows that beings qua entities do not share the same kind of 
being. With regard to Dasein, a stone has a different kind of being from a tree, and both are beings of 
a different kind in comparison to, say, a human being, a computer keyboard, or a work of art. 
In Being and Time Heidegger considers two main categories of beings or entities: human beings 
(i.e., Dasein) and nonhuman beings. He chooses not to speak about other kinds of entities (for example, 
animals, cultural artefacts, works of art) because his objective is not to provide an exhaustive catalogue 
of all possible kinds of being, but rather “to provide a preliminary characterization of the phenomenon 
of world by interpreting the way in which we at first and for the most part move about in our everyday 
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world.”110 Heidegger wants to make explicit two crucial differences. The first is the difference between 
human beings and all other kinds of entities; the second is the difference between entities that Dasein 
can use, which he calls ready-to-hand (in German: vorhanden); and entities that Dasein encounters in 
its dwelling in the world, which he describes as present-at-hand (in German: zuhanden).111 Ready-to-
hand entities are available to be employed in some way—for example, a hammer, a piece of clothing, 
a house. This is in contrast to present-at-hand entities, which are just encountered in their presence—
for example, a rock or the broken branch of a tree.112 
In order to make this contrast more clear, Heidegger gives to everything that Dasein encounters 
in concern the collective name of equipment (in German: Zeug). He clarifies: “Taken strictly, there ‘is’ 
no such thing as an equipment. To the being of any equipment there always belongs a totality of 
equipment, in which it can be this equipment that it is. Equipment is essentially ‘something in-order-
to…’.”113 What this means is simply that all equipment exists in reference to other equipment, in a 
network of interconnections and dependencies that allows each and every entity that is equipment to 
be what it is. For example a pen, together with ink and paper and writing surfaces and chairs, etc, all 
belong to an equipmental whole that makes writing possible. In general, Dasein uses equipment for 
something; for example, the pen is used for writing. Equipment always has an in-order-to and cannot 
be thought of without it. 
Dasein is in-the-world and cannot but be so—but, also, a world is formed by Dasein, in its 
concernful dealings with it. This is not a meta-world: it does not exist parallel to some other world that 
could be thought of as more “real”, or as world proper. In more than one sense, Dasein’s world is the 
only world that Dasein can occupy, a world that is collectively formed and shared with all other human 
beings. It is the world that Dasein has. “But then”, Heidegger asks, 
what about the other beings which, like man, are also part of the world: the animals and plants, the material things 
like the stone, for example? Are they merely parts of the world, as distinct from man who in addition has world? Or 
does the animal too have world, and if so, in what way? In the same way as man, or in some other way? And how 
would we grasp this otherness? And what about the stone? However crudely, certain distinctions immediately 
manifest themselves here. We can formulate these distinctions in the following three theses: [1.] the stone (material 
object) is worldless; [2.] the animal is poor in world; [3.] man is world-forming.114 
These distinctions allow Heidegger to focus on the “specific relation that stone, animal, and man in 
each case has toward world. The distinctions in respect of this relation, or in the absence of such a 
relation, will help to set in relief what we call world.”115 
 
                                                          
110 The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude [1929-30], trans. William Mcneill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington: 
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From signs to language 
From the general conception of equipment as something that has an in-order-to, Heidegger proceeds 
to identify one specific kind of equipment whose in-order-to is to act as a reference to other 
equipment. This he calls sign. 
A sign is not a Thing which stands to another Thing in the relation of indicating; it’s rather an item of equipment which 
explicitly raises a totality of equipment into our circumspection so that together with it the worldly character of the 
ready-to-hand announces itself.116 
To put it a different way, a sign is not only an entity which is ready-to-hand, such as a hammer or a 
pen, but also a special kind of equipment; the sign not only indicates that other entities are equipment 
too, but also, by being a sign, allows the equipmentality of equipment to announce itself. “A sign is 
something ontically ready-to-hand which functions both as this definite equipment and as something 
indicative of the ontological structure of readiness-to-hand, of referential totalities, and of 
worldhood.”117  
By saying that the sign is ontically ready-to-hand and adding that it indicates the ontological 
structure of readiness-to-hand, Heidegger draws a distinction between an entity, as such, and our 
understanding—or our being able to form an understanding—of entities as such. It is one thing to see 
an entity as ready-to-hand (an ontic observation) and quite another to see that entities can be ready-
to-hand (an ontological insight). He maintains, in general, that if Dasein did not already have a general 
primordial understanding of being, beings would be unintelligible to Dasein. But Dasein is caught up in 
its concernful comportment towards the specific beings it encounters and forgets its primordial 
understanding of being.  
That which remains hidden in an egregious sense, or which relapses and gets covered up again, or which shows itself 
only ‘in disguise’, is not just this entity or that, but rather the Being of entities, as our previous observations have 
shown. This being can be covered up so extensively that it becomes forgotten and no question arises about it or about 
its meaning.118 
Since signs are, in fact, equipment, they all belong to an equipmental whole, which too is pointed 
to by significance. In other words, significance (the fact that there are signs, i.e., entities that point to 
other entities as ready-to-hand) reveals a referential totality, a world: 
The ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ signifies an ‘in-order-to’; this in turn, a ‘towards-this’; the latter, an ‘in-which’ of letting 
something be involved; and that, in turn, the ‘with-which’ of an involvement. These relationships are bound up with 
one another as a primordial totality; they are what they are as this signifying in which Dasein gives itself beforehand 
its Being-in-the-world as something to be understood. The relational totality of this signifying we call ‘significance’. 
This is what makes up the structure of the world—the structure of that wherein Dasein as such already is.119 
So, in Heidegger’s conception, signs are special entities, in that they are ontic and ontological at the 
same time. They are ontic in that they exist as specific entities in this world and ontological in that they 
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point to significance as such—just like being, which is not itself an entity, significance is not itself a sign 
either but rather that which makes signs possible. 
Heidegger’s conception of the sign can be read in parallel to that of the American philosopher, 
logician, mathematician, scientist, and founder of Pragmatism, Charles Sanders Peirce. Peirce had 
spoken extensively about signs, defining them as “something which stands to somebody for something 
in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an 
equivalent sign or perhaps a more developed sign.”120 In other words, for Peirce the sign not only 
represents something but also brings up other signs for anyone who can think of them as being 
meaningful in any way.121  
Language is a system of signs too. Words are entities ready-to-hand; they share the ontological 
characteristics of signs, and as such they reveal the ontological structure of their referential totality, 
that is, of a world. This world is a symbolically articulated world in which Dasein finds itself immersed. 
It is important to remember that this world is related to but not identical with the world which Dasein 
finds itself being-in; however, the two worlds, the symbolically articulated one and the one in which 
Dasein is being-in, are almost always confused and taken as one. It is because of this confusion that 
modern human beings tend to conceive being-in-the-world as a relationship between a subject and 
objects: because they tend to see the symbolically articulated world (which consists of references to 
entities ready-to-hand) as identical to the “world” part of the structure “being-in-the-world”. For 
Dasein, it’s not clear what kind of relationship exists between them. This question is obscured, just as 
the originary meaning of being was. 
At this point, one might notice that the argument entails again a certain circularity. Language, 
after all, is created by humans for whom being was, presumably, already an issue. How can it be that 
language allows being to become an issue? Arguments like this reveal a confusion between the ontic 
and the ontological character of language and a difficulty in seeing how Heidegger’s circle of 
understanding operates.122 Heidegger considers circularity an important stage in a study of first 
principles, and he insists that it is an indispensable element of philosophical reasoning. An argument 
against circularity, he says, 
misses the decisive issue here, which is an insight into the centre of the circle as such, an insight made possible in 
such a circling movement and in this alone. For the centre only manifests itself as such as we circle around it. And this 
is why every attempt to argue away such circularity in philosophy only leads us away from philosophy itself.123  
In connection to language it’s not difficult to see that this apparent circularity is a product of the 
confusion between two different axes of reference and disappears as soon as the confusion is clarified. 
The first axis of reference is that of the individual human being—we could call it the “synchronic axis”. 
For each and every human being, each and every one of us, language is what discloses and reveals 
being. However, it’s only after we are within language that we can see human beings in their historical 
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dimension or historicity—which we could call the “diachronic axis”. In other words, the historicity of 
the human being, and that of language, become an issue for an individual only after language has 
revealed being to this particular individual; language as such antecedes the individual.124 
Heidegger is not interested in the origins of language as such, a question that can be readily 
thought of as ontic. It is of course important that language be ontically available, because only then 
can being be thematised. But this is a sort of a virtuous circle, an upwards spiral: Language allows being 
to be thematised, and being makes thinking possible. As Pöggeler explains, “The final paradox of this 
thought’s circular but never ultimately terminated movement lies in this, that the emergence of the 
historicity of thought itself happens historically.”125 Or, in Heidegger’s words: “Language makes 
manifest. … It does not produce … discoveredness. Rather, discoveredness and its enactment of being 
… are conditions of possibility for something becoming manifest”.126 
Critics of Heidegger’s position on language, like Cristina Lafont, argue that Heidegger commits 
“to the generalized primacy of equipment [and] retains the conception of language as a tool.”127 
Heidegger contradicts himself, according to Lafont, because he is holding the very position that he sets 
out to destroy, i.e., he sees language as an ontic instrument which, as she writes, can supposedly be 
used “for the designation of entities independent of it, or for the communication of pre-linguistic 
thoughts.”128 She grants however that in his later writings Heidegger overcomes the inconsistency, but 
at a cost: “The world-disclosure that is contained in a given language … is itself not open to revision on 
the basis of intraworldly experience and therefore cannot be understood as co-determined by our 
processes of learning.”129 
In my view, Lafont misses the point: Dasein encounters language “factually”, as an ontic 
instrument, but this encounter is only possible because being is already understood via language’s 
ontological character. Moreover, the world disclosed by language is not an unmovable and unshakable 
structure of relations and references; rather it is a network of potentialities within which Dasein maps 
out its own trajectory in freedom. As Heidegger explains,  
with Dasein’s factical existence, entities within-the-world are already encountered too. The fact that such entities are 
discovered along with Dasein's own ‘there’ of existence, is not left to Dasein's discretion. Only what it discovers and 
discloses on occasion, in what direction it does so, how and how far it does so—only these are matters for Dasein's 
freedom, even if always within the limitations of its thrownness.130 
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Being-with others, authenticity, the “they” 
If a totality of interconnected references and dependences is revealed qua world to Dasein through 
language, and if entities, other than human beings, that are encountered are described as either ready-
to-hand or present-to-hand, a question arises regarding other human beings. 
Heidegger argues that everything that Dasein experiences in its world is shared with other 
human beings in this world, not only in the ontic sense that equipment or other entities can—and 
will—be shared, but also in the sense that the referential totality of the world, as revealed by language, 
as well as language itself, both ontically and ontologically, are themselves shared: “They are there too, 
and there with it [Dasein] … The world of Dasein is a with-world. Being-in is being-with Others. Their 
being-in-themselves within-the-world is Dasein-with [in German: Mitdasein].”131 He stresses that when 
other people are encountered by Dasein, they are not encountered as objects, which would then need 
to be recognised by Dasein as beings similar to itself. Rather, they are encountered as being-there, 
together with Dasein, in the world in which they all dwell.  
They are not encountered by first looking at oneself and then ascertaining the opposite pole of a distinction. They are 
encountered from the world in which Dasein, heedful and circumspect, essentially dwells. As opposed to the 
theoretically concocted ‘explanations’ of the objective presence of others, which easily urge themselves upon us, we 
must hold fast to the phenomenal fact which we have indicated of their being encountered in the surrounding 
world.132 
The distinction between self and others, between I and You, is for Heidegger not a primordial one; it 
does not belong structurally to Dasein’s being-in-the-world and being-with others. 
This point was contested by Jean-Paul Sartre. In his Being and Nothingness, he argued that 
the ontological co-existence which appears as the structure of ‘being-in-the-world’ can in no way serve as a 
foundation to an ontic being-with … The relation of the MitSein can be of absolutely no use to us in resolving the 
psychological, concrete problem of the recognition of the Other. There are two incommunicable levels and two 
problems which demand separate solutions. 
It may be said that this is only one of the difficulties which Heidegger encounters in passing in general from the 
ontological level to the ontic level.133 
The existence of an ontological, and hence a priori, ‘being-with’ renders impossible all ontic connection with a 
concrete human-reality.134  
In my view, Sartre’s criticism reveals a limitation of his understanding of Heidegger’s project. At 
the risk of stating the obvious, one needs to remember that Heidegger’s method is phenomenological 
and not deductive. This means to say that the ontological difference can only be recognised as a result 
of the enquiry regarding the meaning of being—the very task undertaken in Being and Time. It is not 
a premise from which everything else follows. Therefore is absolutely not valid to speak about a 
“passing” from an ontological to an ontic level, as Sartre claims. It’s not the case that such passing is 
impossible, or not well thought, or not conceivable; but rather because it’s antinomic to the project 
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undertaken by Heidegger. In this connection, Tom Rockmore has criticised Sartre for “his superficial 
reading of Heidegger’s thought” and attributes Sartre’s “near total eclipse in France at present … to 
his loss of the philosophical battle with Heidegger for influence in the philosophical discussion.”135 
Be it as it may, Robert Bernasconi writes that in 1945 Heidegger had privately indicated that he 
accepted Sartre’s critique of the account of MitSein. It also seems that Sartre’s appreciation of 
Heidegger’s early philosophy deepened as his own thinking developed.136   
Nonetheless, Sartre’s argument brings up a separate and important question, regarding the 
recognition of the Other, which, as we will see, will be taken up by Lacan with his introduction of the 
concept of the mirror stage.137  
Heidegger argues that, in its everyday being-with others, Dasein finds itself absorbed by them. 
The world that Dasein shares with them is a world that dictates every aspect of Dasein’s comportment 
towards the beings it reveals to it. The totality of these beings forms a kind of a public “environment” 
in which any and all non-human beings are shared, while any and all other human beings are averaged 
and indefinite: 
This being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely into the kind of being of ‘the Others’, in such a 
way, indeed, that the Others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. In this inconspicuousness and 
unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the ‘they’ is unfolded. We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they take 
pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the 
‘great mass’ as they shrink back; we find ‘shocking’ what they find shocking. The ‘they’, which is nothing definite, and 
which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of being of everydayness.138 
Having introduced the “they” (in German: das Man), Heidegger is now in a position to address 
the question of the tension between the individual and the collective. It can be recalled that Dasein is 
introduced as this kind of being which is always “mine”. And yet Dasein’s world, as disclosed to it by 
language, is always a shared world; ontologically, Dasein cannot but be-with others. If such is the case, 
what is the origin, then, of Dasein’s mineness? “Mine” as opposed to—what? Yours? Whose? 
Heidegger explores the question by identifying a distinction between what is Dasein’s own (i.e., 
“mine”) and what is shared. He employs the term “authentic” (in German: eigentlich) to designate 
what is Dasein’s own, i.e., not shared, and contrasts it to what is “inauthentic” (i.e., shared). It should 
be noted here that the English term “authentic” has certain positive connotations that do not exist in 
the German term and give the false impression that “authentic” is somehow better than 
“inauthentic”.139 This is not part of Heidegger’s intention: 
As modes of being, authenticity and inauthenticity (these expressions have been chosen terminologically in a strict 
sense) are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness. But the inauthenticity 
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of Dasein does not signify any ‘less’ being or any ‘lower’ degree of being. Rather it is the case that even in its fullest 
concretion Dasein can be characterized by inauthenticity—when busy, when excited, when interested, when ready 
for enjoyment.140 
In other words, the concept of authenticity reflects the different possibilities of Dasein’s comportment 
towards being in reference to what is Dasein’s own or shared. As an ontological concept, it reflects 
Dasein’s position in the world vis-à-vis the “they”; and as an ontic concept it refers to choice and 
freedom: “What [Dasein] discovers and discloses on occasion, in what direction it does so, how and 
how far it does so … are matters for Dasein's freedom.”141 
One of Dasein’s possibilities is revealed as the one with the utmost authenticity, i.e., one “which 
is one’s ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped”.142 This possibility is 
Death, “the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein.”143 Death, in this conjecture, is not 
conceived ontically—i.e., as the unavoidable fact of one’s demise—but ontologically. Dasein is 
fundamentally oriented in time as a being-towards-death. Death, as the possibility of an absolute 
impossibility, establishes ontologically Dasein’s finitude and provides Dasein with a trajectory and an 
end. 
 
Historicity, time, temporality 
What has been seen by now is that a symbolically articulated and shared world is revealed to Dasein 
in its concernful dwelling. It was pointed out that what makes this disclosure possible is the fact that 
there are certain entities that have an in-order-to (they are ready-to-hand and as equipment belong to 
an equipmental whole), and more specifically the fact that certain of these ready-to-hand entities are 
in-order-to signify other ready-to-hand entities (i.e., they are signs).144 
If one looks closely, one will see that this in-order-to opens up a further structure. Each in-order-
to implies a for-the-sake-of-which. This for-the-sake-of-which is something that is not yet but has been 
opened up as a possibility. For example, you may use a hammer in-order-to put a nail in the wall; this 
is done for-the-sake-of decorating the house. Still, that is not the only use of a hammer; it’s just a 
possibility. The hammer as such opens up a myriad of possibilities for Dasein; but so do all the other 
ready-to-hand entities that Dasein will encounter. This, for Heidegger, is of the utmost importance. 
Dasein comports itself towards the world at any given moment but is not restricted there; it is always 
in the world presently but pointing to a possibility of being that is not yet. In conventional terms, one 
could say that in its concernful comportment towards entities, Dasein always opens up future 
possibilities.145 
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To be opened up to possibilities of being: this is Dasein’s historicity. Dasein is historical, and with 
it the world itself is historical. Historicity, however, reveals time. In every in-order-to and for-the-sake-
of-which, what is revealed is time. Time is that which makes the structure of equipmentality possible. 
Time is also closely related to temporality, i.e., that which allows beings to “step outside” themselves 
and become temporally meaningful in the three “ex-stases”, future, present, and past.146  
The text of Being and Time ends with a question: “Does time itself manifest itself as the horizon 
of being?”147 Heidegger does not provide an explicit answer, but returns to the question again and 
again. Several years later, he writes: “Being and time determine each other reciprocally, but in such a 
manner that neither can the former—being—be addressed as something temporal nor can the latter—
time—be addressed as a being.”148 The ontic presence of beings before Dasein implies and requires 
temporality. As Safranski comments: “The meaning of being is time; but time is not a cornucopia of 
gifts, it gives us no content and no orientation. The meaning is time, but time ‘gives’ no meaning.”149 
Or, in other words, it is because there is time that being has a meaning. The meaning is given by Dasein. 
In his Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism, William Blattner has suggested that Heidegger’s 
conceptualisation of time is influenced by the transcendental idealism of Kant and, before him, of 
Leibniz and Plotinus. Blattner calls this temporal idealism, and claims that even though Heidegger used 
it in order to explain what Blattner calls the dependence of being on Dasein, Heidegger’s attempt 
fails.150 In my understanding of Heidegger’s project, this criticism does not hold. Heidegger never 
postulates being alongside Dasein: for Heidegger, Dasein can be seen as the locus (or topos) where 
being can be revealed (to Dasein); however, this is not tantamount to saying that being is dependent 
on Dasein, because such a formulation would present being as subordinated to Dasein. 
Heidegger seems to suggest that the limits of the meaning of being are given by a primordial 
time: 
But still more elemental than the circumstance that the ‘time factor’ is one that occurs in the sciences of history and 
Nature, is the fact that before Dasein does any thematical research, it ‘reckons with time’ and regulates itself 
according to it. And here again what remains decisive is Dasein's way of ‘reckoning with its time’—a way of reckoning 
which precedes any use of measuring equipment by which time can be determined. The reckoning is prior to such 
equipment, and is what makes anything like the use of clocks possible at all.151  
To put it differently, there are, as Michael Roubach explains, “three layers of time [which] are linked 
by dependency relations: ordinary time presupposes world time, and world time presupposes 
primordial temporality.”152 Obviously, when one speaks about time in this context, one does not mean 
the time of natural sciences but what is primordially revealed to Dasein together with being and the 
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world. Roubach argues that in Heidegger’s thought the framework of primordial temporality rests 
upon the concept of number and counting: 
Number links the three strata of time: primordial temporality, world time and ordinary time. That is, counting 
connects primordial temporality, which is essentially finite, to measured time, which is infinite. By virtue of this 
connection, infinite time is dependent on finite primordial time.153  
Roubach acknowledges that others do not see it that way—for example, Blattner, who, as we saw 
above, speaks about Heidegger’s temporal idealism. Roubach’s argument is convincing in that it allows 
us to understand how primordial temporality can be derived equiprimordially from Dasein’s 
comportment towards being. The additional step that is needed is provided by the event of 
appropriation. 
Apart from revealing itself as the horizon of being, time is also the horizon of Dasein. Historicity 
is only possible because of the world and Death. In a way that is vaguely similar to the way in which 
signs point ontologically to signification as such, the certainty of one’s own Death gives a foundation 
to Dasein’s historicity, a direction (or sense) to time, and points ontologically to Dasein’s possibilities. 
To put it differently, it is because there is Death that the ex-static, or historical, dimension of Dasein—
as being rooted in a past and headed towards a future—is revealed. The importance that Heidegger 
gives to Death, then, does not reflect some morbid preoccupation with the non-living on his part. Quite 
the opposite. Death is what provides an ontological foundation for Dasein’s authenticity and Dasein’s 
possibilities, in terms of that for-the-sake-of-which Dasein is orienting itself. Indeed, one could say that 
for Heidegger the ontological certainty of Death is that what opens up Dasein to set about doing its 
things—in the sense that it provides Dasein with a history and a trajectory. Death, history, and 
trajectory are unique for each and every human being; the present, however, is always shared.154  
 
Event of appropriation 
One of the more important terms that Heidegger employs is the term “event” (in German: Ereignis). 
In Being and Time, it is indeed used in this precise sense, namely event, but gradually Heidegger allows 
it to obtain other connotations, such as making something one’s own—which has been sometimes 
rendered by means of the neologism enowning, or appropriating or taking over something—rendered 
as appropriation or event of appropriation.155 
As mentioned above, at the end of Being and Time, Heidegger had reached the understanding 
that being is disclosed as presence. He was asking whether there is “a way which leads from primordial 
time to the meaning of being? Does time itself manifest itself as the horizon of being?”156 After Being 
and Time, the task for Heidegger turned, as Daniela Vallega-Neu writes, towards considering the 
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question of being “out of the temporal horizon of being as such.”157 If being is disclosed as presence, 
is there a way to attend to this phenomenon—disclosure of being—more closely? This would mean, 
according to Pöggeler, addressing this question: “How is time to be thought of within a ‘fundamental 
ontological’ investigation if presence itself is to be thought of from the horizon of time?”158 
The conceptualisation of “Ereignis” marks Heidegger’s attempt to look more closely at Dasein’s 
opening to being. This would include both the recognition that being is historical (a recognition that 
would allow him to formulate the problem of modernity in terms of forgetfulness of being), and also 
to conceive of Dasein’s opening to being in terms of what Vallega-Neu describes as Dasein’s being 
“thrown into the groundless openness of being as such” and being forced to open, so to speak, to the 
naked possibility of being.159 It is this inaugural occurrence that Heidegger considers as marked by an 
event of appropriation. As he explains, “What determines both, time and being, in their own, that is, 
in their belonging together, we shall call: Ereignis, the event of appropriation.”160 
To paraphrase Vallega-Neu, Dasein is thrown in the groundless openness of being and 
appropriates it, by giving it a horizon, i.e., time. She writes: 
The itinerary of Being and Time leads toward the discovery of a temporal horizon out of which being discloses as 
presence; however the path of questioning still goes ‘toward’ the temporal horizon of being. … The task [now] is to 
think out of the temporal horizon of being as such, a temporal horizon that since the 1930s Heidegger calls the ‘truth 
of beyng’.161 
Dasein becomes the topos (and agent) of the event (of appropriation) that renders being into 
truth.162 As Pöggeler points out, Heidegger does not wish  
to propose that manner in which the event of appropriation needs thought as the hermeneutical circle itself. Instead 
he wishes in his thought to turn more primordially back to and to dwell in the hermeneutical relationship itself, in 
which the meaning of being is ‘announced’ to Dasein, which already has an understanding of being.163  
In our earlier discussion of the ontological difference, it was stressed that there is no continuity, 
no passing (to use the term that Sartre used) between the two levels, ontic and ontological.164 The 
levels are incommunicable (Sartre again). Admittedly, Heidegger does not seem to be able to make this 
distinction clear enough in his earlier writings, thus allowing (unwillingly) for the possibility of 
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confusion and misinterpretation. With the introduction of the event, Heidegger is now able to assert 
the incommunicability of the ontic and the ontological.165 
 
Regarding mathematics and logic 
The relation of Heidegger’s thought to mathematics is generally considered to be marginal. The 
questions he raises and the way he investigates them seem to be very distant from that of the 
philosophical schools that hold mathematics and logic in high regard. Indeed, as Roubach writes, 
“throughout his writings, Heidegger seeks to sever the connection between mathematics and the 
fundamental questions of philosophy.”166 His position, however, is not a position of blind repudiation 
and rejection. It is usually overlooked that in Heidegger’s early formative years he read extensively in 
what was then called “natural sciences”. Safranski informs us that in the winter semester of 1911–12, 
after breaking off his theological studies, Heidegger enrolled “in the science faculty of the University 
of Freiburg, choosing the subjects mathematics, physics, and chemistry, though continuing his 
philosophical studies with undiminished zeal.”167 His very early writings from that period (his doctoral 
dissertation, his qualifying dissertation, and other papers) reflect his interest. According to Roubach, 
Heidegger, in his original introduction to his doctoral dissertation, described himself as an “ahistorical 
mathematician.” As Roubach points out, Heidegger was exploring the relation between ontology, logic, 
and mathematics, seeking to conceptualise the difference between a transcendental conception of 
numbers (and especially of the number One), and a particular one.168 
Later, Heidegger’s focus changed. His early interest in traditional ontology gave way to the 
question of the meaning of being; and any discussion regarding mathematics and its relation to 
ontology gave way to a more limited conceptualisation, whereby mathematics and logic (in the 
ordinary sense of these terms) are only applicable to a certain ontological region.169 At the same time, 
Heidegger would use etymology to point out the connection between mathematics and learning: 
In its formation the word ‘mathematical’ stems from the Greek τα μαθήματα, which means what can be learned and 
thus, at the same time, what can be taught; μανθάνειν means to learn, μάθησις the teaching, and this in a twofold 
sense. First, it means studying and learning; then it means the doctrine taught.170 
Thus, Heidegger was in a position to show that the mathematical is not identical with the numerical. 
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We are long used to thinking of numbers when we think of the mathematical. The mathematical and numbers are 
obviously connected. Only the question remains: Is this connection because the mathematical is numerical in 
character, or on the contrary, is the numerical something mathematical? The second is the case.171 
Similarly, Heidegger would turn to etymology to bring again to the surface the connection between 
logic and logos (in Greek: λόγος). “The expression ‘logic’ is an abbreviation of the Greek λογική). To 
complete it επιστήμη must be added: the science that deals with λόγος. … Accordingly, logic, the 
science of the λόγος, is the science of thinking.”172 
In Heidegger: The Critique of Logic, Thomas Fay has argued that Heidegger intended to counter 
“the deformation of truth as revelation … into propositional truth, and … the degeneration of λόγος … 
into logic” that has accompanied the forgetfulness of being in Western philosophy since Plato.173 David 
White has pointed out that Fay’s reading fails to see a limitation in Heidegger’s approach, namely that 
he “generally refers to logic as if it were a closed and finished system, a seamless whole with little if 
any internal differentiation … Heidegger’s writings do not approach logic as the varied and multiform 
discipline which it in fact is.”174 Nonetheless, White’s own assessment of Heidegger’s critique of logic 
is favourable. He concludes that “Heidegger has challenged us to think through the metaphysical 
presuppositions of logic in light of our ontological nature as historical beings” but admits that “to 
realize fully the historical and therefore in some sense derivative character of logic is a project that will 
assume proportions of considerable magnitude.”175 
Rudolph Carnap, a leading exponent of logical positivism, analysed a paragraph of Heidegger’s 
What is Metaphysics?, a text from 1929, and famously dismissed it as metaphysical nonsense. As he 
said, it was the result of ”a logical defect of language” that allowed “the possibility of forming 
pseudostatements.”176 Carnap did not limit his comments to Heidegger; he was equally dismissive of 
Hegel and others: 
The metaphysics of Hegel has exactly the same logical character as this modern system of metaphysics. And the same 
holds for the rest of the metaphysical systems, though the kind of phraseology and therewith the kind of logical errors 
that occur in them deviate more or less from the kind that occurs in the examples [from Heidegger’s text] we 
discussed.177 
As Michael Friedman has pointed out, a proper dialogue between Heidegger and Carnap seems to be 
impossible because the two thinkers have a “fundamental disagreement over the philosophical 
centrality of logic.”178 Similarly, Gottfried Gabriel has commented that the opposition between Carnap 
and Heidegger lay “not so much [in their] attitude toward metaphysics itself, but [in] their views as to 
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what remains for philosophy to do following the end of metaphysics.” For Gabriel, it is their “difference 
concerning the nature of truth” that “drives Carnap and Heidegger in differing directions.”179 In a 
similar vein, Thomas Fay has written about the non-applicability of Carnap’s logical/syntactic analysis 
to Heidegger’s phenomenological descriptions.180 
Interestingly, Heidegger did not ignore Carnap’s criticism. His arguments regarding Kantian 
metaphysics in his What is a Thing? apply, according to Roubach, to Carnap as well: 
The [Kantian] distinction between analytic judgements and synthetic sentences, the cornerstone of Carnap’s 
philosophy, and of his notorious paper attacking Heidegger, presupposes transcendental logic and therefore ontology 
as well: it presupposes an ontology that is prior to formal logic. If Carnap has to assume an ontology in order to 
implement his logical distinctions, what he has to presuppose is nothing less than a pre-logical ontology, where logic 
is understood in the Carnapian sense.181 
According to Greg Shirley, “Heidegger’s discussion of logic is connected to his critique of 
epistemology, which he undertakes in order to begin thinking about being.” Shirley argues, 
convincingly, that Heidegger has tried to give “an ontological account of intelligibility that he thinks 
explains how the derivative intelligibility of any system of logic is possible,” concluding “that Heidegger 
is not the irrationalist many take him to be.” As Shirley stresses, “Heidegger’s discussions of logic … 
constitute a novel, relevant, and considered philosophy of logic, and a unique contribution to the 
ongoing project of constructing an account of the nature of logic.”182 
 
Beyond fundamental ontology 
Heidegger’s approach to the question of being was originally conceived as an attempt at fundamental 
ontology, which began with Being and Time. His focus, during this period, was on deconstructing the 
history of ideas; or, in his own words, to destroy the history of ontology. This question was an 
exploration of Dasein’s most basic structure, which he denoted as being-in-the-world. Heidegger found 
himself at the centre of a circle of understanding whereby the agents comprising the structure in 
question, as well as all aspects and facets of the structure, needed to be revealed and considered 
simultaneously.  
Heidegger realised, then, that even though his aim remained unaltered, the traditional 
terminology of philosophy could not be up to the task. It became clear to him that it was not a question 
of creating a “new” or “better” fundamental ontology. To talk about ontology as such would be like 
making it possible to succumb to the same old error in Western philosophy—namely, mistaking the 
structure of being-in-the-world as a subject/object relationship whereby Dasein as a subject studies 
and discusses the being of beings as objects. Heidegger gradually came to understand that the task he 
had originally set for himself, that of explicating the meaning of being, was tantamount to going 
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beyond fundamental ontology. He abandoned the project of Being and Time and, during what has 
been called the turn (In German: Kehre), abandoned some of his earlier concepts and introduced 
others.183 
There is a significant debate regarding Heidegger’s turn, its radicality, and its import.184 In my 
view, most of the basic questions integral to Heidegger’s thinking remained as present and pressing as 
ever for him, both before and after this “turn”. In his Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, 
William Richardson had suggested designating the pre-turn Heidegger as “Heidegger I”, and the one 
after the turn as “Heidegger II”.185 As Heidegger himself put it “only by way of what Heidegger I has 
thought does one gain access to what is to-be-thought by Heidegger II. But Heidegger I becomes 
possible only if it is contained in Heidegger II.”186 
“Heidegger II” ceased conceiving of the question of being as a question of an ahistorical 
fundamental ontology and saw it as a question of world disclosure, historicity, and language.187 
Groping his way into the question of being allowed him to recognise it as a question about the ways in 
which being is historical and about the world epochs revealed by it. This, in turn, opened a way for him 
to focus more clearly on the specifics of the modern epoch, the epoch of science and technology.188 
This new epoch had begun with Descartes, who had conceived of the human being as an agent 
of knowledge, striving to find absolute certainty from a starting point of absolute doubt. This was the 
locus of Descartes’s cogito, which Heidegger had targeted in Being and Time. There, he spoke about 
the phenomenological destruction of the “cogito sum” which was supposed to be completed in Part 2, 
Division 2 of Being and Time.189 He did not complete it.  
Instead, Heidegger turned his attention to the specifics of the new epoch. The modern, scientific 
worldview is obscuring crucial aspects of Dasein’s engagement with the world. Modern man seems to 
be uninterested in realising his or her authenticity, losing focus on what is his or her own (in the 
Heideggerian understanding). In the time of modernity, Dasein seems to be increasingly under the 
sway of the they. Dasein’s comportment towards other human beings becomes increasingly similar to 
Dasein’s comportment towards things: human beings become equivalent to mere objects (present-at-
hand) or tools (ready-to-hand).  
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Heidegger’s critique of technology, science, and the modern, mechanistic, world could be seen 
as a logical outcome of his attempt at elucidating the meaning of being. By tracing truth to the ancient 
Greek a-letheia and being to logos, Heidegger had become more and more concerned with the 
forgetfulness of being. It was no longer an observation, or a difficulty in the path of understanding, as 
he has it in Being and Time; it was not even just a question of identifying something that the ancients 
saw but the moderns have lost—i.e., an ontic manifestation of the historicity of being. It became a 
matter of great moral urgency, revealing a kind of nostalgia, as Jacques Derrida has put it—a “myth of 
a purely maternal or paternal language, a lost country of thought.”190 
So, for Heidegger, Dasein has a duty towards being, a task, which he calls Task of Thinking. The 
task is to strive against its forgetfulness, exemplified, in Heidegger’s view, in the advent of modern 
technology, science, cybernetics etc. It is, in other words, to bring the question of being to the 
forefront. As such it’s an urgent task: 
Does the name for the task of thinking then read instead of Being and Time: Opening and Presence? But where does 
the opening come from and how is it given? … The task of thinking would then be the surrender of previous thinking 
to the determination of the matter of thinking.191 
In this sense, one can see the whole philosophical trajectory of Heidegger as a trajectory towards 
disappointment and moral despair. In his understanding, adopting the modern worldview involved 
discarding fundamental aspects of Dasein’s comportment towards being. Heidegger made it his task 
to bring this question back to the fore—to proceed as a moral, or, rather, as a deontic philosopher. 
Indeed, Heidegger gradually revealed himself as a thinker who was more attentive to deontic questions 
pertaining to authenticity, deficient understanding of being, and deficient modes of comportment 
towards the world. In a way, Heidegger’s later thinking can be seen as ontological but with an eye to 
the ontic. He was increasingly concerned about the malaises of modernity, but he no longer thought 
that philosophy alone was enough to counteract what he saw as decline. In his posthumously 
published interview with Der Spiegel, he was clear: 
Philosophy will be unable to effect any immediate change in the current state of the world. This is true not only of 
philosophy but of all purely human reflection and endeavour. Only a god can save us. The only possibility available to 
us is that by thinking and poetizing we prepare a readiness for the appearance of a god, or for the absence of a god 
in [our] decline, insofar as in view of the absent god we are in a state of decline.192 
It might not be so easy for us to decide how to interpret Heidegger’s position vis-à-vis this “state 
of decline.” Dominique Janicaud has commented that 
the essential difference that seems to characterise the thinking of ‘Heidegger II’ is that this thinking slides toward 
apolitics by undergoing a seemingly negligible displacement, not by default, but by clear design.193 
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This explicitly ‘apolitical’ attitude, which has nothing to do with a regular indifference toward politics or with the 
‘apolitical’ stance of Being and Time, is based upon a re-interpretation of the world situation as a function of his 
reading of the history of metaphysics.194 
Janicaud has proposed the name “destinal historicalism” for this thinking that sees “metaphysics 
conceived as the history of being,”195 and as Krell argues, after the publication of the Black Notebooks, 
it became blindingly obvious that, in Heidegger’s case, this destinal historicalism corresponded to his 
conviction that Germany was destined to play a privileged role in rescuing Greek antiquity for the future of the 
Western world. And, to the extent that such ‘destinalism’ inheres in Heidegger’s thinking … of the ‘history of beyng’ 
in general, an enormous shadow is cast over that thinking.196 
It is up to his readers, Krell writes, “to magnify what is thought provoking in [Heidegger’s thinking] 
even as they decry its failings.”197 
What is important for me, as a reader of Heidegger and practitioner of psychoanalysis, is to focus 
now, on Heidegger’s growing concern about the uncritical acceptance of what he called modern 
technological thinking and worldview, and his critique of science. Having followed, in this chapter, his 
strategy in approaching the question of being and shown how, for him, a world is opened up by 
language and shared, I have clarified his position regarding the historicity of Dasein’s concernful 
comportment towards beings. I expounded Heidegger’s conceptualisation of truth as unconcealment, 
rather than correspondence as traditional metaphysics has it and his rejection of the naïve Cartesian 
view of the human being as a subject vis-à-vis the objects he or she studies. As I will argue, this critique 
is of the utmost importance for psychoanalysis if psychoanalysis is aiming at establishing a 
philosophically robust foundation capable of providing justification for both its theoretical 
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197 Ecstasy, Catastrophe, p. 191. 
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Chapter 2: A critique of science and psychoanalysis 
In 1947, Medard Boss, a Swiss psychiatrist, wrote to Heidegger asking “for help in reflective thinking.”1 
Boss had come to Heidegger via Being and Time. He felt that Heidegger’s thought could offer new 
insights for the understanding and treatment of human psychological suffering and mental illness. Boss 
was certain that Heidegger—though not a medical doctor—had something to say about the 
shortcomings of the so-called scientific approach of modern medical sciences. This letter became the 
occasion for a collaboration and a long-lasting friendship.  
In 1959, Boss started holding Heidegger seminars at his home in Zollikon, Switzerland. Two to 
three times every semester, Boss would invite 50 to 70 doctors, psychiatrists, and psychologists who 
would come to hear Heidegger over the course of a few days. Heidegger had hoped, Boss informs us, 
that “his thinking would escape the philosopher’s study and become of benefit to wider circles, in 
particular to a large number of suffering human beings.”2 The seminars continued for a good 10 years, 
until Heidegger’s physical powers started declining because of his age. In the beginning, there was no 
systematic note-taking; after 1963, that task was undertaken by Boss himself. He would record and 
transcribe Heidegger’s words and send the texts to him for proofreading and corrections. Then they 
would be distributed to the next seminar’s participants. All the seminars’ protocols, together with parts 
of conversations between Heidegger and Boss, as well as fragments of their correspondence, have 
been published in book form, under the title Zollikon Seminars, forming the most comprehensive, yet 
at times fragmentary, collection of Heidegger’s thoughts about psychiatry, psychology, and, especially, 
psychoanalysis.3 
The scientific background of the participants in the seminars was not very helpful in allowing 
them to understand Heidegger’s questioning and thinking, or even to see its relevance to their work. 
Boss compared the whole setting with one where a man from Mars visits a group of Earth-dwellers 
and attempts to communicate. Still, he wrote, 
the strangest thing about the Zollikon Seminars was that neither Heidegger nor the seminar participants grew tired 
of them. From the beginning and over the years, the teacher and students worked persistently toward achieving a 
common ground.4 
                                                          
1 Medard Boss, ‘Preface to the First German Edition of Martin Heidegger's Zollikon Seminars’ [1987], trans. Franz Mayr and Richard Askay, in 
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3 Martin Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars: Protocols, Conversations, Letters, ed. Medard Boss, trans. Franz Mayr and Richard Askay (Evanston, 
IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001). 
4 Boss, ‘Preface’, p. xix/xiii. 
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It seemed as if Heidegger undertook this task as a kind of duty, a duty to transmit some of his insights 
to people who should most greatly benefit from it. Of course, he did not set up to teach medical 
doctors about medicine, or psychologists about psychology. He only wanted to make manifest all the 
assumptions that science—be it medicine, psychology, or psychiatry—tacitly makes, and to indicate 
where those assumptions fall short of the task at hand.  
 
Science and scientific method 
Science and the scientific method were at the centre of Heidegger’s questioning throughout the 
Zollikon Seminars. Many scholars do not think that Heidegger had a specific philosophy of science as 
such. William Richardson, for example, believed that Heidegger, being an important philosopher, could 
not afford “to ignore the problems of science,” and that his “critique of the sciences is inseparable 
from, because unintelligible without, his interpretation of the fundamental nature of modern times as 
such.”5 For Richardson, “What Heidegger offers is not a philosophy of science but a humanism for a 
scientific age.”6 
In her Heidegger’s Philosophy of Science, Trish Glazebrook has argued that “the question of 
natural science is a constant and continuous support against which Heidegger’s thinking develops and 
grows.” She claims that philosophy was a “rigorous science” for Heidegger, and has suggested a 
“radically novel” interpretation of Heidegger, “according to his philosophy of science.”7 
The sciences aspire to an objectivity supposedly guaranteed by their reliance on facts, 
measurements, formulas, and theoretical models. At the heart of what the sciences claim to do lies 
the assumption that things are measurable, and that there is a correspondence between scientific 
models and theories and reality (presumed to be measurable). Practitioners of science take this 
correspondence for granted and fail to recognise that their assumptions and methods entail already a 
tacit, unexamined, understanding both of their subject matter as well as of ways to approach it. They 
implicitly tend to take for granted that modern science is somehow better than other approaches. That 
is the major issue with science, according to Heidegger. As Harold Alderman explains, “science, as 
Heidegger sees it, does not merely construe its set of propositions as a picture of the world. … It 
decides, in a normative fashion, that the world itself consists in nothing other than the picture drawn 
by science.”8 The problem, then, is not that science is inadequate for what it studies, but that it fails to 
acknowledge its limitations, and tends, uncritically, to regard anything not conforming to its “scientific” 
view with arrogance. In Heidegger’s words, 
If physicists make judgments about metaphysics, which is quite absurd in itself, then one must demand that physicists 
first reflect on metaphysical ideas, for instance, this idea about time. Of course, physicists can do this only if they are 
prepared to go back to the underlying suppositions of physics, and beyond this, to what remains and continues to be 
                                                          
5 William J. Richardson, ‘Heidegger's Critique of Science’ [1968] in Trish Glazebrook (ed.), Heidegger on Science (Albany: State University of 
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standard in this domain as acceptio [or presupposition], even when the physicist is unaware of it. It is no accident that 
in a strict sense modern science’s self-critique is lacking today.9 
Speaking about science in the Zollikon Seminars, Heidegger has in mind the so-called “natural” 
or hard sciences. He follows the methodological distinction between natural and human sciences 
rigorously established by the German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey in his Introduction to the Human 
Sciences of 1883. Dilthey had argued that there is a limit to the kind of theoretical regularities that can 
be established in human sciences. Psychology, in particular, as a science dealing with human beings, 
cannot, according to Dilthey, examine them apart from their interactions with society.10 For Heidegger, 
medicine in general and psychiatry in particular are sciences that purport to offer the rigour of natural 
sciences; it is this presumed rigour that remains at the centre of his critique throughout the Zollikon 
Seminars.  
When a human being comes under the scrutiny of a science, it becomes its object and can only 
be studied as an object. For Heidegger, this means that everything that distinguishes a human being 
qua Dasein from objects that the human being encounters in the world has to be left aside. This of 
course is not always a problem: there are times when it is perfectly acceptable for a human being to 
be studied as an object, or, to put it in Heideggerian terms, as an entity present-at-hand—for example, 
when one needs to measure someone’s height and weight, in order to calculate their body/mass index.  
Quite often, however, this is not the case. The limitation of modern science is that it cannot 
study the human being as anything other than an entity present-at-hand. In this respect, it studies the 
human being as something that it is not—an object—and in fact it forces it to be an object. As 
Glazebrook explains, for Heidegger all modern science forces the beings it studies “to behave in a way 
they would not when left to themselves: as objects. In this sense, it is violent.”11 
With regard to the human being, Heidegger insists, the approach should be different:  
In the perspective of the Analytic of Dasein, all conventional, objectifying representations of a capsule-like psyche, 
subject, person, ego, or consciousness in psychology and psychopathology must be abandoned in favour of an entirely 
different understanding. This new view of the basic constitution of human existence may be called Dasein, or being-
in-the-world.12 
For Heidegger, every science, to the extent that it examines entities of a certain, specific type, 
has its own ontology. It is in this regional ontology that the foundations for each science are to be 
found. But in Heidegger’s view these foundations are themselves founded on a more primordial 
understanding, an understanding of being, or, as Heidegger refers to it in the context of the Zollikon 
Seminars, a fundamental ontology. He explains: 
Fundamental ontology is not merely the general ontology for the regional ontologies, a higher sphere, as it were, 
suspended above (or a kind of basement beneath), against which the regional ontologies are able to shield 
themselves. Fundamental ontology is that thinking which moves within the foundation of each ontology. None of 
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these regional ontologies can abandon the foundation, least of all, the regional ontology of psychiatry as a research 
area, moving within the realm of the unfolding essence of the human being.13 
This is all the more so for sciences that study the human psyche. What is being studied—i.e., the 
psyche—is correlated in a most fundamental way with who does the studying: the observers study 
themselves, so to speak. Still, there is no such a thing as an unmediated access to one’s field of study. 
There are always assumptions that have already been accepted, either explicitly or tacitly. These 
assumptions—i.e., these regional ontologies—are of major importance but are systematically 
overlooked. 
Clearly, such a critique is directly applicable to psychoanalysis: for Heidegger, Freud failed to 
question his concepts thoroughly, could not avoid imposing a mechanistic understanding on the 
phenomena he studied, and accordingly distorted them. 
 
The ancient world: conformity with nature 
In our everyday engagement with our world, we human beings create interpretative and explanatory 
narratives of that world, as well as of our involvement with it. We are curious about this world. In 
Heidegger’s view, the term “curiosity” expresses “the tendency towards a peculiar way of letting the 
world be encountered by us in perception.”14 
At different times and in different societies, the demands human beings make on their 
explanatory systems are dissimilar and depend upon their intended uses. For example, a tribe of 
hunter-gatherers would need to have some knowledge and understanding of the different fruits and 
animals around them. They would also need a technology (i.e., appropriate tools) to pick the fruits and 
hunt the animals. They would need to know what is available, what to do with it, how to do it, when 
to do it, and what outcome to expect. Similarly, other people belonging, say, in a proto-society of 
farmers would need to have an understanding of crops, of tending plants, of the weather. At the basis 
of all engagement with the world there is the same basic assumption—or expectation, or hope: the 
world is intelligible, i.e., it makes (some) sense. Whether it is the whims of a deity, animal, or the 
weather, or an understanding of the workings of nature, the underlying assumption is always that 
things are somehow knowable. 
Strictly speaking, the question is not about what is knowable as such, but rather about including 
all encounterable entities in a referential totality where things can make sense and be employed in 
some way, for-the-sake-of or in-order-to something. As Heidegger writes 
The ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ signifies an ‘in-order-to’; this in turn, a ‘towards-this’; the latter, an ‘in-which’ of letting 
something be involved; and that in turn, the ‘with-which’ of an involvement. These relationships are bound up with 
one another as a primordial totality; they are what they are as this signifying in which Dasein gives itself beforehand 
its Being-in-the-world as something to be understood. The relational totality of this signifying we call ‘significance’. 
This is what makes up the structure of the world—the structure of that wherein Dasein as such already is.15 
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In an early systematisation of what could be called ancient science (and worldview), Aristotle 
understood human knowledge within a rational framework of observations and general principles. As 
the historian of science John Losee explains, “Aristotle … maintained that the scientist should induce 
explanatory principles from the phenomena to be explained, and then deduce statements about the 
phenomena from premises which include these principles.”16 
According to philosopher of science Alexandre Koyré, the key aspects of the ancient worldview 
were:  
(a) the belief in the existence of specific ‘natures’ and (b) the belief in the existence of a Cosmos, i.e., the belief in the 
existence of principles of order by virtue of which the totality of real beings form a (naturally) well-ordered whole. … 
Things are not indifferent as to whether they be here or there, but that, on the contrary, everything in the Universe 
has its proper place in conformity with its nature.17 
It was by referring to this natural order of things that the ancient Greeks explained the observed 
differences between the earthly and the heavenly world. 
As an example, we could take motion. All motion on Earth seemed to be irregular, and always 
unfolding in such a way that entities were either at rest or striving to return to a point of rest, an “end”. 
Celestial bodies, on the other hand—e.g., the sun, the stars, the moon—appeared to be moving 
perpetually in circles. Celestial motion did not seem to have an “end”, in contrast to what appeared to 
be the case on Earth. In his History of Philosophy, Wilhelm Windelband writes that the Pythagoreans 
interpreted this difference by suggesting that 
the harmony prevailing in the motions in the heavenly bodies had, like the harmony in music, its ground in an order, 
in accordance with which the various spheres of the universe moved about a common centre at intervals fixed by 
numbers.18  
The Pythagorean antithesis between the earthly and heavenly worlds was taken up by Aristotle 
in his theory of causality.19 Aristotle distinguished between four types of causes: material, formal, final, 
and efficient. All were referring to earthly things. Let us, for example, consider a silversmith who has 
received an order to make a bowl and begins work to make it. According to Aristotle, the final cause is 
the order given to make a bowl; the formal cause is the shape an object must have in order to be 
thought of as a bowl; the material cause is what a bowl is supposed to be made of (e.g., silver); and 
the efficient cause is what is needed in order to actually get a bowl when all the other causes are known 
or given—in other words, the craftsman himself. Applying the concept of the efficient cause to the 
motion of bodies, Aristotle postulated that if something is moving, it moves because something else is 
making it move (for example, by pulling or pushing it). In the ancient worldview, any earthly movement 
will continue to approach its telos or end, i.e., its final cause. When it reaches it, movement will stop.20 
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Thus, according to the ancient worldview, everything has its natural place. The earthly world is 
an imperfect world, and things have not yet reached their telos. If not there already, it will make its 
way, so to speak, to reach it. All transformation and change needs an external cause. In contrast to 
this, the heavenly world is perfect and eternal. No transformation or change is conceivable there.  
 
The modern world: conformity with law 
People no longer think of the world in the same way. In the modern, scientific worldview, there is no 
difference whatsoever between what is happening here on Earth and what is happening in the sky. 
Things do not move to reach their “end”, and, in fact, there is no such a thing as an “end” of motion. 
Motion will continue unaltered for as long as something (a “force”) will cause it to change; this might 
be a direct force such as gravity or an indirect one such as friction. Crucially, in the modern, scientific 
worldview, there is no need for an efficient cause or a motive. In nature, things do not happen because 
someone or something causes or wills them to happen. They just happen. 
What this meant, in practical terms, was not easy to grasp. Change is observable, things do 
indeed happen; but if a final cause is not to be postulated, what makes them happen? Thus, as Koyré 
writes, in Galileo’s studies of the phenomenon of free fall, what he tries to explain or understand  
is not the fact of the fall itself; it is not a matter of discovering the cause of the bodies’ fall. What is he looking for is 
the essence of the motion of fall. … The problem is to discover the nature of this kind of motion, its essence, or one 
might say, its definition … It is this which would constitute … that fundamental axiom, from which it would then be 
possible to deduce everything else.21 
In other words, what Galileo was after was the law of free fall. 
Conformity with a law is the predominant supposition of modern science: everything happens 
according to some natural law; the law, or laws, can be formulated; and their effects can be 
calculated.22 The domain of nature is set up as a domain where points of mass move in space and time. 
This setup, in turn, is based on the assumption that space and time are uniform. The Galilean universe 
is that of a homogenous space in which points of mass move and fall in conformity with law.23 
Heidegger stresses that in order to construct his universe, Galileo utilises concepts such as space, 
motion, time, and causality, which he takes for granted. He is not reflecting further on them, even 
though they are of crucial importance for his enterprise. Galileo is not positing a hypothesis about 
space, time, etc.; he is not supposing there are time and space: “He accepts without question: space, 
motion, time, and causality.” 
What does it mean to say—I accept something like space? I accept that there is something like space and, even more, 
that I have a relationship to space and time. This acceptio is not arbitrary, but contains necessary relationships to 
space, time, and causality in which I stand. Otherwise I could not reach for a glass on the table. No one can experiment 
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with these [a priori] assumptions. That there is space is not a proposition of physics. What kind of proposition is it? 
What does it indicate about the human being that such suppositions are possible for him? It indicates that he finds 
himself comported to space, time, and causality from the beginning.24 
 These concepts are, according to Heidegger, “out of the reach for the natural sciences, but, at 
the same time, they are the very foundation for the very possibility of the natural sciences 
themselves”.25 Which is to say that Galileo did not reach to conclusions about space, time, or causality 
by reflecting inductively on the phenomena he studied. He posits them from the beginning.  
As Koyré points out, “Galilean epistemology [was] not positivist. It [was] Archimedean.”26 For 
example, contrary to what is commonly accepted, Galileo did not test his theories of gravity by 
executing carefully designed experiments, such as dropping objects from the Leaning Tower of Pisa.27 
In fact, as Heidegger argues, is only because Galileo wanted nature and its processes to be measurable 
and calculable that he accepted the homogeneity of space and time.28 Galileo was able to formulate a 
modern, “scientific” worldview by accepting certain concepts—such as space, time, causality—that do 
not belong in this worldview, in the sense that they were not its product, but rather they made it 
possible.  
Modern science’s main supposition is that processes of nature conform with some kind of law. 
Conformity with a law means that the objects of nature are measurable and that the processes in 
nature are calculable (and predictable). This supposition, conformity with law, and its corollary—
calculability—require that time and space be uniform and calculable themselves. The study of nature 
becomes the study of the motion of bodies in space. The implicit aim of the modern scientific method 
is, according to Heidegger, the control of nature.29 However, the fact that the modern, scientific 
worldview is founded on such an acceptance has been “forgotten”.  
The idea that the ancient worldview is radically different from the modern is not exclusive to 
Heidegger. Koyré, for example, who had been close to Husserl while studying at the University of 
Göttingen and considered him a “decisive influence on his own approach to the history of 
philosophy,”30 has written extensively about the passing from what he called the closed world or 
Cosmos of the ancients to the infinite universe of modern science.31  
Heidegger identifies the problem of modern science in that it confuses measurability with 
reality. “That which is calculated in advance and that which is measurable—only that is real [for 
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science].”32 It follows that non-measurable entities cannot be direct objects of scientific research and 
cannot be described by a theory. In fact, such entities are either completely dismissed or reduced to 
one or more of their features as long as the features are measurable themselves. So, for example, since 
shame or embarrassment are not directly measurable, they cannot be studied scientifically. The 
redness of a face, however, or the circulation of blood, can.33 Or, alternatively, one can gauge them 
indirectly with the help of questionnaires or Likert scales. Heidegger wonders why is it so difficult to 
recognise “the strangeness of this method regarding the human being, and what constitutes the 
human being’s being.”34 
 
On the givenness of space 
Let us return, for a moment, to the question of space and time and reflect on a simple action.35 As I am 
sitting here, I decide to fetch the glass of water from the table over there. I see the glass, then I stand 
up, I walk to that table, I stretch my hand, I grasp the glass of water, the freshness of which I can now 
feel in my hand as I hold it, and then I return to my initial seat. If I consider the whole of this bodily 
experience, where would I locate my body? This is what Heidegger invites us to wonder. Is my body 
just an object in space, an object that I happen to inhabit, but which is similar to all the other bodies I 
may see or encounter? Or is it the case that space is something that I am only able to conceive of 
because I have a body? How does this work? 
I am sitting here. I look around and take in the place I occupy in this room, using my eyes. When 
I stretch my hand, I can see where it reaches: It reaches away from my body, but not very far away. If 
I want to reach further, I can move my body a bit; in this way, I am able to extend my hand’s reach. I 
can also walk. While I was here, I could see the table over there. Now I am walking towards the table. 
The bodily experience of the place I occupy in this room allows me to reach far beyond the corporeal 
limits of my body in a very real sense. I am able to see in the clearest way that my body, the 
embodiment of this Dasein that I myself am, extends beyond the corporeal limits of this same body 
qua object in a room. 
Now let us say that after I reach the desk over there, I stop and look again around me. What do 
I see? I am standing in a room, next to a desk, and I see, say, a window in the wall opposite me. I can 
see that I am at a distance from this window. I am at a distance from other objects in the room: I know 
that because I experience the depth of this room. If I decide to measure the distance between the 
window and myself, I can do so. What I need to do is simply to count my steps as I walk from here to 
there. While I am doing that, however, my experience of the room’s depth moves with me. At any 
given moment, my “here” moves with me as I walk over there. Whatever I do, I am always in a place 
that is “here” for me. I may be able to measure the distance between myself and any other object in 
the room, but I cannot measure my very experience of the room’s depth. What was disclosed to me 
was the experience—namely, that I am at a (measurable) distance from this or that object; and yet the 
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experience itself is not measurable. As Heidegger puts it, “I [only] measure the distance between two 
[material] bodies, not the depth opened up in each case by my being-in-the-world”.36 
Space is also opened to Dasein via the senses of hearing and touch: 
One says that seeing is ‘superior’ to grasping. One can control grasping through seeing because sight, like hearing, is 
essentially oriented to distance. Yet in a dark room, I can ‘control’ seeing too, through touching. If seeing has a wider 
range than grasping, then grasping and seeing obviously have something to do with our relationship to space.37 
For Dasein, Dasein’s body is not just an object in space; it is radically unlike any other object 
Dasein can encounter. Dasein is spatial but its spatiality does not consist in that it is embodied. Rather 
it is because Dasein makes room in space in its being-in-the-world that Dasein is spatial. In other words, 
the body of Dasein is in space in an existential (i.e., ontological) and not just bodily (i.e., ontic) sense. 
In general, the body has this double “role” of being both ontological as well as ontic—in much 
the same way that the sign (or language in general) is both ontic and ontological.38 Accordingly, space 
is not a framework where Dasein finds its bodiliness but rather something that is disclosed to Dasein 
through Dasein’s bodiliness. It is the body that discloses space to Dasein, not the other way round. 
Interestingly, in his discussion of space and the ways it is opened to Dasein, Heidegger does not make 
any special reference to the sense of smell—or of taste for that matter. Elsewhere he writes that men 
differ from animals in terms of the discriminatory capacity of their senses, but comments that this does 
not say anything about the world they inhabit. 
For we immediately find ourselves in the greatest perplexity over the question concerning greater or lesser 
completeness in each case with respect to the accessibility of beings, as soon as we compare the discriminatory 
capacity of a falcon's eye with that of the human eye or the canine sense of smell with our own, for example.39 
Human beings do not find themselves in an already “open” world which acts as a container of 
objects, one of which is their own bodily existence. Such a view implicitly presupposes that the 
spatiality of the world has already been disclosed to human beings. But close examination of the 
phenomenon of the body shows that this is not the case. A human being—or, better, Dasein—is able 
to make room in space (in German: Einräumen von Raum) in its being-in-the-world: 
This ‘bodiliness’ hides a whole problematic of its own, though we will not deal with it here. 
The Dasein of the human being is spatial in itself in the sense of making room [in space] and in the sense of the 
spatialisation of Dasein in its bodily nature. Dasein is not spatial because it is embodied. But its bodiliness is possible 
only because Da-sein is spatial in the sense of making room.40 
For Heidegger, then, the modern scientific view of space as the theatre where natural processes 
take place is an abstraction, founded upon an originary disclosure of space to Dasein via Dasein’s 
bodiliness.  
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What is the origin of this disclosure? Heidegger returned to this question repeatedly. In Being 
and Time he attempted to derive spatiality from temporality, but later he admitted that this attempt 
was “untenable”,41 the reason being, as Maria Villela-Petit comments, that this would open the 
possibility for an equivalent reciprocal derivation of temporality from spatiality—something that 
would jeopardise the whole project of Being and Time.42 
Instead, Heidegger connected the question about the origin of space to building and dwelling, 
activities that should be understood in terms of Dasein’s being-in-the-world: “Ich bin, du bist mean: I 
dwell, you dwell. The way in which you are and I am, the manner in which we humans are on the earth, 
is Buan, dwelling. To be a human being means to be on the earth as a mortal. It means to dwell.” And 
later in the same: “Building, by virtue of constructing locales, is a founding and joining of spaces. … 
Building is closer to the essence of spaces and to the essential origins of ‘space’ than any geometry 
and mathematics.”43 
 
On the givenness of time 
Heidegger’s criticism of the modern scientific view of time is similar. The conception of time as a linear 
succession of empty points, each called “now”, is accepted by modern science as the only “objective” 
conception of time.44 As such, it is not challenged by modern (scientific) theories of time such as the 
one found in Einstein’s Theory of Relativity.  
The theory of relativity in physics does not deal with what time is but deals only with how time, in the sense of a now-
sequence, can be measured. [It asks] whether there is an absolute measurement of time, or whether all measurement 
is necessarily relative, that is, conditioned.45 
Einstein’s conceptualisation of time, as expressed in his theory, had been the subject of a debate 
between Einstein himself and the philosopher Henri Bergson in 1922. As the historian of science Jimena 
Canales writes, 
Bergson and Einstein accepted that an essential difference existed between psychological and physical conceptions 
of time, yet they made different deductions from this. For Einstein, this led him to conclude that ‘the time of the 
philosophers does not exist, there remains only a psychological time that differs from the physicist’s.’ For Bergson 
this lesson—that psychological and physical assessments of time were different—made, on the contrary, the 
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philosopher’s task even more interesting, especially because no one, not even physicists, could avoid the problem of 
relating time back to human affairs.46 
Canales points out that Heidegger was dissatisfied with both Einstein’s and Bergson’s conceptions of 
time. 
His project would differ from Aristotle’s, Einstein’s and Bergson’s in this essential respect. Instead of continuing to 
debate about what time is, which was at the crux of the Einstein-Bergson debate, he proposed to take a step back 
and ask, what, after all makes time?47 
Only such an approach would suffice to account for the rich phenomena that are characteristic of time 
as it is opened to human beings. 
Heidegger invited his seminar participants to consider the human experience of time—which he 
designates as “world-time”. As he explains, this refers to the time that makes itself public in the 
temporalising of temporality: “And we designate it thus not because it is present-at-hand as an entity 
within-the-world (which it can never be), but because it belongs to the world in the sense which we 
have interpreted existential-ontologically.”48 
When one tries to study time phenomenologically—i.e., by letting “that which shows itself be 
seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself”49— one sees that far from being a 
succession of empty “nows”, time (or world-time) has specific characteristics that render it not empty 
at all. 
Its first characteristic can be called significance. This refers to the recognition that, for human 
beings, time is always, and essentially, time for something, never an empty vehicle that can be assigned 
a meaning (or significance) at will. 
Its second characteristic is datability. Moments of time are datable but this, Heidegger stresses, 
is not simply to say that they correspond to this or that specific calendar date; rather it means that a 
specific moment in time, for human beings, is always related to other “moments” in time, never 
isolated. It may be before or after such and such, while this was happening, when that other thing 
happened, and so on.  
The third characteristic of time is its extendedness. We may say “now”, but we very rarely—if 
ever—refer to a temporal point of zero length; any “now” is temporally extended and can occupy any 
length of time, such, for example, as an evening, a season, a historical period.50 
Finally, time’s fourth characteristic is its publicness. As Heidegger puts it: 
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The datable, significant, and extended ‘now’ is also never a ‘now’, merely referring to me. … It is a ‘now’ that is 
immediately commonly accessible to all of us talking here with each other. … At any given time, the spoken ‘now’ is 
immediately received-perceived by everyone present. We call this accessibility of ‘now’ the publicness of ‘now’.51 
Having outlined these four characteristics of time, Heidegger moves on to explain that they also 
apply to when we speak of the past, by saying “at that time” and of the future by saying “then”. These 
are, he says, what we call the three dimensions of time: the past, the future, and the present. But these 
dimensions  
are not simultaneous, as with the dimensions of space, but always only sequential. … All three dimensions are 
equiprimordial, for one never occurs without the other. All three are open to us equiprimordially, but they are not 
open uniformally.52 
In this way, time for Dasein is first and foremost temporality. Its characteristics are lost for the scientist 
who considers the pure now-sequence as the only objective, true time. “What we call datability and 
significance are regarded as subjective vagueness, if not sentimentalism. [The scientist] says this 
because time measured physically can be calculated ‘objectively’ at any time.”53 
 
Dasein, body, and sexual difference 
Alphonse De Waelhens, a Belgian philosopher who was critical of Heidegger, commented that “in 
Being and Time one does not find thirty lines concerning the problem of perception; one does not find 
ten concerning that of the body.”54 When Medard Boss brought this criticism up to Heidegger 
(attributing it to Sartre) and asked for his opinion. Heidegger’s answer was rather restrained: “I can 
only counter Sartre’s reproach by stating that the bodily is the most difficult [to understand] and that 
I was unable to say more at that time.”55 
De Waelhens was not alone in pointing out this apparent limitation of Heidegger’s. Still, the 
criticism is not quite relevant: In Heidegger’s Neglect of the Body, Kevin Aho explains that Heidegger’s 
apparent reluctance to talk about the body follows from the fact that he did not intend to write a 
phenomenological study of the human being in his or her bodily (ontic) existence. “The core motivation 
of Heidegger’s early project is not to offer phenomenological investigations into the concreteness of 
bodily life. Rather it is to enquire into the meaning of being of Dasein itself.”56 Similarly, David Cerbone 
argues that 
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[an] explicit consideration of the body, or of Dasein’s ‘bodily nature’, may be seen to be at odds with the kind of 
investigation Heidegger takes himself to be engaged in, namely a transcendental investigation of those features which 
are distinctive of Dasein’s (our) way of being.57  
There can be no doubt that the problem of the body, and indeed the problem of sexual 
difference, is of crucial importance for any understanding of what it is to be human, but it is also a 
matter of priorities. In Cerbone’s words, “Heidegger insists on developing his existential analytic of 
Dasein, and so his account of the world, first: until that’s completed, the whole problematic of Dasein’s 
bodily nature must remain hidden.”58 
This is exactly what Jacques Derrida points out in connection to sexuality. Derrida observes that 
“about what we glibly call sexuality Heidegger has remained silent.”59 Derrida discusses Heidegger’s 
having been concerned to insist on the neutrality, and indeed the sexual neutrality, of Dasein, and 
believes that he finds in it the repetition of an old hierarchical division between the sexes.60 In 
connection to this, Cerbone notes that 
sexual … predicates rely for their sense on the ‘general structures of Dasein’, but not the other way around. That is, 
one can spell out what it is to be Dasein without reference to sexuality (the body), but one cannot spell out human 
sexuality (what a human body is) without first explicating what it is to be Dasein.61  
The question of the body is crucial, then, but not in the trivial (ontic) sense of our having a body 
and recognising that we are dependent on it; it is, rather a question of Dasein’s bodiliness. As indicated 
above, space is, for Heidegger, something which is disclosed to Dasein through its bodiliness. It could 
be still argued, however, that in its bodiliness, the body is still just an object. In connection with this, 
Heidegger invites us to consider this simple question: What are the limits of the body? Where does the 
body stop? “The corporeal thing stops with the skin,” he says. But 
when we are here, we are always in relation to something else. Therefore, one might say that we are beyond the 
corporeal limits. … The bodily limit and the corporeal limit are not quantitatively but rather qualitatively different 
from each other.62 
The differentiation between what is bodily and what is corporeal reflects a differentiation 
between two senses of the word “body” in the German language, namely the quantifiable “material 
body”(in German: Körper) and on the other the “lived-body” (in German: Leib). As Aho explains “the 
lived body is not a reference to a Cartesian/Newtonian body, not a corporeal mass with measurable 
attributes” such as weight, mass, shape, location and boundaries.63 Piotr Hoffman writes that this 
distinction was later taken up by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, who used it in order to explain (and refute) 
                                                          
57 David R. Cerbone, ‘Heidegger and Dasein's “Bodily Nature”: What is the Hidden Problematic?’ International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 
8/2 (2000), 209-230, p. 212. 
58 ‘Dasein's “Bodily Nature”’, p. 225. 
59 Jacques Derrida, ‘Geschlecht: Sexual Difference, Ontological Difference’ Research in Phenomenology, XIII (1983), 65-83, p. 67. 
60 ‘Geschlecht’, pp. 69ff., 81. 
61 Cerbone, ‘Dasein's “Bodily Nature”’, p. 228n15. 
62 Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars, p. 86. 
63 Aho, Heidegger's Neglect, p. 14. According to K. Aho, this differentiation was first explicitly articulated by Husserl. See Heidegger's Neglect, 
p. 153n13.  
Chapter 2: A critique of science and psychoanalysis  56 
  
the origin of the Cartesian mind-body dualism.64 Heidegger was very sceptical about the success of 
their project: “As for the French authors,” he said, “I am always disturbed by [their] misinterpretation 
of being-in-the-world; it is conceived either as being present-at-hand or as the intentionality of 
subjective consciousness.”65 
Heidegger attempted to speak about the ontic characteristics of Dasein as a factical being, 
without making the same error. In this sense, Dasein is considered in relation to its (ontological) 
neutrality—i.e., as neither masculine nor feminine: “The peculiar neutrality of the term ‘Dasein’ is 
essential, because the interpretation of this being must be carried out prior to every factual concretion. 
This neutrality also indicates that Dasein is neither of the two sexes.”66 However, as Aho explains, “the 
neutrality of Dasein is ‘broken’, insofar as we are each gendered, factical beings.”67 Heidegger, too, is 
quite clear about it: “Neutral Dasein is never what exists; Dasein exists in each case only in its factical 
concretion.”68 This might seem like an inconsistency; it fades, however, when one recognises that we 
can only talk about a ‘break’ of Dasein’s neutrality insofar as we are already in a world that we 
recognise and share, and are each trying to make sense of our lives. It is, in other words, something 
that can only happen subsequently, a secondary rather than a primary moment.69 
 
Soma and psyche 
The implications of the differentiation between the lived and the corporeal body are even more 
apparent when we consider phenomena such as pain. When I have a back pain, where is it in terms of 
spatial location? Of course it is somewhere around my back, but the actual experience of pain does 
not involve the material, measurable spatiality of the body. One can have a mental image of one’s 
body, and thus be able to locate spatially a bodily pain, but this picture need not correspond to the 
material form of one’s body. Heidegger points out that medically trained observers 
are educated in anatomy and physiology as doctors, that is, with a focus on the examination of bodies, [and for this 
reason they] probably look at the states of the body in a different way than the ‘layman’ does. Yet, a layman’s 
experience is probably closer to the phenomenon of pain as it involves our body lines, even if it can hardly be 
described with the aid of our usual intuition of space.70 
And what about the phenomenon of emotional pain? When I feel grief of sorrow “inside myself”, 
where is this pain located exactly? Is this pain psychical or is it somatic? Does this question make sense 
at all? If I am to study pain, where should I look? What about sorrow? Is sorrow real? How can it be 
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studied? How can your sadness be measured? What about blushing from shame and embarrassment? 
Can blushing be measured? 
One could say that even though shame or sorrow cannot be directly measured, they can be 
measured indirectly. For example, if you blush, that means that your face is more red than usual, and 
this could be quantified by measuring the flow of blood. This is not a satisfactory answer for Heidegger. 
Throughout the Zollikon Seminars he is never tired of repeating that the traditional way of studying 
non-measurable psychic phenomena by reducing them to something which can be measured is never 
appropriate. “It is imperative,” he said, “to refrain from any possibility of reductionism.”71 For 
Heidegger, attempting to reduce phenomena to something that can be measured is violent, an assault 
upon reality, as Glazebrook writes.72 
It has to be noted in this connection that Heidegger’s argument against reductionism is only 
applicable to research conducted according to quantitative methodologies. Indeed, recent decades 
have seen the emergence of an abundance of qualitative research methodologies that purport to 
gather an in-depth understanding of human behaviour, and the reasons behind them, ensuring that 
this understanding is firmly grounded on—and reflects—the empirical data collected. They are, 
however, extraneous to Heidegger’s argument, as it is unfolded throughout the Zollikon Seminars, 
since Heidegger is focusing on the limitations of the natural sciences in particular. 
To illustrate his point Heidegger, turns his attention to a relatively new (at the time) field of 
medicine, that of psychosomatics. Psychosomatics is that branch of medical science that attempts to 
study illness at the intersection of soma or body (in Greek: σώμα) and psyche or soul (in Greek: ψυχή), 
focusing on the mutual influences of each on the other.73 Heidegger dedicated more than one seminar 
meeting to discuss its concepts and overall approach. He brought an example from a lecture given at 
the first meeting of the Swiss Psychosomatic Association by Robert Hegglin, a Swiss physician and 
cardiologist. In that lecture, Hegglin had introduced psychosomatics as a concept that covers all mutual 
influences between psyche and soma and had suggested holding to one “simple principle” in order to 
distinguish between the two: “Psychic phenomena cannot be weighed and measured, but only felt 
intuitively, whereas everything somatic can be somehow grasped by numbers.”74 Hegglin had brought 
up the example of sadness, which, as he had explained, cannot be measured, but can be studied 
indirectly, by investigating quantitatively the process of tear-formation. 
This is exactly the kind of approach that Heidegger would take issue with. It is very clear, he 
pointed out, that if you decide to follow Hegglin’s suggestion, you are not measuring sadness; you are 
only measuring “a fluid and its drops at the most, but not tears [of sadness]”.75 Tears are not tears of 
sadness in their own right. Tears of sadness can only be seen (and recognised as such) by human beings 
who know what sadness is. Humans can distinguish between tears caused by sadness and tears caused 
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by something else—for example, by an irritation of the eye, or by a strong blast of air. Even if one 
decided to investigate quantitatively the formation of tears, the equipment one would use to measure 
their flow would not be in a position to distinguish between tears of sadness, tears of irritation, etc. 
For Heidegger, bodily expressions of psychic phenomena cannot be reduced to a set of 
measurable manifestations of bodily functions, however elaborate. 
We usually take [a phenomenon such as] blushing as an expression, that is, we immediately take it as a sign of an 
internal state of mind. But … psychologists … misinterpret everything as an expression of something interior instead 
of seeing the phenomena of the body in the context of which men are in relationship to each other.76 
In other words, phenomena pertaining to human behaviour should not be interpreted as an expression 
of a supposed interiority understood as standing vis-à-vis the world: “If one speaks about the … I–Thou 
and We relationships, then one says something very incomplete. These phrases still have their origin 
in a primarily isolated Ego.”77 They are conceptual constructions that belong in the modern, scientific 
worldview and are adopted uncritically.  
Heidegger holds that the discussion about the distinction between psyche and soma cannot but 
be a philosophical one. Contrary to what appears to be the case, the thematic domains of psyche and 
soma, or body and soul, are not given in advance. They “are determined by the manner each case can 
be accessed, and in turn, the way of access is determined by the subject matter, hence, by soma and 
psyche.”78 Any enquiry about the nature of the connections between psyche and soma is leading us to 
a dead end if the answer is expected to be on the level of the somatic or the psychological. In much 
the same way as modern physics, which takes time and space as suppositions and accepts them 
without raising questions pertaining to the regional ontology of physics, medical science takes soma 
(body) as a given, without for a moment stopping to contemplate its own regional ontology. From the 
point of view of medical science, the body is an object present-at-hand, and as such, it (the science) is 
justified in studying it in its measurability. But this is a very limited view of what the body is. 
 
Certainty, truth, science 
For Heidegger, all this is a reflection of the modern outlook that holds that only measurable entities 
are accessible by science. Two of the conceptual pillars of modern scientific method are the notions of 
object and objectivity. These are a relatively recent addition to the history of thought. They belong to 
the general phenomenon of how something which is present can manifest itself to the human being. 
In ancient Greek thought, something which is present was considered to be something that has 
emerged in itself; the term they used was physis (in Greek: φύσις), a term derived from a verb that 
meant bring forth, produce, etc. After Descartes, things are no longer understood as emerging in 
themselves; they are now understood as objects for a thinking subject. As Heidegger explains, 
Objectivity is a definite modification of the presence of things. A subject thereby understands the presencing of a 
thing from itself with regard to the representedness. Presence is understood as representedness. … The fundamental 
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difference lies in the fact that in the former experience something is a being insofar as I represent it. Modern science 
rests on the transformation of the experience of the presence of things into objectivity.79 
This change has had major repercussions in our relation to the world. The whole domain of 
nature was now thought of as a domain of processes—knowledge of which was guaranteed by their 
measurability, i.e., their calculability. The change of our conception of presence, which took place after 
(and because of) Descartes, led to a change of what is truth. In the past truth was the self-manifestation 
of what is immediately present; after Descartes it is “characterised as what can be ascertained clearly 
and evidently, [and is] indubitably certain for a representing Ego”.80 
Descartes was determined to locate the foundations of certainty in mathematics, because he 
did not want to rely on the authority of the Bible or the Church. Descartes was searching for “a single 
principle of highest and absolute certainty, from which afterwards, by the method of composition, the 
whole compass of experience must find its explanation.”81 Descartes realised that even then, when 
doubting everything, one can still ascertain the existence of one’s own consciousness, the 
consciousness of the doubting subject. As Heidegger explains, “that fundamental proof and certainty 
[is] expressed in the proposition:  Ego cogito sum, I think I am. In the immediate insight into ‘I think’, 
that I am is also immediately given.”82 Heidegger stresses the point that Descartes’s statement is not 
a conclusion, and in this he echoes what Descartes writes in his reply to the Second Objections to his 
Meditations: 
And when we become aware that we are thinking beings, this is a primary notion that is not derived by means of any 
syllogism. When someone says, ‘I am thinking, therefore I am, or exist’, he does not deduce existence from thought 
by a syllogism, but, recognizes it as something self-evident by a simple intuition of the mind. This is clear from the 
fact that if he were deducing it by means of a syllogism, he would have to have had previous knowledge of the major 
premise ‘Everything which thinks is, or exists’; yet in fact he learns it from experiencing in his own case that it is 
impossible that he should think without existing.83 
Having established its own existence by the very intuition of its thinking, the human intellect can 
now turn towards the world—understood as being out there, as a domain of objects vis-à-vis the 
human intellect qua observing subject. The Cartesian subject, just like Descartes himself, seeks for 
certainty. Certainty needs a solid foundation, and the only truly solid foundation for certainty can be 
given by science and mathematics. Heidegger notes: 
In principle, mathematical things possess the same proof and certainty. This is the reason that the projection of nature 
as a calculable domain of objects at the same time implies that calculability is understood as mathematical 
determination. … In this manner of anticipatory projection of nature as a domain of calculable objects a decision has 
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already been made … that everything not exhibiting the characteristics of mathematically determinable objectivity is 
eliminated as being uncertain, that is, untrue and therefore unreal.84 
For Heidegger, all these considerations should form an important part of the initial elaboration of the 
concepts employed by any science that would claim to study human beings in their concernful 
engagements with each other and with the entities they encounter in the world, in their being in time, 
in their being healthy or ill. And yet they do not. Doctors, psychologists, scientists, and laymen alike 
“have moved uncritically into the technical-scientific way of thinking and view it as the only one that 
is valid.”85 
The similarities between Heidegger’s conception of science and “the work of Kuhn, Feyerabend, 
Polanyi, Hanson, Hesse and other post-positivist theories of science” are, as John Caputo writes, 
“suggestive”.86 Heidegger uses the term “acceptance” to denote the shared constellation of beliefs 
within a scientific community—a “paradigm”, in Kuhn’s terminology87—and points out that the study 
of the conditions of this acceptance does not form part of the scientific enterprise: “We stand before 
phenomena, which require us to become aware of them and to receive-perceive them in an 
appropriate manner. It is no longer up to the physicist, but only to the philosopher, to say something 
about what is accepted in this way.”88  
 
A critique of psychoanalysis 
Heidegger did not have any direct contact with Freud, and it is not precisely known how much he really 
read him. But he did not respect Freud’s thought. In a speech that he gave in 1947, he made it clear 
that he saw psychoanalysis as a major threat: “Psychology—which long ago turned into 
psychoanalysis—is taken … as a substitute for philosophy (if not for religion)”.89 
Heidegger was most critical of Freud’s tacit belief in the explainability of psychical life in causal 
terms: for Heidegger, Freud assumed that the psychical and the physical domain operate in the same 
way, and wanted to apply the concept of scientific causality to the psychical domain.90 Heidegger 
thought of Freud as claiming that “only what can be explained in terms of psychological, unbroken, 
causal connections between forces is actual and genuinely actual,”91 and believed that analysis, in the 
Freudian sense, is nothing but “a reduction in the sense of a dissolution so that we might develop a 
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causal explanation.”92 Having observed that there is no such a thing as an unbroken explanatory chain 
in the conscious mental life of an individual, Freud had “to invent” the unconscious in order to establish 
an unbroken [chain of] causal connections. The postulate is the complete explanation of psychical life whereby 
explanation and understanding are identified. This postulate is not derived from the psychical phenomena themselves 
but is a postulate of modern natural science. What for Kant transcends [conscious] perception, for instance the fact 
that the stone becomes warm because the sun is shining, is for Freud ‘the unconscious’.93 
In Heidegger’s view, the introduction of hypotheses such as that of an unconscious motivation 
(to explain, for example, a slip of the tongue or a parapraxis) does not advance the understanding of 
the phenomenon in question; instead it distorts it because it involves unexamined prior assumptions. 
“The matter [attributed to] unconscious intention is an explanation as opposed to a phenomenological 
interpretation. This explanation is a pure hypothesis that in no way advances the understanding of the 
phenomenon itself.”94 
We tend to think of remembering as an action of retrieving something and returning it to (our) 
awareness. And we think of forgetting as a disruption of this action, or a difficulty in completing it. We 
cannot see that such a description already includes a tacit assumption regarding memory itself, 
according to which memory is a psychical container or storage, from which we are supposed to be able 
to retrieve information at will. This is a very problematic description. In fact, if we look at it closely, we 
will see that remembering or forgetting is not even the primary phenomenon. Heidegger explains: 
The different ways of ‘forgetting’ are the ways and manners of how something withdraws from oneself, how it 
conceals itself. When I forget the umbrella at the hairdresser, what is that? I did forget taking the umbrella with me, 
but not the umbrella. I omitted it. I did not think of it. I was just concerned with something else. Therefore, here 
forgetting is a privation of having thought of something. Here, memory [is understood as] recalling something. 
I have forgotten the name of someone I know. I cannot retrieve his name. It no longer comes to mind. It slipped my 
memory. The name slipped my memory. What slipped my memory is a privation. From where did it slip? From 
retaining it, from memory. Therefore, this forgetting is the privation of retaining something. In turn, to retain 
something is a specific form of the relationship toward which I comport myself. It is not a mode of thinking about 
something because I do not need to think continuously about a name, which I retain. Here memory is [understood] 
as retaining.95 
In other words, if we attend to the phenomenon of forgetting closely enough, we will see that the 
primordial phenomenon is “retaining”. When I forget something it is because I no longer wish to think 
about it, and I let it slip away from me; it is not because there is a failure of some sort in a retrieval 
mechanism or process. 
This is an argument that Heidegger had made before. In Being and Time, for example, he had 
written: 
Having forgotten as an inauthentic way of having been, is thus related to that thrown being which is one's own; it is 
the temporal meaning of that being in accordance with which I am proximally and for the most part as-having­been. 
Only on the basis of such forgetting can anything be retained by the concernful making-present which awaits; and 
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what are thus retained are entities encountered within-the-world with a character other than that of Dasein. To such 
retaining, there corresponds a non-retaining which presents us with a kind of ‘forgetting’ in a derivative sense. … 
Remembering is possible only on [the basis] of forgetting, and not vice versa; for in the mode of having-forgotten, 
one's having been ‘discloses’ primarily the horizon into which a Dasein lost in the ‘superficiality’ of its object of 
concern, can bring itself by remembering.96 
There is a difference between recalling (in German: Erinnerung) and making-present (in German: 
Vergegenwärtigung), a difference that reflects different modes of Dasein’s comportment towards 
beings. If it is difficult to clarify this difference, this would only serve to show us how “in the prevailing 
physiological-psychological approach, such a phenomenon is presupposed as self-evident and known,” 
while it “not only remains indeterminate, but even more significantly, a decisive state of affairs goes 
unnoticed”.97 
A phenomenon such as my leaving something behind—e.g., an umbrella at the hairdresser—
cannot be explained with the help of, say, a repressed motive, as a psychoanalyst would hold; for 
Heidegger, the grounds for the assertion are invalid. Even if it were the case that something unpleasant 
is avoided by means of my forgetting the umbrella, it is rather that I let myself be absorbed with 
something else in order to be able to let slip away what is uncomfortable for me. I let myself be 
“entirely absorbed in this avoidance in a nonreflective way.” The psychoanalyst tries to explain in terms 
of a set of laws, rules, and models, while the phenomenologist only attempts to interpret, i.e., to bring 
the phenomenon to light. “The matter [attributed to] unconscious intention is an explanation as 
opposed to a phenomenological interpretation.”98 
According to Heidegger, Freud’s overall metapsychology “is the application of Neo-Kantian 
philosophy to the human being”,99 whereby the human being is understood in terms of its interactions 
with an unknown reality. As Richard Askay and Jensen Farquhar explain, Neo-Kantianist philosophical 
trends 
however widely divergent, shared the conviction that something can only be a ‘science’ if it returned to the spirit of 
Kant. … Heidegger … must have had in mind the Neo-Kantianism of Helmholtz …. Helmholtz gave a generic, 
physiological account of sense-perception with empirical analogies to Kant’s transcendental psychology. He held that 
the sensible world is a product of the interaction between the human organism and an unknown reality: the world of 
experience is determined by this interaction.100 
More specifically, Freud’s basic approach “specifically neglects to determine the human being’s 
character of being, [the character] of the human being, who radically articulates his being human with 
language.”101 It is Freud’s adherence to a subject–object model of the human being, together with his 
insistence that the world is presented to the subject’s consciousness via object-presentations (i.e., a 
combination of a thing-presentation and a word-presentation) that prevented him from seeing that 
being is disclosed to human beings in the clearing—i.e, the openness where being is disclosed to Dasein 
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as truth—even before they have developed a consciousness, that is, even before they have developed 
an awareness of their reflective comportment towards being.102 
Concealment is not the antithesis of consciousness, but rather concealment belongs to the clearing. Freud simply did 
not see this clearing; otherwise, he would have succeeded in understanding the consciousness of children. There is a 
relationship to clearing which need not be ‘conscious’ and reflected on in the Freudian sense. … Concealment is not 
a hiding, as is Freud’s ‘repression’, because hiding [as repression] is a special way and manner of being in the 
clearing.103  
Freud operated within the mechanistic/scientific (i.e., Cartesian) worldview whereby the human 
being is to be reduced to an object present-at-hand and can be studied scientifically. Because of this, 
he failed to give an adequate account of the human being as a world-disclosing being and needed to 
resort to unnecessary hypotheses, the most problematic of which is that of the “fatal distinction 
between the conscious and the unconscious.”104 In short, if Heidegger’s criticism of psychoanalysis is 
to be taken seriously, what is at stake is first and foremost the concept that is at the very heart of the 
Freudian project, the unconscious. As William Richardson elaborates, 
If the Freudian unconscious is only the underside of a Cartesian conception of consciousness, conceived as an 
encapsulated ego-subject, what happens if this Cartesian model is scrapped? Does not the unconscious go too? Of 
course it does—and that is exactly Heidegger’s position. For Dasein is not fundamentally an ego-subject. Dasein is the 
clearing of being in which all beings (including itself) may appear and reveal themselves as what they are.105 
The second axis of Heidegger’s critique of psychoanalysis regards Freud’s failure to grasp the 
totality of the phenomenon of being-in-the-world, which led to his failure to draw out a complete 
account of the human being in his or her historicity. “The ‘psychoanalytic case history’ is by no means 
a history but [an explanation by means of] a naturalistic chain of causes, a chain of cause and effect, 
and even more, a construct.”106 
Heidegger’s critique focuses on the “orthodox”, Freudian version of psychoanalysis; it is not 
difficult to see, however, that it is applicable to almost all post-Freudian varieties of psychoanalysis. 
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Chapter 3: Heidegger and the clinic 
Even before the commencement of the Zollikon Seminars, Heidegger’s ideas were making inroads into 
discussions about psychology, psychopathology, and psychotherapy. Concepts such as Dasein or being-
in-the-world, and ideas such as his on time, temporality, and historicity, were gradually understood as 
very relevant and connected to the work of those who were trying to study, and alleviate, human 
suffering. 
Speaking more generally, phenomenological influences have been largely fuelling the 
developments in the field of qualitative research in psychology in recent decades. The overall influence 
of phenomenology on psychiatry, psychology, and clinical psychology has been very extensive, with 
several schools of psychotherapy bearing names such as “Existential Therapy”, “Humanistic 
Psychology”, and “Person-centred Therapy”, to name but a few.1 
Among the many writers who could be mentioned in this connection are, for example, French 
psychiatrist Eugène Minkowski, who incorporated phenomenology into psychopathology in his study 
of depression in order to describe and study the lived experience of the human being;2 Austrian 
neurologist and psychiatrist Viktor Frankl, who developed an existential therapy called logotherapy;3 
Scottish psychiatrist R. D. Laing, who focused on the study of the experience of psychosis and became 
associated with the so-called anti-psychiatry movement;4 American psychiatrist and psychotherapist 
Irvin Yalom, whose existential psychotherapy centres on what he calls four “givens” of existence, i.e., 
death, freedom, isolation and meaninglessness;5 Dutch psychotherapist Emmy van Deurzen, whose 
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work in the UK focuses on an exploration of the so-called “lived-world” and the human being’s 
problems in living;6 and many others.7 
Heidegger’s influence has been growing in the field of qualitative research in psychology and 
nursing as well. One can mention, for example, Sherrill Conroy, who has proposed an interpretative 
phenomenology—“a qualitative method for research is offered that clearly incorporates Heideggerian 
philosophy into an interpretive phenomenological research design”;8 or others who are discussing 
“how [Heidegger’s] philosophy may translate into a methodological framework to be utilized in 
contemporary nursing research.”9 
There were also some attempts to relate Heidegger’s philosophy to Heinz Kohut’s Self 
Psychology and his “non-Cartesian” conception of the human being.10 As John Riker has argued, 
both Heidegger and Kohut offer visions of human nature that are decidedly anti-Cartesian, for both hold that we are 
embedded in the world with no possibility of complete transcendence. For Heidegger we are always in-the-world-
with-others; for Kohut we develop through self-object relationships and never outgrow our need for them. 
Subjectivity arises out of intersubjectivity, not vice versa.11 
On their part, Robert Stolorow and his collaborators have been working on a so-called 
intersubjective-systems theory, acknowledging readily the Heideggerian influence on their own post-
Cartesian psychoanalysis. According to Stolorow, “Post-Cartesian psychoanalysis and Heidegger’s 
existential philosophy are both forms of phenomenological enquiry. Post-Cartesian psychoanalysis is 
an ontic discipline … Heidegger’s existential analytic, by contrast, is an ontological inquiry.”12 Stolorow 
argues that 
an encounter with post-Cartesian psychoanalysis has the potential of enriching Heidegger’s existential philosophy, in 
that post-Cartesian psychoanalysis gives an account of the relational contexts that make it possible for one to dwell 
in and bear the painful emotional experiences, the ground moods, that are revelatory of authentic existence.13 
Among the works by the psychiatrists and psychologists who can be said to be more or less 
directly influenced by Heidegger’s philosophy, Ludwig Binswanger’s Existential Analysis, or 
Daseinsanalysis (in German: Daseinsanalyse) and Medard Boss’s own Daseinsanalysis (in German: 
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Daseinsanalytik), stand apart. Interestingly, for reasons related more to timing rather than to their 
respective merits, Binswanger is much more widely known than Boss in the Anglo-Saxon world and 
America. For a long time, psychologists came into contact with Heideggerian thought primarily, or even 
solely, through Binswanger. It was believed that the differences between Binswanger and Boss were 
minimal, even though this was not the case.14 
Both authors were very open in acknowledging their debt to Heidegger, as the names of their 
respective theories suggest; and both authors had come to Heidegger from a more or less Freudian 
starting point. Their respective approaches represented direct and explicit attempts to apply 
Heideggerian insights to psychiatry and psychotherapy, and as Hans Cohn puts it, they stand apart as 
“the most comprehensive and radical attempts made so far to provide a philosophical answer and 
alternative to Freud’s scientific project.”15 It is from this angle that I will approach them here. I will 
examine them as comprehensive attempts at creating a clinically useful Heideggerian theory of 
psychology and psychotherapy. 
 
Binswanger’s Daseinsanalyse 
Ludwig Binswanger was a Swiss psychiatrist and psychotherapist born into a family with a tradition in 
psychiatry going back to his grandfather. Binswanger studied psychiatry and then served his internship 
under Eugen Bleuler and his assistant, Carl Gustav Jung. Through Jung, Binswanger came into contact 
with Freud in Vienna. Their first meeting, and subsequent friendship, was of tremendous importance 
for the young psychiatrist. Freud presented a fundamental challenge to Binswanger, not only for his 
science, psychiatry, but also for his understanding of man. They remained friends until the end.  
Binswanger was deeply influenced by Freud’s theories, which he placed within the larger 
tradition of an interpretative approach in the human sciences as laid out by Dilthey.16 He thought, 
however, that Freud’s theory missed two things: a solid philosophical grounding for its concepts and 
formulations; and a more comprehensive conception of man. The first of the two was the promise of 
Husserl’s phenomenology, while the second, Binswanger felt, was provided by Heidegger’s analytic of 
Dasein. 
According to Spiegelberg, it appears that Binswanger was originally thinking of adopting the 
name “phenomenological anthropology” for his theory, but eventually chose the term Daseinsanalyse, 
first suggested by the Swiss psychiatrist Jakob Wyrsch.17 The term is sometimes rendered in English as 
Existential Analysis. 
Binswanger maintained that experience is never meaningless, and strove to get to its meaning. 
He also refused to accept that there are clearly distinguishable normal and abnormal states of mind, 
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and rejected any rigid division between psychotic and neurotic disturbances. In his view, any symptom 
and mental health phenomenon had a meaning in the life history of the specific individual, and his 
therapeutic approach was to explore and investigate this meaning, never to guess it or to impose it. 
Binswanger developed his ideas with Heidegger’s knowledge and support. Spiegelberg writes that it 
was Heidegger who kept urging Binswanger to write a “hermeneutics of exploration”.18 Gradually, 
however, Binswanger started distancing himself from Heidegger and this, at least according to Roger 
Frie, led to Heidegger’s taking “offence” and deciding to work with Medard Boss, who “was not inclined 
to be critical.”19 
Binswanger agreed with Heidegger that the problematic division of the world into subject and 
object can be overcome only through Heidegger’s concept of being-in-the-world; he maintained that 
this concept could be used to approach and explore mental phenomena such as the psychoses. As he 
explained, 
In the mental diseases we face modifications of the fundamental or essential structure and of the structural links of 
being in the world as transcendence. It is one of the tasks of psychiatry to investigate and establish these variations 
in a scientifically exact way.20 
In order to describe human beings in their worldly existence and suffering, Binswanger utilised 
more Heideggerian concepts such as care, thrownness, anxiety, etc. He felt, however, that Heidegger’s 
approach was not fully adequate for his (Binswanger’s) own aims. In his major work, Grundformen und 
Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins, Binswanger criticised Heidegger for ignoring the social dimension in 
his analytics.21 Binswanger contended, as Frie explains, “that Heidegger’s care-structure is unable 
satisfactorily to explain authentic human existence in terms of relation, because the realization of 
authentic being results in the individualization of Dasein.”22 Thus, Binswanger suggested a combination 
of Heidegger’s views with elements of Martin Buber’s philosophy of the so-called “basic experience”, 
namely the dialogue between I and Thou, and attempted to supplement Heidegger’s concept of care 
with a phenomenology of love.23 In the words of Emmy van Deurzen, 
Binswanger considers mutuality or being-with to be fundamental to human existence. Instead of having to choose 
between Heidegger’s inauthentic being with other or authentic being alone, we can redeem ourselves and others 
through true encounter in Buberian style. This encounter, which is a loving mode of being, is what the therapist should 
aim for with the patient.24 
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From a strictly Heideggerian point of view, Binswanger’s Daseinsanalyse is based on a 
fundamental misunderstanding. Heidegger never set out to create a theory of anthropology: his 
Analytic of Dasein was meant to be prior to anthropology, as well as prior to psychology or biology. 
Dasein is an ontological concept, not an ontic one; when Heidegger uses the term “Dasein”, he does 
not employ it as a synonym for the term “human being”. Binswanger seems to confound the 
ontological scope of Heidegger’s concept with the ontic scope of his own approach. 
Still, this misunderstanding might not be so unexpected, as Frie argues. Frie draws attention to 
the fact that in early Heidegger the distinction between ontological and ontic concepts might not 
always have been so clear-cut and obvious: 
Dasein itself can at the same time be considered to be factically a human being. From this perspective, it is not entirely 
surprising that Heidegger’s ontological investigation was seen by Binswanger and other early commentators to 
provide a productive model for anthropological studies of the human being.25 
I do not find Frie’s explanation entirely satisfactory. As already discussed, the ontological scope of 
Heidegger’s project had been very clear throughout his writings—the only thing slightly changing 
between the early and the later Heidegger being his terminology and main focus. In my view, 
Binswanger has missed the point. 
There is a similar misconstruction involved in Binswanger’s take on concepts like care. For 
Heidegger, care is an empty formula, ontologically prior to any “factical ‘attitude’ and ‘position’ of 
Dasein, … it is always already in them.”26 Care is not one of the (ontic) ways in which Dasein relates to 
the beings it encounters. Care, in Heidegger’s ontological sense, encompasses all ontic terms 
representing each and every way in which Dasein is involved with the entities of this world, for example 
(ontic) care (e.g., “I care for my children”), (ontic) love (e.g., “I love my job”) or other terms such as 
hate, contempt, dislike. Binswanger, however, does not seem to see this. As Heidegger himself put it 
during his Zollikon Seminars, 
Binswanger’s misunderstanding consists not so much of the fact that he wants to supplement ‘care’ with love, but 
that he does not see that care has an existential, that is, ontological sense. Therefore the analytic of Dasein asks for 
Dasein’s basic ontological (existential) constitution and does not wish to give a mere description of the ontic 
phenomena of Dasein.27 
For Heidegger the relation of Dasein to being “is not a determination which only concerns the 
theme of fundamental ontology, but … the fundamental characteristic of Dasein as such.”28 
Binswanger became aware of this misunderstanding, as he admitted in the preface to the fourth 
edition of his Grundformen, but he called it fruitful, and pointed out that his own focus was not 
fundamental ontology as such.29 In connection to this, Bradley Seidman writes: 
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Perhaps it is more accurate to look upon Binswanger’s fruitful misunderstanding of Heidegger as a separate, 
independent, construct of man which rescues psychoanalysis from the one-sided, naturalistic distortion of the image 
of man. … Binswanger’s philosophical and psychiatric undertaking must be judged from the viewpoint of his 
professional goal. If his intention was to interpret Heidegger, then putting into Heidegger’s mouth what Buber has 
said is a misunderstanding. But if we look upon Binswanger as focusing on the insufficient manner of Heidegger’s 
Being-with, and then complementing this with Buber’s I–Thou dialogue, then there is no fault with Binswanger’s 
endeavour.30 
In characterising Heidegger’s being-with as insufficient, Seidman here follows Sartre’s argument, 
namely that Heidegger fails to clarify how it is possible to “pass” from an ontological to an ontic 
inference. Sartre’s criticism was discussed in Chapter 1, and found not convincing.31 In the same way, 
Seidman’s attempt to justify Binswanger’s thinking from a philosophical (Sartrean) point of view is not 
convincing either. 
Binswanger questioned the grounding of Freud’s metapsychology from a philosophical point of 
view and attempted to complement it with insights from Heidegger’s philosophy. From the vantage 
point of some decades later, however, Binswanger’s Daseinsanalyse appears as an honest but limited, 
and perhaps a bit naïve attempt. Its import today is narrow. 
 
Boss’s Daseinsanalytik  
Medard Boss was a Swiss psychiatrist, with a trajectory similar to Binswanger’s.32 He, too, had begun 
by studying Freud’s theories. Based in Zurich, Boss became connected to Jung’s circle, and for a period 
of time he even practiced Jungian analysis. He became disillusioned, however, with Jung’s own 
theoretical formulations as well, which, Boss felt, were unsupported in Jung’s clinical praxis. This led 
him to Binswanger, with whom he shared a common background and training. It was Binswanger who 
first drew Boss’s attention to Heidegger. 
After a period of struggling with Being and Time during the war, Boss decided to contact the 
philosopher himself, having felt that Heidegger’s approach offered new insights for the understanding 
of man. Boss developed his own version of a theory and practice of “psychology” which would utilise 
Heidegger’s unique insights and terminology. He called it Daseinsanalytik (rendered into English as 
Daseinsanalysis) to underline its Heideggerian connection.  
Boss was not a philosopher. He was a psychiatrist interested in human suffering and mental 
illness. He agreed with Heidegger that philosophy is of the utmost importance to psychoanalysis if 
psychoanalysis is to be grounded solidly at all, and adopted the same phenomenological approach.33 
Like Heidegger and, before him, Husserl and Brentano, Boss believed that in order to study psychical 
phenomena we need to go to the phenomena themselves. He laid great stress on the “need to be able 
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to abstain from forcing man into any preconceived and prejudicial category beforehand, such as ‘soul’, 
‘psyche’, ‘person’ or ‘consciousness’.”34 
Boss greatly respected Freud. He felt that Freud’s method, psychoanalysis, was in itself evidence 
that Freud’s work had certain Daseinsanalytik qualities. The basic psychoanalytic “tools”—such as free 
association, opaqueness of the analyst, the analyst’s free-flowing attention, the attempt to reconstruct 
a patient’s history, the search for the meaning hidden in the manifestations of one’s psychic life—were 
tools that were giving Freud “an immediate and primary understanding of man.”35 What Boss took 
issue with were Freud’s theoretical constructions.  
Boss described Daseinsanalysis as beginning with the “simplest, immediately given and 
indisputable phenomenon—the primary awareness of Being-ness.” He argued that “man’s primordial 
being-in-the-world is not an abstraction but always a concrete occurrence.” For Boss, this immediate 
and primary awareness of “Being-ness as such” is the very essence of man’s existence. This ontological 
structure of being-in-the-world as the primary awareness of Being-ness is not something existing in 
some “superworld”, nor is it like a Platonic idea or a Kantian a priori; instead, Boss argues, it is 
manifesting itself only now and here in, or as, man’s existence. This is an important point for Boss, 
because in this way he avoids Sartre’s argument about the impossibility of passing from the ontological 
to the ontic. For Boss, the ontological is readily observed in the actual phenomena of life. 
Regarding language, Boss argues that “in its deepest meaning [it] has to be regarded as a 
primordial existentialium of human Dasein.”36 Through language the world is disclosed to Dasein. In 
fact, Dasein as such has to be regarded as the clearing in which the world is disclosed. Dasein is 
essentially world-disclosure. Dasein’s original spatiality is grounded on this fact, and is closely related 
to man’s original temporality, which in turn always refers to his own Dasein’s disclosing and taking care 
of something.37 
Criticism of the Freudian “unconscious” was central to Boss’s writings. He claimed that nothing 
can justify its introduction—certainly not the phenomena of mental life that led Freud to it, such as 
dreams, parapraxes, etc. For Boss, it was only because Freud thought of “ideas” as internal (or mental) 
representations of objects or other entities of an external world that he deemed it necessary to bring 
in the assumption of the existence of an unconscious. Otherwise, he would not be able to explain the 
observable fact of, say, one’s temporarily forgetting a well-known piece of information. For Freud, this 
piece of information, this “idea”, could not but have been made temporarily inaccessible (namely, 
pushed into the “unconscious”) by a mental force such as “repression”. Obviously, if there was such a 
force at play, and yet we are unaware of it, this can only mean that it must be located in the 
unconscious as well. At the heart of all this is the underlying belief in a state of affairs in which a human 
being is something analogous to a camera, an entity (subject) that collects and processes 
representations of the world out there.38 Not so for Boss: a thought is not seen as the internal presence 
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of an idea originating in (or reflecting) an external world, but rather as evidence of the “ec-static” 
character of Dasein as an “elucidating, meaning-disclosing clearing.”39 
In this view, a piece of information that is unexpectedly forgotten is evidence only of one thing: 
that sometimes the presence of an entity (the piece of information) can fall out of one’s existential 
realm of openness. 
Forgetting is not a separate mental ability, any more than remembering or retaining. It is an occurrence of our open 
realm of presceptive being-in-the-world, one to which we are given over at all times. Like remembering, it concerns 
the things of my world. It is without exception the names themselves, the persons or objects, which, having revealed 
themselves from their places in the world-openness as which I am existing, can either be retained or slip away from 
me. It does not involve the displacement of some assumed endopsychic representations of external world objects.40 
Boss was also skeptical about Freud’s conception of mental determinism, especially in reference 
to human psychopathology: 
A Daseinsanalytic study of pathogenesis does not aim to trace phenomena back to causes, but is concerned with 
discovering biographical incidents which then motivated a human being to conduct himself in a certain way and which 
still motivate him to perpetuate these modes.41 
Writing about mental illnesses such as schizophrenia, Boss makes two points: 
First, schizophrenic illness is not, current conceptions notwithstanding, a disorder in intrapsychic representations of 
objects in the outside world, or of inner drives and aspirations, all of which would reside in a capsule-like psyche. … 
Second, schizophrenia must be seen as a disturbance of the specific being-in-the-world which is the nature of human 
being.42 
Boss insisted that “schizophrenia will be recognized in its encroachment on the freedom of being-in-
the-world when human experience itself is seen as open, responsive, ec-static being-in-the-world.”43 
In other words, “human being is nothing but its perceptive opened, and so this characteristic mode of 
behavior of the schizophrenic—in psychiatry called schizoid behavior or autism—amounts to a radical 
destruction of human being.”44 Regarding the etiology of the illness, Boss pointed out that 
whenever the schizophrenic’s ability to respond to the encountered is overextended or claimed more intensively than 
he can bear, his existential freedom collapses. This explains why it is that schizophrenia is unknown in animals, rare 
in children, not infrequent in women after childbirth, and most frequent after puberty. In the latter two situations, 
the individual’s perceiving existence is opened to powerful new demands from others.45 
Finally, comparing the Daseinsanalytic view of schizophrenia with that of obsessive-compulsive 
disorder, he wrote: 
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The obsessive-compulsive patient is never so completely engulfed in what he has perceived that he must become it 
and thereby perish as a human being. In schizophrenia the patient loses his freedom and with it his dwelling place in 
the world to a much higher degree. Obsessive-compulsion may encroach on the patient’s freedom, but it does not 
engender its destruction.46 
All in all, Boss would recognise that in practice there is much in common between Freud’s 
psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis. He argued, however, that 
Daseinsanalysis is the only form of psycho-therapy which has a philosophically adequate foundation for 
understanding the phenomena which appear within that situation as well as the fundamental meaning of 
psychotherapy itself and how it is even possible in the first place.47 
From a Heideggerian point of view, there can be little doubt that Boss has been much more 
successful than Binswanger in applying Heidegger’s insights to psychiatry and psychotherapy. Boss 
remained throughout his writings very close to Heidegger’s texts, and did not shy away from using 
Heidegger’s very distinct language, and reproducing in his writings many of Heidegger’s own 
examples—to the point that sometimes is not easy to distinguish between the two. Eric Craig considers 
Boss’s language as one of the reasons why his work has not been more widely embraced, especially in 
America.48  
In my view there are two main issues with Boss’s Daseinsanalysis. The first is the question of 
whether it is indeed useful, or even valid, to use concepts such as Dasein within a framework of study 
of human psychopathology, in the manner of Boss; and the second is related to Daseinsanalysis’ 
effectiveness as a therapeutic tool. Let us begin with the first. 
We can accept that a phenomenological description of one’s own (ontic) existence on this earth 
will state something like I am this Dasein whose being is always mine. Still, this is not tantamount to 
saying that I am identical to Dasein as such—Dasein is not synonymous with my being qua human 
being. For example, when I consider my own personal suffering, this suffering is ontic, and not 
ontological. It is not valid to say that it is a suffering of this particular Dasein—in contrast to, say, the 
Dasein next door who these days does not suffer at all. It would be conceptually more correct to say 
that I am suffering, qua Dasein, in one of the many ways that Dasein can suffer. The multiplicity or 
totality of these ways is ontological; my own suffering, on the other hand, however typical, complex 
or multifaceted it may be, is merely ontic. In a similar vein, Dasein’s death is ontological, but my own 
unavoidable demise is ontic. 
Yet we see Boss as claiming that a Daseinsanalytic therapy would seek to help a schizophrenic 
patient to achieve “a measure of authentic selfhood and slowly go on to richer, more free, more mature 
possibilities of perceiving and responding to a freer being-in-the-world.”49 Is it not the case that here 
Boss is treating an ontological concept, such as being-in-the-world, as if it were an ontic property of 
Dasein qua human being? Is it not the case that the concept of richer or more free possibilities of 
perceiving being-in-the-world is disregarding the ontological difference? A similar problem can be 
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identified in Boss’s reference (in the same example) to freer and more mature possibilities of 
perceiving. Is it not the case that Boss allows himself to include his own views on (ontic) mental 
development (e.g., mature as opposed to immature, and free as opposed to unfree) in a discussion 
that ought to remain ontological? 
By arguing that concepts such as being-in-the-world are not abstractions, but always concrete 
occurrences, Boss fails to keep open Heidegger’s own distinction. Heidegger writes: “Being and its 
structure transcend every being and every possible existent determination of a being. Being is the 
transcendens pure and simple. … Phenomenological truth (disclosedness of being) is veritas 
transcendentalis.”50 One can see here that, for Heidegger, Being, being-in-the-world, Dasein, care, etc., 
are not abstractions but transcendens pure. For Boss, however, they are taken as worldly and concrete, 
i.e., ontic. In other words, it appears as if the ontological difference is being disregarded.51 
This disregard is reflected in Daseinsanalysis in terms of its clarity and internal consistency. Let 
us take an example. As seen above, Boss describes schizophrenia as an encroachment on the freedom 
of being-in-the-world, the degree of which may help in differentiating schizophrenia from, say, 
obsessive-compulsive disorder. He does not, however, seem willing to offer an explanation of how a 
differing degree of encroachment can account for the radically different (clinical) picture of these two 
different modes of suffering, leaving the whole issue rather in the dark. It appears as if in the eyes of 
a Daseinsanalyst, an obsessive-compulsive patient might well become schizophrenic, if for some 
reason the encroachment is increased. In effect, one seems to be at a loss as regards an understanding 
of the reasons some people fall ill in this rather than that way.52 By choosing to remain on what he 
considers to be a phenomenologically appropriate level, Boss fails to produce a clinically relevant 
theory. 
This brings us to the second issue with Daseinsanalysis, which is related to its therapeutic 
effectiveness. In a paper focused on this subject, Richard Boothby contrasts Boss’s overall optimism 
regarding the expected outcome of a therapy to Freud’s overall pessimism and modesty.53 For Boss, a 
cure can be envisaged in terms of “the patient’s realization of previously overlooked possibilities”,54 
and as such it is always possible, provided that a trusting and accepting relationship between patient 
and analyst is established. Freud, on the other hand, had a radically different view, and did not hide 
his pessimism regarding the power of analysis as a tool.55 According to Boothby, Boss’s optimism can 
be traced back to his rejection of the unconscious. Boothby argues, convincingly, that Boss failed to 
acknowledge the clinical observations that had led Freud to his theoretical formulations, and failed to 
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account for them. As an example, Boothby examines Boss’s phenomenological descriptions of 
phenomena which Freud would describe and explain using hypotheses such as that of the unconscious 
and repression. Boss’s descriptions led him to reject the postulate for an unconscious as misplaced and 
unnecessary. However, as Boothby argues, if we look carefully at what Boss offers in its stead, we will 
see that he is effectively saying nothing more than that repression occurs; as if repression is, so to 
speak, nothing but “an unexplained and unexplainable feature of existence.”56 In all, Boothby’s view is 
that Boss misunderstood Freud conception of the unconscious, and failed to recognize the complexity 
of the concept. He chose to attack only its weakest, mechanistic, formulation, offering instead 
something which “refers less to the unconscious than to what Freud called the preconscious”.57 
Boss’s influence has been and remains significant. He has been, as van Deurzen writes “without 
a doubt the foremost exponent of existential psychotherapy in its purest Heideggerian form.”58 Cooper 
has no doubt that Boss’s writings “offer therapists of all persuasions an opportunity to reflect on, and 
reconsider, some of their most cherished beliefs”, even though his “unerring loyalty towards Heidegger 
… also gives Daseinsanalysis a somewhat reactionary, stagnant feel”.59 This “stagnant feel”, together 
with what I consider to be a failure, of Boss’s part, to present a clinically compelling psychotherapeutic 
theory, reveals Daseinsanalytik as not much more than an exercise in Heideggerian phenomenology.  
 
Heidegger and psychoanalysis revisited 
In the previous chapter, I outlined Heidegger’s critique of psychoanalysis. Heidegger’s picture of 
Freudian theory seems to tally with what is known about Freud’s influences and background. Indeed, 
as was previously mentioned, Freud’s philosophical standpoint is solidly located in the scientific 
worldview of the 19th century, and this being so, it would follow that what he sought to accomplish 
would be a scientific (i.e., a deterministic) description of human mental life and behaviour, as an 
interaction between the biological organism and the external world. Freudian concepts such as the 
unconscious, the instincts (or drives), repression, and so on and so forth, provide enough evidence of 
Freud’s intention to formulate a scientific—understood as causal—model of human mental life and 
behaviour. 
 According to Henri Ellenberger, Freud’s philosophical background was a mixture of positivism, 
scientism, and atheism. Freud attended lectures by Franz Brentano, who was also the teacher of 
Husserl and, also according to Ellenberger, had been unmistakeably influenced by philosophers like 
Fechner, von Hartmann, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche.60 Heidegger, on his part, would count Freud 
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among the proponents of a type of Neo-Kantianism, which sees the human being in terms of its 
interactions with a reality that is not known.61 
Freud himself believed that he lacked the talent for philosophy—“by nature,” as he admitted in 
a 1931 letter—and that he had “made a virtue of necessity” to “convert the facts that revealed 
themselves” to him in as “undisguised, unprejudiced, and unprepared” a form as possible.62 
Accordingly, he professed his lack of respect for what he perceived as arrogance on the part of 
metaphysicians and did not have much time for philosophy.63 Freud was not, however, always so 
hostile to it. As David Livingstone Smith writes, Freud “was critical of the philosophical orthodoxy of 
his day … [but] was alive to many of the philosophical ramifications of his work”.64 In this connection, 
Clark Glymour has commented that 
Freud's writings contain a philosophy of mind, and indeed a philosophy of mind that addresses many of the issues 
about the mental that nowadays concern philosophers and ought to concern psychologists. Freud's thinking about 
the issues in philosophy of mind is often better than much of what goes on in contemporary philosophy, and it is 
sometimes as good as the best.65 
Many writers, including Boss, have emphasised the difference between Freud the scientist and 
Freud the psychoanalyst. Even if one agrees with Heidegger that Freud’s metapsychology is an artificial 
mechanistic construction that fails to question its presuppositions, one must at least recognise that it 
was Freud’s attention to the phenomena that guided him in his theoretical speculations and not the 
other way around. Freud did not hesitate to challenge the medical, scientific, and philosophical 
establishments of his time by introducing concepts that ran contrary to conventional knowledge. For 
a child of his time, Freud was a very rebellious child indeed.66 In addition to this, Freud never shied 
away from modifying or abandoning hypotheses and concepts if clinical evidence required him to. 
Freud’s main motivation for developing psychoanalysis was his readiness to recognise that his 
observations—i.e., his listening to what his patients had to say—did not fit well with received 
knowledge, and his willingness to challenge tradition. This quest for truth is echoed in Ernest Jones’s 
biography, where he writes, “Freud’s passion to get at the truth with the maximum of certainty was, I 
again suggest, the deepest and strongest motive in his nature and the one that impelled him towards 
his pioneering achievements.”67 
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Far from acting like a short-sighted 19th-century scientist, eager to describe human beings in a 
way that would conform to a tacit mechanistic ontology, Freud developed psychoanalysis as a 
technique whose point, as it has been argued, was never 
to influence the patient in a manipulative way, … to try to explain his life history in causalities. This was what 
Heidegger accused psychoanalysis of. On the contrary—it is precisely psychoanalysis that meets the demands made 
by Heidegger.”68 
Similar points have been made by others who have attempted a re-evaluation of basic Freudian 
conceptions from a non-mechanistic point of view, and have argued about the hermeneutic dimension 
of Freudian psychoanalysis—a dimension that, according to them, was there from the beginning, from 
the very moment that Freud discovered that there were illnesses that “speak”. Frederick Wertz has 
argued that despite their theoretical divergences, there is a profound agreement in the approach, 
subject matter, and methods of phenomenology and Freudian psychoanalysis; Richard Boothby has 
tried to draw parallels between Freud’s metapsychology and phenomenology, via Lacan; while, as we 
shall see, a Lacanian reading of basic Freudian conceptions has been advocated by Heideggerian 
scholar and psychoanalyst William Richardson.69 
Heidegger’s criticism, however, raises an additional, and slightly different question, namely 
whether the phenomena Freud researched are really in need of an explanation. Heidegger clearly 
believed that this was not the case. We saw above, for example, how he described Freudian repression 
as “avoidance in a nonreflective way”.70 In Freud’s eyes, such a description would appear as an 
oversimplification: Freud held that any mental phenomenon, such as a slip of memory, can occur for a 
number of singular or combined reasons—a phenomenon which he described as overdetermination:71 
Heidegger’s “avoidance in a nonreflective way” could very well coexist with an avoidance because of, 
say, a fear of an unwittingly anticipated emotional strain—or something like this. This is just a 
description, but it represents the type of conflict that Freud had in mind when he spoke about 
repression in the first place. To put it differently, repression is just the name Freud gave to a 
phenomenon he observed; to deny that such a phenomenon exists at all on the basis of a criticism 
regarding Freud’s Cartesian worldview, or to reduce it to something simpler such as “avoidance in a 
nonreflective way”, would be an assault upon the phenomenon, as Heidegger himself would have put 
it—albeit in a different context.72 
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 Approaching these questions from a different point of view, Maurice Merleau-Ponty thought 
that “phenomenology, … is converging more than ever with Freudian research”.73 Merleau-Ponty 
accepted that there are indeed mental phenomena in what he called the limits of consciousness. As he 
explained, 
since our philosophy [i.e., phenomenology] has given us no better way to express that intemporal, that indestructible 
element in us which, says Freud, is the unconscious itself, perhaps we should continue calling it the unconscious—so 
long as we do not forget that the word is the index of an enigma … The accord of phenomenology and of 
psychoanalysis should not be understood to consist in phenomenology’s saying clearly what psychoanalysis had said 
obscurely. On the contrary, it is by what phenomenology implies or unveils as its limits—by its latent content or its 
unconscious—that it is in consonance with psychoanalysis.74 
A very similar argument has been made by Richard Boothby in his discussion of Medard Boss’s 
objections. Boothby argues that Boss—and one could say the same for Heidegger, whose views on the 
subject are virtually identical to Boss’s—“misunderstands the relation of Freud’s theoretical 
constructions to his clinical experience and … tends to miss the central intention of Freud’s positing of 
the unconscious.”75 As Boothby points out, 
Freud’s theoretical construction of the unconscious functioned not to mechanize or to objectify the human being but 
rather to conceptualize the possibility of a split subject … ‘split’ because certain domains of [the subject’s] otherwise 
intelligible material remain unassimilable to free and conscious activity.76 
But the question still remains. If, as Boothby argues, one grants that Heidegger failed or 
neglected to take into account the clinical phenomena that Freud observed, and therefore missed 
Freud’s central intention, and if, as I argue here, Heidegger’s philosophy of being is to be taken 
seriously, then one would still need to reconcile the challenge that Heidegger’s philosophy represents 
with the basic tenets of Freudian metapsychology. Is this possible? 
Let us attend to the question of the unconscious a bit more closely. We see Heidegger claiming 
that the introduction of such a hypothesis reflects Freud’s Cartesian subject–object worldview and his 
tendency to adopt uncritically ideas from the natural sciences, such as that of causality. For Heidegger, 
the “unconscious” is only needed if one sees the human being as an agent, or observer, operating in 
the world through a window of consciousness/perception and responding to stimuli coming from 
“outside”. This distinction, however, is not sustained by the phenomena themselves: Heidegger claims 
that Freud misses the ontological status of Dasein qua being-in-the-world and fails to see that 
concernful comportment towards beings is only possible when being has been revealed to Dasein. Let 
us grant this to him. Now, if we also accept that Heidegger’s understanding of the phenomena that 
Freud struggled to study and describe is oversimplified and inadequate, as argued above, then where 
do we stand? 
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To put it more concretely, if the ontic status of the unconscious is questionable—that is, if there 
is no justification, philosophically, to postulate such an entity—what is its exact status? Or, more 
simply: What is this unconscious that Freud finds impossible not to postulate? 
Attempting to address this very question, M. Guy Thompson has commented that “despite the 
controversial nature of this concept, there is a pervasive agreement among analysts that whatever the 
unconscious is, it is certainly not a form of consciousness.”77 Discussing, among other things, 
Heidegger’s and Sartre’s views, Thompson suggests that 
from Heidegger's ontological perspective, the unconscious is not a theoretical construct, nor is it ‘in’ my head, but 
‘out’ there, in the world, an inescapable dimension of being. … We apprehend it as an enigma, a dimension of our 
existence that lies hidden one moment, then slips into view the next, only to disappear again, in perpetuity.78 
John Searle is not satisfied with this understanding of the unconscious as an enigma. He 
considers this evidence of carelessness. “Since Freud”, he writes,  
we have found it useful and convenient to speak glibly about the unconscious mind without paying the price of 
explaining exactly what we mean. Our picture of unconscious mental states is that they are just like conscious states 
only minus the consciousness. But what exactly is that supposed to mean? I have not seen a satisfactory answer to 
that question.79 
Searle’s point fades a bit as soon as one considers the issues more closely. Indeed there is no 
such thing as a conscious mental state as such. To speak about a conscious or an unconscious mental 
state is just an abstraction. Freud does, of course, speak about conscious mental states in a place or 
two,80 but he only uses the term used figuratively: Consciousness is never static, it’s always on the 
move, so to speak. Consciousness is always revealed to an observer as a continuous flow of data of 
consciousness, or a flow of ideas, as Freud himself sometimes calls it—or a stream of thought, as 
William James would have it.81 What you find is never a distinct mental state “minus the 
consciousness” as Searle supposes, but rather a break in the continuity of the stream of consciousness, 
a gap. In other words, Searle might be attacking a conception of the unconscious that it is not to be 
found in Freud as such.82 It is in this gap that the indirect manifestations of the Freudian unconscious 
are to be seen, and nowhere else. The question is, how to approach it.  
In a similar vein, how can we approach other Freudian “entities” such as, for example, the 
instincts (or drives)? Freud felt it necessary to introduce them because he wanted to understand (and 
explain) phenomena such as sexual urge, sexual object choice, etc., or other phenomena such as 
repetition, trauma etc. For Heidegger, Dasein, in its concernful comportment towards being, is always, 
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and already, “ahead” of him/herself, absorbed in a future potentiality-to-be. Dasein is not driven or 
pushed from behind (by an instinct or drive) but turned towards something ahead. To draw on 
something like a drive “is already a reinterpretation and an objectification into a process, that is, an 
improper interpretation.”83 Freud’s failure is, therefore, palpable. “If one desires to reduce willing, 
wishing, propensity, and urge to ‘drives’ one must first ask the contrary question: Is the human being 
present within the total construct of Freudian libido theory at all?”84 
It seems that there is no easily accessible common ground on which Heidegger and Freud would 
have been willing to consider seriously one another’s views. As it stands, a proper dialogue between 
Freud and Heidegger never took place.85 As Askay and Farquhar explain, 
according to Freud, it was psychoanalysis that served as the ground of philosophy—and not the reverse, as Heidegger 
asseverated. … Freud conceived his ‘metapsychology’ as the ground for everything, including psychoanalysis itself as 
well as philosophy.86 
They point out that Heidegger may have failed to consider the Schopenhauerean background of 
Freud’s “determinism”; but also that Freud would have mistaken Heidegger’s insistence on the 
ontological dimension of human being for evidence of mysticism.87 But this criticism would be unfair 
as well, as I hope I have shown.  
After Freud’s death, psychoanalysis took a variety of different pathways, and many different 
schools were formed, almost all of them asserting the importance of their descent from Freud but 
disagreeing substantially with each other. In my view, none of these schools is immune to Heidegger’s 
critique, but, crucially, not many of them seem to be interested in responding to it.  
A different path was followed by Hans Loewald, a former student of Heidegger’s who 
disillusioned with philosophy re-trained as a psychoanalyst; and by Jacques Lacan, who had, at several 
points in his teaching, openly acknowledged his debt to Heidegger and Heideggerian ideas. The 
theories of Loewald and Lacan have a lot in common, as Jonathan Lear points out; their difference lies, 
he writes, in what they value.88 When Loewald came into contact with Lacan’s teaching, he was not so 
impressed. He did recognise that Lacan had something interesting to say, but wrote that Lacan 
“interprets Freud in an extremely one-sided and biased way and … he ends up obscuring whatever 
contributions he has to offer.”89 
 
                                                          
83 Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars, p. 173. 
84 Zollikon Seminars, p. 172. 
85 Askay and Farquhar present an attempt at such a “dialogue” in Askay and Farquhar, Apprehending the Inaccessible, pp. 211-229. 
86 Apprehending the Inaccessible, p. 224. 
87 See Apprehending the Inaccessible, pp. 228-229. 
88 Jonathan Lear, ‘Introduction’ in Hans Loewald, The Essential Loewald: Collected Papers and Monographs (Hagerstown, Maryland: University 
Publishing Group, 2000), ix-xl, p. xxii. 
89 Loewald, quoted in Martin Woessner, Heidegger in America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 85. 
Chapter 3: Heidegger and the clinic  80 
  
Hans Loewald’s disillusionment  
Loewald was an American psychoanalyst of Jewish-German origin.90 He had initially studied philosophy 
at Freiburg under Heidegger and would have become a philosopher but for Heidegger’s connections 
with National Socialism. This severely alienated Loewald and led to his withdrawal from philosophy. 
Later he would describe it thus: “My teacher in this field [philosophy] was Martin Heidegger, and I am 
deeply grateful for what I learned from him, despite his most hurtful betrayal in the Nazi era.”91 
Loewald’s steps led him to Rome, where he studied medicine. Later, he began his practice as a 
psychiatrist in Padua before escaping to America when anti-Semitism and political tensions in 
Mussolini’s Italy made it increasingly difficult to practice.  
Heideggerian influences are evident in Loewald’s point of view and the questions he decided to 
explore, but he rarely acknowledged them explicitly, at least not until the later years of his teaching. 
In his 1962 paper ‘Superego and Time’, for example, he examined “the significance of the future, as a 
temporal mode, for a deeper understanding of the superego”92 and argued that the role that 
psychoanalysis ascribes to the superego cannot but be seen within a temporal frame, in the sense that 
the superego always points towards a future ego. There are conspicuous Heideggerian undertones 
when he says that 
Insofar as the superego is the agency of inner standards, demands, hopes and concerns in regard to the ego, the 
agency of inner rewards and punishments in respect to which the ego experiences contentment or guilt, the superego 
functions from the viewpoint of a future ego, from the standpoint of the ego’s future that is to be reached, is being 
reached, is being failed or abandoned by the ego.93 
And further in the text: “In the structure of the superego, the ego confronts itself in the light of its own 
future.”94 
Some years later, in a series of lectures he gave at Yale University, he made much more direct 
references to Heidegger when he compared Freud’s dictum, Wo Es war, soll Ich warden—translated 
by him as “where id was, there ego shall come into being”95—to Heidegger’s thrownness or factuality 
(in German: Geworfenheit): 
The factuality of human existence in Heidegger’s sense has a different dimension than the psychoanalytic id, and 
Heidegger does not concern himself with the differentiation of unconscious and conscious mentation. My comparison 
merely refers to the idea, which both authors have in common, epitomised in the dictum: Become what you are.96 
In some of his writings Loewald attempted to address the question of the ontological status of 
various psychoanalytical concepts such as drive (or instinct), instinctual energy, cathexis, etc. He 
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criticised, for example, a reading that would see them as direct loans from physics or biology, as well 
as Freud’s unwillingness to abandon his subject–object (i.e., Cartesian) point of view: “Instinct does 
have psychological meaning and the term has its legitimate use in psychoanalysis only as a 
psychological concept, and not as a biological or ethological one.”97 According to Loewald, 
Ego and id are psychoanalytic constructs that … make use of the concept of instinctual energy. … That the same 
conception has been used in psychoanalysis [and physics] does not mean that psychoanalysis has taken it over from 
physics or that it is physical in nature and thus not really applicable in psychological discourse.98 
In Loewald’s view, we can understand Freud’s reluctance to revise his concepts in accordance with 
new insights as a direct result of 
[Freud’s] theoretical bias in favour of a biological instinct concept, and his reluctance, amounting to an aversion, to 
involve himself deeply in the investigation of mental stages and states where the subject–object polarity does not 
hold.99 
Loewald never abandoned philosophy completely. While it is clear that his questioning was 
informed by Heidegger, it is also evident that Loewald was not interested in establishing a solid, 
Heidegger-proof philosophical foundation for psychoanalysis. Disillusioned with philosophy, he was 
interested in bringing up some questions and pointing at paths that would perhaps be helpful in 
answering them. Loewald completed his Freud Lectures at Yale thus: “These lectures perhaps have 
turned out to be, in the end—far more than they should have been—tentative philosophical reflections 
on psychoanalysis. Some of the things I have discussed I have wanted to say for a long time.”100  
As Martin Woessner has commented, “If Heidegger, especially in his brief, delusional attempt 
to ‘lead the Führer’, represents the hubris of philosophy, then Loewald represents the humility of 
therapy.”101 
 
William Richardson’s attempt at bringing together 
William Richardson has always held a special place in the world of Heideggerian philosophers in that 
he has been a practicing psychoanalyst as well, working in a Lacanian orientation. His Heidegger: 
Through Phenomenology to Thought has been the first introduction to Heidegger written in English,102 
while the co-authored (with John Muller) Lacan and Language was one of the first books to introduce 
Lacan’s thought to the USA.103 Richardson had a “didactic” analysis in Paris, in the late 1970s, and after 
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returning to the USA in 1981 he began a limited psychoanalytic practice. Nevertheless, he never 
thought of abandoning philosophy in favour of psychoanalysis. 
Richardson has written that he was “profoundly convinced that psychoanalysis in general and 
Lacan in particular are gravely in need of a philosophical base, and that Heidegger’s thinking offers a 
suggestive paradigm for approaching that task.”104 In fact, he had been one of the first to explicitly 
attempt to discuss potential points of contact between Heideggerian philosophy and psychoanalysis. 
In an early paper, he endeavoured to find a “place” in Heidegger’s conception of the human being qua 
Dasein where the Freudian unconscious could be located. He suggested there that “if a philosophy 
such as phenomenology … has a place in it for what is valid in Freud’s insight … then perhaps 
psychoanalysis may profit from its help.”105 His own answer in that “propaedeutic”—as he called it—
essay is that “the place of the unconscious in Heidegger is in the ontological dimension of Dasein, 
conceived as a pre-subjective, onto-conscious self”,106 i.e., in the ontological structure by reason of 
which Dasein is open to being and can comport towards beings (entities) as beings. His claim was that 
this structure, qua structure, is itself not conscious.107 
Richardson returned to the question of the Freudian unconscious in connection to Lacan:  
If we understand human being as Being-in-the-world, the whole notion of [Freudian] psychic causality is rendered 
superfluous … But … what Freud discovered in the unconscious was not an unbroken chain of psychic causality but 
the hidden power of speech, and that the unconscious is structured not like a thermodynamic machine but rather 
like a language … This, indeed, is the hypothesis of Lacan.108 
Richardson’s assessment was unambiguous: “My claim is that Lacan’s interpretation of the Freudian 
unconscious as ‘structured like a language’ desperately needs a philosophical base that mathematical 
formalism and all the topology in the world cannot give him.”109 This philosophical base might well be 
Heidegger’s conception of logos and truth: “The process of logos as legein, letting appear, is also a 
letting truth come to pass. … This truth, for all of the darkness that surrounds and permeates it, is 
nonetheless a liberating healing truth that permits the talking cure to cure.”110 
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Further attempts at a dialogue 
Binswanger, Boss, Loewald, and Richardson all tried in one way or another to bring together some of 
the basic aspects of Heideggerian philosophy, and all shared one very important characteristic. They 
were all clinicians. They all saw patients in a psychotherapeutic setting and were all faced with the day-
to-day challenges of clinical work. There have been other, non-clinical attempts to discuss Freudian 
psychoanalysis together with Heidegger, but very few of them were systematic or broad in scope. 
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to mention briefly two of the more recent ones here. 
In her Life and Death in Freud and Heidegger, Havi Carel attempts to connect Freud with 
Heidegger through the concepts of life and death as understood and developed by the two thinkers 
respectively. She criticises Freud’s conception of the death drive as having a limited explanatory value 
and suggests a new reading, locating its importance “in the metaphysical insights that arise from it, 
such as the intertwining of death in life and the inherent presence of self and other-directed 
destructiveness in psychic life.”111 Through her own reading of Heidegger’s being-towards-death, Carel 
then attempts to bring Freud’s understanding of the human being, as a being in internal conflict, 
together with what she considers to be Heidegger’s moral imperative—his insistence that Dasein be 
authentic. It’s an interesting approach, but not without its shortcomings. Apart from her somewhat 
limited—and, in effect, normative—understanding of the Freudian project as a project aimed at 
reinstating the person’s well-being—“its aim,” she writes, is “to help people make good on their desires 
and hopes”112—the main problem in my view is related to a misunderstanding of the ontological 
difference, especially with regard to her major concept, Death. This is evident, for example, when she 
speaks about “the personal nature of death”—referring to what Heidegger calls Dasein’s “ownmost”, 
“non-relational” possibility113—and then comments that “although Heidegger stresses the personal 
significance of death for each individual, he also emphasises its significance with respect to the social 
nature of Dasein.”114 There is an antinomy here. Talking about the personal significance of death for 
an individual is not the same as talking about death as Dasein’s ownmost non-relational possibility. 
In his Primal Scenes, Ned Lukacher made a bold attempt to bring Freud, and what he took as his 
main insight (namely, that psychic suffering relates to forgotten events of the past which would need 
to be reconstructed and “remembered” during the analysis) together with Heidegger’s concept of the 
forgetfulness of being, passing though Lacan and Derrida. For him, Freud and Heidegger meet in their 
questioning of any narrow understanding of temporal ordering in terms of a timeline extending from 
a past to a future. He reads the Freudian concept of the primal scene as his category for “a (non-) event 
whose indeterminant temporality precipitates the temporal ordering of subsequent events”, and 
connects it with Heidegger’s being-for-death, which “establishes the subject’s historical finitude.”115 
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From the question of being to Lacan 
Heidegger’s philosophy represents a turning point in the history of ideas in the 20th century. His 
challenge to a philosophical tradition that began with the ancient Greeks and reached its highest point 
of coherence and influence with the emergence of Descartes’s cogito was enormous. The form of the 
challenge, i.e., Heidegger’s insistence on rethinking the question of being, was obscure and easy to 
misconstrue. This did not prevent it from reaching its audience. 
Heidegger made manifest the limits of the Cartesian subject–object distinction and pointed at 
what the problem really was—that of understanding what he called the meaning of being. He realised 
that even philosophy was not adequately equipped to penetrate deeper to this problem, and 
abandoned its traditional concepts such as metaphysics, fundamental ontology, and the like. 
Heidegger understood that the problem of the meaning of being and its corollaries—the problem of 
the human being, of truth, of the world—is a problem of language, in the sense that language creates 
or discloses a world. 
Heidegger’s conception of truth as unconcealment, or disclosure, represented a major rupture, 
a cut, that distanced him from a tradition that saw truth as a simple question of ascertaining the 
agreement of statements with the state of affairs the statements were about. If Galileo’s method 
represented a rupture with the world of the ancients, Heidegger’s thought represents what Badiou 
calls “the closure of an entire epoch of thought and its concerns.”116 
Lacan was very aware of all criticisms that Freud’s theories attracted but thought they were not 
enough to warrant an outright dismissal of Freudian thought and its main innovations. He claimed that 
the spirit of Freud’s discoveries had been forgotten or misconstrued, and heralded a return to him. In 
the process Lacan formulated his own version of psychoanalysis, which until the end he insisted on 
calling Freudian rather than Lacanian; he also found that in the process he was distancing himself from 
the philosophical background which in the beginning had helped him secure the foundations of his 
reading of psychoanalysis. 
Richardson had suggested that we need to return to Lacan, in the same way that Lacan returned 
to Freud. We need, Richardson wrote, “to return to the moment of énonciation where the speaking 
subject called Jacques Lacan was at his very best. But this means trying to articulate his un-said, 
learning to read him as he has taught us to read Freud”.117 
Richardson did not attempt to bring this return to completion in any systematic way. He did 
return many times to the question of reading Lacan together with Heidegger, suggesting that 
Heidegger’s ontology is more appropriate for providing a foundation for psychoanalysis than the 
linguistics and mathematics that Lacan employed, but he never attempted to develop such a synthesis 
himself. He does not speak about many other aspects of Lacan’s teaching. 
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Chapter 4: Rereading Freud 
The history of psychoanalysis is roughly divided in two periods, one before and one after the Second 
World War. They are demarcated by the massive exodus of Freud and other psychoanalysts from 
Austria and Germany because of the Nazi anti-Jewish policies and persecutions of the 1930s, but also 
by Freud’s own death in 1939. After the war, psychoanalysis was to flourish mainly away from its 
origins, in the UK and the USA, in France, and also in Latin America. Freud’s heirs would each follow 
their own trajectories, forming different schools according to the answers they were each giving to the 
theoretical problems they encountered. 1 
In Francophone countries, developments would be forever marked by the teachings of Lacan, a 
psychoanalyst of the so-called second generation whose main work belongs solidly in the second, post-
Freudian period. Lacan believed that the spirit and radicality of Freud’s discovery was being 
misconstrued and strove throughout his career to reverse that trend. In the words of psychoanalyst 
and historian of psychoanalysis Elisabeth Roudinesco, “Jacques Lacan sought to bring plague, 
subversion, and disorder to the moderate Freudianism of his time.”2 Lacan demanded that 
psychoanalysts “return to Freud” and read closely what the old master had written. That, he claimed, 
would be enough to reveal that Freud’s main discovery was ignored and misunderstood. “Indeed”, he 
said as early as 1953, 
I believe that the return to Freud’s texts which my teaching has focused on for the past two years has convinced me 
… that there is no firmer grasp on human reality than that provided by Freudian psychoanalysis and that one must 
return to the source and apprehend, in every sense of the word, these texts.3 
Freud’s discovery, in Lacan’s view, consisted in recognising the extent to which human suffering 
is dependent on, and subject to, language. His own reading of Freud might have been seen at times as 
rather idiosyncratic, but Lacan remained for a long time true to his pledge to “return to Freud” by 
reading Freud’s texts closely and referring to them again and again. “It is up to you to be Lacanians if 
you wish”, he said, as late as in 1980. “For my part, I am a Freudian.”4 
In Lacan’s opinion, the major failure of the post-Freudian schools of psychoanalysis was their 
tendency to supersede Freud’s focus on language with theories that paid more attention to a supposed 
biology of instincts, to phylogenetic inheritance, or to physiological development and adaptation to 
                                                          
1 For a quick survey of the landscape see Editor’s introduction in Ross M. Skelton (ed.), The Edinburgh International Encyclopaedia of 
Psychoanalysis (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), pp. vii-x. 
2 Elisabeth Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan, trans. Barbara Bray (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), p. xv. 
3 Jacques Lacan, ‘The Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real’ [1953], trans. Bruce Fink, On the Names-of-the-Father (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2013), 1-52, p. 3. 
4 ‘Overture to the 1st International Encounter of the Freudian Field: Caracas, 12 July 1980’, trans. Adrian Price, Hurly-Burly, 6 (September 
2011), 17-20, p. 18. 
Chapter 4: Rereading Freud  86 
  
the demands of life. Lacan insisted that these were misconstructions. Admittedly, Lacan’s reading of 
Freudian theory led him to the development of an entirely new psychoanalytic theory, one whose 
“regional ontology”,5 so to speak, was very remote from that of Freud. He was well aware of this: 
There is no question … of my doing the metaphysics of the Freudian discovery and drawing out its consequences for 
what may be called being, in the widest sense of the term. This is not my intention. This would not be useless, but I 
think that it can be left to others and that what we are doing here will indicate how it might be approached.6  
In Lacan’s view, for Freud “it is already quite clear that symptoms can be entirely resolved in an 
analysis of language, because a symptom is itself structured like a language: a symptom is language 
from which speech must be delivered.”7 And thus, by calling for a return to Freud, Lacan was calling 
for a return to the recognition that for the suffering human being language is as crucial—if not more 
crucial—than biology. 
We saw, in earlier chapters, how Heidegger’s and other philosophers’ critiques of psychoanalysis 
were meant to expose what they considered the limitations of Freud’s thought—for example, its 
alleged naïve biologism. In view of this, I will argue here that Lacan’s work offers a novel and unique 
way around these arguments by bringing to light the core of Freud’s discovery. 
In contrast to Freud, who claimed that he did not have any particular philosophical aspirations, 
Lacan was in close contact and dialogue with many of the most important philosophers of his time. He 
had followed Alexandre Kojève’s Hegel seminars in the 1930s, and was participating in intellectual 
circles with figures like Roman Jacobson, Jean Hyppolite, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Claude Lévi-
Strauss.8 Lacan had a particular admiration for Heidegger, and was making frequent allusions to his 
work his own teaching. He met Heidegger through a common acquaintance, Jean Baufret, a young 
philosopher who contributed a lot to the introduction of Heidegger’s thought to the French 
intelligentsia, and who incidentally was also one of Lacan’s analysands. In 1955, Lacan received 
Heidegger’s permission to translate his essay ‘Logos’, which was then published in the first issue of La 
Psychanalyse.9 Lacan and Heidegger met a few times, the last time being in 1975. Lacan even sent him 
a signed copy of his Écrits and tried, during his last visit, to interest him in the latest formulations of 
his theories. 
Apparently Heidegger remained unimpressed. “It seems to me”, he wrote to Medard Boss, that 
the psychiatrist needs a psychiatrist.”10 
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Approaching a body of work 
Lacan published relatively little during his lifetime. A collection of some of his talks and a few previously 
published papers appeared in print in 1966. A selection of some of these papers appeared in English 
in 1977,11 while a full translation had to wait until 2006.12 Lacan’s teaching consisted mainly of his 
seminar, held without interruption, apart from summer breaks and other holidays, for almost 30 years. 
Transcriptions of seminar sessions were circulating among his pupils for reference and discussion, and 
eventually started being published in an “established” form by his son-in-law, Jacques-Alain Miller. 
“Lacan”, wrote Jacques-Alain Miller, 
is not an author.. His work is a teaching. We must take this into consideration; we must know that following his star 
requires that we do not synchronise and dogmatise his teaching, that we do not hide but rather stress its 
contradictions, its antinomies, its deadlocks, its difficulties. For a teaching on the analytic experience is like a work in 
progress and implies a back and forth motion between text and experience.13 
At the time of this writing, 2016, many of Lacan’s seminars remain unpublished, and even more 
are without an official translation. This understandably slow process presents the researcher with a 
number of problems. What is one to do with those of Lacan’s seminars which are not yet available? 
How are we to approach those texts that are available in various versions differing slightly one from 
the other? What about the absence of definitive or good English translations for many of them? What 
about the various unauthorised translations of some of the unauthorised French versions? 
A further question is about Lacan’s teaching itself. 
Unsurprisingly, many (if not all) Lacanian concepts and terms change gradually in the course of 
his teaching; at the end some of them become so different from what they were in the beginning that 
they are completely unrecognisable. An example that most readily springs to mind is the term 
“jouissance”, which undergoes a heavy transformation from its first technical appearance in 1958 to 
its elaborations in the later seminars of Lacan.14 We reach here a problem similar to the one we 
encountered when discussing Heidegger’s conceptual pathway. What is the best way to approach this? 
Many scholars choose to present a chronological exposition. They follow concepts and their 
development by putting them in the context of Lacan’s teaching at any given moment. This is a valid 
and respectful approach that can give a more or less clear overview of the meandering character of 
Lacan’s thinking and presentation—but it runs the risk of placing unwarranted stress on potential 
conceptual anachronisms and creating a false impression of inconsistency. 
                                                          
11 Jacques Lacan, Écrits: A Selection [1966], trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Tavistock Publications, 1977). 
12 Écrits [1966], trans. Bruce Fink, Héloïse Fink, and Russell Grigg (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006). To facilitate cross-referencing, 
all references to Écrits as a whole, or to papers from the Écrits, will also include the French original page number after a slash. 
13 Jacques-Allain Miller, ‘Extimité’ [1985-86], trans. Françoise Massardier-Kenney, in Mark Bracher et al. (eds.), Lacanian Theory of Discourse: 
Subject, Structure, and Society (New York: New York University Press, 1994), 74-87, p. 75. 
14 Dylan Evans enumerates quite a few different nuances of jouissance in Lacan’s work: Jouissance as pleasure, or as orgasm; as desire; as an 
ethical stance; as jouissance of the Other; as feminine, or of the body; as connected to language. Dylan Evans, ‘From Kantian Ethics to Mystical 
Experience: An Exploration of Jouissance’ in Dany Nobus (ed.), Key Concepts of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (London: Rebus Press, 1998), 1-28, 
pp. 2-13. 
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It is for this reason that my approach—for the purpose of this research—will be different. I shall 
try to visualise Lacan’s work as if from a (future) retrospective vantage point. I shall attempt to benefit 
from an artificial, so to speak, hindsight, approaching Lacan’s major concepts as if they were available 
in their eventual form almost from the beginning. Thus, I will be taking their different forms as 
attempts at their elucidation. I am of course aware that this was not exactly the case. For example, it 
cannot be argued seriously that a concept such as jouissance—to stay with this particular example—
meant exactly the same for Lacan at the beginning and at the end of his teaching. But while the actual 
content of the term is, for Lacan, very changeable, only slowly becoming more clarified, in the course 
of many years of teaching, the way it fits together with the rest of Lacan’s conceptual constructions 
does not change too much. It appears as if the concept and its connotations become gradually less 
blurry. 
In effect, it is as if Lacan himself is cleaning up his act as he moves forward. Some of his older 
concepts, hypotheses, and models are abandoned or replaced, while others—the ones that prove to 
be important or fruitful—are fine-tuned or further elaborated. Identifying these, let’s call them, 
persistent threads from our retrospective vantage point allows for the outlining of a remarkably 
consistent body of work. This approach will allow me to comb the theory, so to speak, clearing up each 
concept from extraneous elements, and presenting it in as clear and succinct a way as is conceivably 
possible in its connections to other concepts and terms. In this way, I will be building on one of Lacan’s 
own comments on his work: “My discourse proceeds, in the following way: each term is sustained only 
in its topological relation with the others.”15 In other words I shall approach the Lacanian opus 
accepting that it is exactly this, an opus, a complete, self-consistent body of work—the term “work” 
used here in the sense utilised by Jean-Claude Milner in his Considerations of a Work. 
The notion of a work is a modern one, provided we understand it in its narrow sense, that is to say as the principle of 
uniqueness … centred on a naming system—the author’s name and the work’s title—which subsumes material 
production, in particular that of the text, under the regime of the One. In other words, the work is not necessarily one 
book; neither is it even necessarily a book. The work is not composed of matter; it is rather a form, one which 
organises culture.16 
In addition to this diachronic aspect of Lacan’s theories, there is an equally important synchronic 
aspect pertaining to his teaching style as such. At any given moment in his career, Lacan delivered his 
theories as if they were products of a fully functioning and self-consistent generative model. At least 
this is how his teaching appears to an observer. Lacan presented himself as having a whole theory at 
his disposal, choosing to deliver to his audience as much as was needed in order to build an argument 
or make a point. He would leave out all explicit theoretical justification or references for the steps he 
was taking, opting instead for an aphoristic exposition full of hints, allusions, and suggestions.  
This of course contributed a lot to the notorious opacity of his style, but in practical terms it gave 
him the theoretical freedom to explore ideas and develop new conceptual models and hypotheses as 
he saw fit. Be it as it may, Lacan’s choice provides us with a further justification to consider his work 
as if it were a complete, self-consistent corpus; at any given moment he presented it as such.  
                                                          
15 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis [1964-65], ed. Jacques-Allain 
Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1998), p. 89. 
16 See Jean-Claude Milner, ‘Considerations of a Work’ [1995], trans. James Penney, Journal for Lacanian Studies, 4/1 (2006), 141-158, p. 142. 
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Revisiting Freud’s discovery 
As we have seen, Freud’s work became the target of many philosophical criticisms. The debate persists 
and is sometimes referred to as the Freud Wars, after “an acrimonious exchange of reviews, responses, 
and counter-charges on the nature and validity of psychoanalysis” that took place in the mid-1990s in 
pages of the New York Review of Books.17 
A classic text in which psychoanalysis is dismissed as pseudoscience is Karl Popper’s Conjectures 
and Refutations, an English rewriting of an earlier book of his, published in 1934 in German. According 
to Popper, a theory or hypothesis can only be considered scientific if it can be put to the test and run 
the risk of being rejected. It doesn’t need to be rejected, of course. It only needs to run the risk. For 
this reason, psychoanalysis cannot be thought of as scientific. Its claims can never tested (and possibly 
falsified); and accordingly it is “simply non-testable, irrefutable”.18 
Freud himself attempted to tackle these arguments in his 1937 paper, ‘Constructions in 
Analysis’: 
It is true that we do not accept the ‘No’ of a person under analysis at its face value; but neither do we allow his ‘Yes’ 
to pass. There is no justification for accusing us of invariably twisting his remarks into a confirmation. In reality things 
are not so simple and we do not make it so easy for ourselves to come to a conclusion.19 
The analyst, Freud stressed, should rather focus on the progress of the work as a result of their 
interventions and to new material that these interventions contributed in eliciting. It is this that would 
provide the analyst with the conceptual tools needed to assess the confirmation or refutation of his or 
her hypotheses. “Reactions on the part of the patient are rarely unambiguous and give no opportunity 
for a final judgement. Only the further course of the analysis enables us to decide whether our 
constructions are correct or unserviceable.”20 
Freud’s argument would not be convincing for Popper. He would counter that clinical 
observations are “like any other observations, [i.e., they] are interpretations in the light of theories …; 
and for this reason alone they are apt to support those theories in the light of which they were 
interpreted.”21 Popper conceded that he had no doubt that much of what Freud says  
is of considerable importance, and may well play its part one day in a psychological science which is testable. But … 
those ‘clinical observations’ which analysts naïvely believe confirm their theory cannot do this anymore than the daily 
confirmations which astrologers find in their practice.' And as for Freud's epic of the Ego, the Super-ego, and the Id, 
no substantially stronger claim to scientific status can be made for it than for Homer's collected stories from Olympus. 
                                                          
17 Lavinia Gomez, The Freud Wars: An introduction to the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 5-6. 
18 Karl R. Popper, ‘Science: Conjectures and Refutations’ [1961], Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (London: 
Routledge, 2002), 43-86, p. 49. 
19 Sigmund Freud, ‘Constructions in Analysis’ [1937d], trans. James Strachey, in James Strachey (ed.), Moses and Monotheism, An Outline of 
Psycho-Analysis and Other Works (Standard Edition, Volume XXIII (1937-1939); London: Hogarth Press, 1966), 255-270, p. 262. 
20 ‘Constructions in Analysis’, p. 265. 
21 Popper, ‘Science: Conjectures and Refutations’, p. 49n3. 
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These theories describe some facts, but in the manner of myths. They contain most interesting psychological 
suggestions, but not in a testable form.22 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, who made frequent references to Freud and psychoanalysis, also felt that 
Freud has been able to see something, but he too was rather sceptical of Freud’s explanations and 
theories. Wittgenstein argued that at the heart of Freud’s argument lies a fundamental confusion 
between a retrospective explanation of a reason on one hand and a hypothesis about causation on the 
other. “When we laugh without knowing why,” Wittgenstein said during his Cambridge Lectures, 
Freud claims that by psychoanalysis we can find out. I see a muddle here between a cause and a reason. Being clear 
why you laugh is not being clear about a cause. If it were, then agreement to the analysis given of a joke as explaining 
why you laugh would not be a means of detecting it. The success of the analysis is supposed to be shown by the 
person’s agreement. … The difference between a reason and a cause is brought up as follows: the investigation of a 
reason entails as an essential part one’s agreement with it, whereas the investigation of a cause is carried out 
experimentally.23 
It is interesting to note that Wittgenstein’s argument here is very similar to that of Heidegger, 
who had pointed out that to attribute something to an “unconscious intention is an explanation as 
opposed to a phenomenological interpretation. This explanation is a pure hypothesis that in no way 
advances the understanding of the phenomenon itself.”24 These are important criticisms that should 
not be left unanswered. 
Adolf Grünbaum attempted to challenge Popper’s claim regarding the scientific status of 
psychoanalysis; nevertheless, he argued that psychoanalytical clinical evidence as such can never be 
an adequate foundation for psychoanalysis’ core hypotheses and metapsychology.25 Others attempted 
to look into psychoanalysis from a phenomenological angle, stressing its hermeneutic dimension.26  
A relatively early attempt to evaluate psychoanalytic claims by means of a meta-analysis of all 
relevant scientific research was made by Paul Kline, whose Fact and Fantasy in Freudian Theory aimed 
“to establish what parts of Freudian theory have been confirmed or, at least could be confirmed by 
objective, scientific psychological research.”27 Its conclusion:  
                                                          
22 ‘Science: Conjectures and Refutations’, p. 49. 
23 Wittgenstein, quoted in Jacques Bouveresse, Wittgenstein Reads Freud: The Myth of the Unconscious, trans. Carol Cosman (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 26.  
24 Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars, p. 169. See also Bouveresse, Wittgenstein Reads Freud, pp. 69, 70, 95; Smith, Freud's Philosophy of the 
Unconscious, pp. 132-136; and also above, pp. 60ff. 
25 Adolf Grünbaum, The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). Grünbaum’s 
arguments have been carefully deconstructed by Paul Robinson in Paul Robinson, Freud and his Critics (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1993), pp. 179-266. See also David Sachs, ‘In fairness to Freud: A critical notice of The Foundations of Psychoanalysis, by Adolf 
Grünbaum’ in Jerome Neu (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Freud (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 309-338. 
26 See Paul Ricoeur, Freud & Philosophy: An essay on interpretation, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970); Hermann 
Lang, Language and the Unconscious: Jacques Lacan's Hermeneutics of Psychoanalysis [1973], trans. Thomas Brockelman (New Jersey: 
Humanities Press, 1997). 
27 Paul Kline, Fact and Fantasy in Freudian Theory (London: Methuen & Co, 1972), p. ix. 
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Any blanket rejection of Freudian theory … simply flies in the face of the evidence. … [But] it would be wrong to 
assume that … the whole or even the majority of psychoanalytic theory must be accepted on the grounds that failure 
to confirm the rest is due to the methodological problems of verification.28 
The project of scientific verification of psychoanalysis in this manner continues, and still attracts 
a lot of publicity when some results are published. One recent example of such research is the ongoing 
Tavistock Adult Depression Study,29 a randomised controlled trial in the NHS to establish whether long-
term psychoanalytic psychotherapy provides lasting relief to patients suffering from treatment-
resistant depression. The findings are, again, positive. Nevertheless, seen in the light of Heidegger’s 
critique of science, the whole attempt of scientific verification or refutation of psychoanalysis is 
revealed as unsatisfactory, and its findings are shown to be beside the point. 
Freud could not foresee the scope and hostility of all later criticisms, which became more 
prevalent three, four or even more than four decades after his death, nor could he do anything about 
it. The debate continues.30 A careful evaluation of some of these criticisms has been presented by Paul 
Robinson His focus is on those critics 
who offered the most systematic, original, and disturbing (if not always the most hostile) reinterpretations of Freud’s 
life and thought … the historian of science Frank Sulloway, the Sanskrit scholar and sometime psychoanalyst Jeffrey 
Masson, and the philosopher of science Adolf Grünbaum. … What they share is simply a marked hostility to Freud, as 
well as the talent and industry to have created counterviews whose weight and ingeniousness require that they be 
taken seriously.31 
Robinson’s conclusion was that they “are poorly founded and seem unlikely to have an enduring effect 
on our image of Freud. None of the three makes his case. Ultimately each of them fails for empirical 
reasons.”32 
 
Attending to the phenomena 
Freud was not the first to observe that people have dreams, make slips of the tongue, or suffer from 
unexplainable hysterical symptoms. He was not even the first to study them.33 But he was the first 
who, after turning his systematic attention to these phenomena, decided that they were meaningful 
and began studying them as meaningful. As he commented in the first chapter of his Interpretation of 
Dreams,  
It is difficult to write a history of the scientific study of the problems of dreams because, however valuable that study 
may have been at a few points, no line of advance in any particular direction can be traced. No foundation has been 
                                                          
28 Fact and Fantasy in Freudian Theory, p. 346. 
29 See Peter Fonagy et al., ‘Pragmatic randomized controlled trial of long-term psychoanalytic psychotherapy for treatment-resistant 
depression: the Tavistock Adult Depression Study (TADS)’ World Psychiatry, 14/3 (09/25 2015), 312-321. 
30 See for example Donald Levy, Freud Among the Philosophers: The Psychoanalytic Unconscious and its Philosophical Critics (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1996); Smith, Freud's Philosophy of the Unconscious; Paul-Laurent Assoun, Freud, la philosophie et les philosophes 
[1976] (Paris: Quadrige / Puf, 2005); and Jonathan Lear, Freud (New York: Routledge, 2005). 
31 Robinson, Freud and his Critics, p. 5. 
32 Freud and his Critics, p. 267. 
33 For a fascinating and detailed survey of what he calls dynamic psychiatry, with a special focus on the theoretical systems of Janet, Freud, 
Adler, and Jung, as well as on their precursors see Ellenberger, Discovery of the Unconscious. 
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laid of secure findings upon which a later investigator might build; but each new writer examines the same problems 
afresh and begins again, as it were from the beginning.34 
And elsewhere: 
Small failures of functioning, like the temporary forgetting of normally familiar proper names, slips of the tongue and 
of the pen, and so on, had hitherto not been considered worthy of any explanation at all or were supposed to be 
accounted for by conditions of fatigue, by distraction of the attention, etc.35 
Freud devised a tool in order to study these phenomena—namely, free association—and 
developed a number of hypotheses, models, and theories to understand them, describe them, and 
account for them. In my view, Freud’s work should be approached by distinguishing between the 
mental phenomena that his theory talked about—i.e., the subject matter proper of psychoanalysis—
and the theories that he developed. 
Freud was in no doubt about his claim that psychoanalysis is a science: he was working with 
observations, hypotheses, refutations of hypotheses and so on. He considered his a purely scientific 
endeavour, only directed by his quest for truth, which, he believed, can only be approached with the 
help of the tools of science, and he did not have much time for philosophy. “I must confess”, he wrote 
in 1926, 
that I am not at all partial to the fabrication of Weltanschauungen. Such activities may be left to philosophers, who 
avowedly find it impossible to make their journey through life without a Baedeker of that kind to give them 
information on every subject. Let us humbly accept the contempt with which they look down on us from the vantage-
ground of their superior needs. … We know well enough how little light science has so far been able to throw on the 
problems that surround us. But however much ado the philosophers may make, they cannot alter the situation. Only 
patient, persevering research, in which everything is subordinated to the one requirement of certainty, can gradually 
bring about a change.36 
He returned to this in his New Introductory Lectures some years later: “As a specialist science, a branch 
of psychology—a depth psychology or psychology of the unconscious—[psychoanalysis] is quite unfit 
to construct a Weltanschauung of its own: it must accept the scientific one.”37 
 
Concepts, basic assumptions and hypotheses of psychoanalysis 
My starting point in what follows is that most of Freud’s concepts—such as libido, instincts (or drives), 
the unconscious, the mental apparatus—do not pertain to “real” entities that exist independently from 
the theory within which they appear. I shall take them as descriptive attempts, as models that aim to 
represent, study, and understand the phenomena that constitute the subject matter of psychoanalysis. 
                                                          
34 Freud, ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’, pp. 61-62. 
35 ‘A Short Account of Psychoanalysis’ [1924f], trans. James Strachey, in Albert Dickson (ed.), Historical and Expository Works on 
Psychoanalysis (Pelican Freud Library, 15; Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1986), 159-182, p. 170. 
36 ‘Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety’ [1926d], trans. James Strachey, in Angela Richards (ed.), On Psychopathology (Pelican Freud Library, 
10; Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1983), 227-333, pp. 247-248. 
37 ‘New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis’ [1933a], trans. James Strachey, in James Strachey and Angela Richards (eds.), New 
Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (Pelican Freud Library, 2; Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1983), 29-247, p. 193. 
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In his posthumously published Outline of Psychoanalysis Freud begins by stating very concisely 
the basic assumption of psychoanalysis: 
We know two kinds of things about what we call our psyche (or mental life): its bodily organ, and scene of action, the 
brain (or nervous system), and on the other hand, our acts of consciousness which are immediate data and cannot 
be further explained by any sort of description. Everything that lies between, i.e., between the brain and the 
immediate data of consciousness, is unknown to us, and the data do not include any direct relation between these 
two terminal points of our knowledge. If it existed it would at the most afford an exact localisation of the processes 
of consciousness and would give us no help towards understanding them.38 
So, for Freud, our mental life is a product of a bodily organ, the brain. He accepts that there is, in 
principle, some sort of correspondence between what is mental (or psychical) and what is bodily (or 
physical, i.e., the brain as such, the nervous system, etc.); he emphasises, however, that this 
correspondence does not allow for a reduction of the former to the latter: different tools and 
hypotheses are needed. Freud sees psychoanalysis as that set of tools and hypotheses which can help 
clarify confusions, solve problems, and answer questions, raising new ones, as needed, just as science 
does. 
It is on this ground that Freud puts forward the two fundamental hypotheses of psychoanalysis. 
According to the first, our psychical or mental life is a function of a structured and spatially localised 
apparatus: “Mental life is the function of an apparatus to which we ascribe the characteristics of being 
extended in space and of being made up of several portions.”39 According to the second, there are 
aspects of psychical life which are not included in what we can know in our so-called conscious 
processes, i.e., they are unconscious:  
Conscious processes do not form unbroken sequences which are complete in themselves. … There are physical or 
somatic processes which are concomitant with the psychical ones and which we should necessarily have to recognise 
as more complete than the psychical sequences, since some of them would have conscious processes parallel to them 
but others would not.40 
Elsewhere Freud had argued that the concept of the unconscious is both “necessary” and 
“legitimate”— necessary in the sense that it allows us an understanding of various mental phenomena 
and legitimate because its introduction does not involve more arbitrary steps than needed for the 
introduction of the concept of consciousness.41 He thought, however, that the unconscious is more 
than just a useful concept. He considered it to be a mental entity that very possibly had a biological 
counterpart in the brain, as his parable regarding a mythical “most simplified” living organism might 
indicate.42 
These two hypotheses together suffice as a foundation for the whole psychoanalytic enterprise. 
The localisation hypothesis allows Freud to develop a model of this “mental apparatus”, which, with 
the help of his second hypothesis, namely that of the unconscious, is freed from the constraints of the 
                                                          
38 ‘An Outline of Psychoanalysis’, pp. 375-376. 
39 ‘An Outline of Psychoanalysis’, p. 376. 
40 ‘An Outline of Psychoanalysis’, p. 389. 
41 ‘The Unconscious’, p. 168. 
42 See ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, pp. 297-298. 
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fragmented nature of the immediate “data of consciousness”. The novelty of Freud’s thought is, in my 
view, threefold. 
The first of Freud’s innovations is his recognition that the mental life and consciousness are not 
synonymous. There are always discontinuities or gaps in the flow of the immediate data of 
consciousness, and yet these discontinuities belong to mental life as well. Freud took these 
discontinuities or gaps to be meaningful; he urged that these discontinuities be considered as absences 
that can have a meaning, or can be reflected upon—in just the same way that a gap because of a book 
missing from a bookshelf tells us something about the bookshelf and its owner. 
Freud’s second innovation is the very tool he devised to explore these discontinuities—namely 
free association. Its design implies that, in Freud’s view, the only one who might be holding a key for 
interpreting mental phenomena is the individual involved, and that this key involves talking. The 
implications are enormous. For example, if real pain and suffering can be inflicted to the body 
according to lay ideas about its functioning and not according to anatomical facts, as was shown to 
happen in some cases of hysteria, this can only mean that ideas, i.e., words, i.e., language, are very 
powerful, and the body is subject to them. 
Freud’s third and most important innovation is his postulate that in principle all mental 
phenomena can be thought of as meaningful in ways that involve the individual concerned: A dream 
you have is a dream that concerns and involves you. A slip of the tongue is a slip of your own tongue. 
The actual details of the explanation, and the hypotheses these details involve, are almost irrelevant 
as long as we recognise that there was something in those phenomena that had something to do with 
you. 
In summary, I will take Freud’s discovery as focusing around three points: a) All aspects of one’s 
psychical life can be thought of as meaningful for the individual involved; b) There are aspects of what 
we consider to be psychical that are not immediately available to consciousness; c) the body can suffer 
in ways dictated by language. Points (a) and (b) opened to him the possibility of formulating theoretical 
models of how this non-conscious agency works; point (c) confirmed that speech is a powerful enough 
tool to deal with this kind of suffering. Seen in this way, one aspect of Freud’s discovery becomes a bit 
more protected from attacks by the philosopher. For example, in his Zollikon Seminars we see 
Heidegger claiming that Freud 
postulates an unbroken [chain] of explanation, that is, the continuity of causal connections. … The postulate is the 
complete explanation of psychical life whereby explanation and understanding are identified. This postulate is not 
derived from the psychical phenomena themselves but is a postulate of modern natural science.43 
This is an argument that echoes Wittgenstein’s regarding the alleged muddle (in Freud’s thinking) 
between a reason and a cause. Freud indeed seems at rare points to be claiming that the laws he 
discovers can have predictive power;44 much more often, however, he talks about retroaction, 
retrospective interpretation, or “tracing back”: “the phenomena can be traced back to incompletely 
                                                          
43 Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars, p. 208. 
44 I was able to locate just one passage where Freud speaks about prediction. It is in his Psychopathology of Everyday Life: “My hypothesis is 
that this … is not left to arbitrary psychical choice but follows paths which can be predicted and which conform to laws”. Sigmund Freud, ‘The 
Psychopathology of Everyday Life’ [1901], trans. James Strachey, in Angela Richards (ed.), The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (Pelican 
Freud Library, 5; Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1987), 31-382, p. 38. 
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suppressed psychical material, which, although pushed away by consciousness, has nevertheless not 
been robbed of all capacity for expressing itself.”45 
In other words, Freud does not claim that certain psychical material will invariably bring about 
specific psychic phenomena, but rather that you can take any current manifestation of mental life and 
retrospectively trace back to its origins which have been obscured (or “repressed”). In the process you 
effect a change in the older material by allowing it to express itself again: this is what psychoanalysis, 
as a therapeutic method, does. 
 
Retroaction, secondary revision, time 
The idea of retroaction—i.e., that a change in one’s psychic life can be effected retroactively—was one 
of Freud’s most important insights. I use this term, retroaction, to translate the German term 
Nachträglichkeit, which the Standard Edition of Freud’s work has rendered as deferred action.46 Freud 
first introduced it in his so-called Project for a Scientific Psychology in 1895,47 in order to refer to those 
psychic phenomena where an event or a series of events exercises some kind of retroactive influence 
on something that has happened in the past. He employed it repeatedly in his clinical work,48 but 
perhaps not so often in his later theoretical work. 
Nonetheless, the idea behind it can be seen at work in Freud’s understanding of how 
psychoanalysis works, as well as in other theoretical constructions, such as in the so-called secondary 
revision, a process of dream work whereby people attempt to retroactively smooth out the gaps they 
observe when they speak of one of their dreams.49 Most importantly, it can be seen at work in analysis 
itself. Both concepts, retroaction and secondary revision, bring up the question of time. 
In thinking about time, Freud seemed to be concerned with two different problems, the first 
being the origins of our conscious awareness and perception of time, and the other regarding the time-
related functions of the mental apparatus as such—its internal clock, so to speak. In connection to the 
first question, Freud believed that the concept of time, the one that we hold in our consciousness, is a 
construction: “Our abstract idea of time seems to be wholly derived from the method of working of 
the system Pcpt.-Cs. [Perception-Consciousness] and to correspond to a perception on its own part of 
that method of working.”50 In contrast to this, he had claimed 
                                                          
45 ‘The Psychopathology of Everyday Life’, p. 344.   
46 For a discussion of the unforeseen (and unwelcomed) repercussions of this translation see Helmut Thomä and Neil Chesire, ‘Freud's 
Nachträglichkeit and Strachey's "Deferred Action": Trauma, Constructions and the Direction of Causality’ International Review of Psycho-
Analysis, 18 (1991), 407-427, p. 407. 
47 See Sigmund Freud, ‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’ [1895], trans. James Strachey, in James Strachey (ed.), Pre-Psycho-Analytic 
Publications and Unpublished Drafts (Standard Edition, Volume I (1886-1899); London: Hogarth Press, 1966), 281-391, p. 356. 
48 See, for example, Freud’s discussion of a dream where a four year old boy is thought to be retroactively assigning a meaning to a scene he 
had witnessed at the age of eighteen months in ‘From a History of an Infintile Neurosis (The “Wolf Man”)’ [1918b], trans. James Strachey, in 
Angela Richards (ed.), Case Histories II (Pelican Freud Library, 9; Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1987), 233-366, p. 278. 
49 See ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’, pp. 628-650; and also ‘New Introductory Lectures’, p. 50. 
50 ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, p. 300. 
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that the processes of the system Ucs. [Unconscious] are timeless; i.e., they are not ordered temporally, are not altered 
by the passage of time; they have no reference to time at all. Reference to time is bound up, once again, with the 
work of the system Cs. [Consciousness].51 
It was this timelessness that would help explain retroaction and secondary revision as psychic 
phenomena. If it is possible for a current event to exercise some kind of influence on a past event, that 
can only imply that the mental representations of the events are indistinguishable in regards to the 
time of their occurrence: there is nothing that could make one see which one is first and which one is 
second. They are only ordered in reference to an interpretative narrative the subject employs in order 
to include these events in their history. This interpretative narrative is retroactively subject to multiple 
secondary revisions as needed, with its elements becoming overdetermined.52 
In connection to the second question, that of the “internal clock” of the mental apparatus, Freud 
developed a functional model of the system Pcpt. whereby perception of time is derived from the 
periodicity of its functioning. In a short 1925 paper Freud tried to describe this in more detail, using 
the simile of a small “contrivance”, as he called it, the Mystic Writing Pad, that allowed one to take 
notes, providing “both an ever-ready receptive surface and permanent traces of the notes that have 
been made upon it.”53 According to Freud it is this periodicity that serves as a kind of clocking 
mechanism, on the basis of the assumption that perception and memory are two mutually exclusive 
functions. 
As I have argued elsewhere, the limitation of Freud’s thinking about time is that there is no way 
to derive conscious awareness of time from the way one postulates the mechanism of system Pcpt.-
Cs. to operate, however elaborate one’s understanding might be.54 This is to say that even if his Mystic 
Writing Pad simile were appropriate and to the point, still Freud has not succeeded in showing how 
awareness of time is produced. Awareness of time and operation of time, as internal clock, are on 
different, incommunicable levels. 
It appears that Freud (who during his studies in Vienna attended Brentano’s lectures) was 
heavily influenced by Brentano’s endeavour to develop an epistemological approach on which 
empirical psychology could be founded.55 Brentano used the notion of duration to explain how a 
cognitive mechanism which gathers data from an external world transforms this data into an 
awareness of time, objects, and interactions between objects. As Joel Pearl comments “the conceptual 
network underlying Freud’s thinking about time is restricted to a linear notion of time”56 stemming 
from Brentano’s influence. Pearl shows that 
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By establishing his model of the psyche according to Brentano’s epistemology, Freud unconsciously incorporated its 
underlying notion of time. From this moment on, the further development of Freudian psychoanalysis was routed 
along a specific path, from which it was never diverted.57 
He concludes that Freudian psychoanalysis “explains the phenomenon of temporality … as the product 
of a cognitive system of presentations, as a necessary side-effect within an inner world founded upon 
a mechanistic and linear notion of time.”58 This explanation of time, Pearl contends, is not adequate—
a view that I share. Pearl contrasts the Cartesian viewpoint of Brentano (and Freud) to a 
phenomenological pathway which, starting from Husserl, also a student of Brentano, leads to 
Heidegger, a student of Husserl. 
Returning to Freud’s discovery, it is my view that the reading just presented is more faithful to 
Freud’s spirit (and letter): if speech is a powerful enough tool to deal with psychic suffering, this might 
be so because it allows discontinuities and gaps in the chain of the immediate data of one’s 
consciousness to be retroactively thought of, reflected upon, and interpreted. 
It reveals, however, a certain limitation, namely the incomplete elaboration on his part of the 
position of consciousness—especially as a result of his recognition that consciousness cannot be 
thought of as synonymous with mental life. Freud himself struggled with this limitation, as evidenced 
by his dissatisfaction with his paper on Consciousness, which was supposed to be part of the 12 planned 
papers on Metapsychology.59 Freud attempted to break free from the limitation by introducing a 
different, structural model of the mind.60 However, this model too was based on a “Cartesian 
conception” of an “encapsulated ego-subject”, as Richardson had put it, and as such remains 
vulnerable to the philosopher’s criticisms.61 
 
Lacan’s return to Freud  
It is at this precise point that I see Lacan entering the picture. Lacan, a psychiatrist turned 
psychoanalyst, reads Freud and recognises the enormous potential Freud’s ideas unleash for the 
understanding and alleviation of human suffering. He also acknowledges the incisiveness of criticisms 
and arguments such as those of Heidegger or Wittgenstein, and, as Sergio Benvenuto argues, shares 
with them the rejection of the belief that psychoanalytic theory can contribute to the scientific study 
of the human mind as an object.62 Lacan never ceased to acknowledge his enormous debt to Freud. 
Lacan’s “return to Freud” is but an attempt to bring this to light and work out the implications. 
“It is curious to note,” Lacan says, 
                                                          
57 A Question of Time, pp. 101-102. 
58 A Question of Time, p. 102. 
59 Of these 12 papers only five were published. The manuscripts of the other seven were not found, even though it is known that they had 
been written. See Jones, Freud, Life and Work, Vol. 2, pp. 208-209; and Gay, Freud: A Life, p. 373. 
60 See Freud, ‘The Ego and the Id’. 
61 Richardson, ‘Heidegger and Psychoanalysis?’, p. 14. See also above, pp. 81-83. 
62 See Sergio Benvenuto, ‘Wittgenstein and Lacan Reading Freud’ Journal for Lacanian Studies, 4/1 (2006), 99-120. 
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even if in this case it is not absolutely proven, that words are the only material of the unconscious. It is not proven 
but it is probable (and in any case I have never said that the unconscious was an assemblage of words, but that the 
unconscious is precisely structured).63 
The crucial importance of language (and speech) for psychoanalysis was of course acknowledged 
from its very beginning. It is known that Freud followed in the footsteps of Joseph Breuer, who was 
conducting sessions of what Anna O., one of his (Breuer’s) patients, named the “talking cure”. Even 
before that, while in Paris, in 1888, Freud had written a paper in which, as Ernest Jones writes, he made 
a “comparative study of hysterical and organic paralyses so as to ascertain whether their different 
origins, one mental, the other physical, produced differences in the nature of the paralyses 
themselves.”64 His main finding was that hysteria behaves according to the patient’s lay conceptions 
and beliefs of how the body operates. He discovered, that is, that the hysteric’s body suffered in ways 
dictated by ideas—i.e., language—and not by anatomy: 
In its paralyses and other manifestations, hysteria behaves as though anatomy did not exist or as though it had no 
knowledge of it. And in fact a good number of the characteristics of hysterical paralyses justify this assertion. Hysteria 
is ignorant of the distribution of the nerves …. It takes the organs in the ordinary, popular sense of the names they 
bear: the leg is the leg as far up as its insertion into the hip, the arm is the upper limb as it is visible under the clothing. 
There is no reason for adding paralysis of the face to paralysis of the arm. A hysteric who cannot talk has no motive 
for forgetting his understanding of speech, since motor aphasia and word deafness are unrelated to each other in the 
popular mind, and so on.65 
This finding might not have particularly impressed Freud’s teachers and colleagues at the time. 
Writing about his research later, Freud said that Jean-Martin Charcot, his teacher in Paris, “agreed with 
this view, but in reality it was easy to see that he took no special interest in penetrating more deeply 
into the psychology of neuroses.”66 However, the results provided him with a solid medical, i.e., 
scientific, foundation for his later hypotheses. 
The starting point, therefore, is that the whole of psychoanalysis—everything: the 
communications of the analysand, the interventions and interpretations of the analyst, psychoanalytic 
theories, models, hypotheses and so on—happens within language. Language is necessary and 
unavoidable for psychoanalysis. Of course, many Freudian and post-Freudian psychoanalytic theories 
include hypotheses about further phenomena thought to be taking place on a pre-verbal or even an a-
verbal level—for example the id, instincts (or drives), anxiety, defences, transference, 
countertransference and such like. 
Lacan, however, never stopped emphasising the fact that regardless of the theoretical models 
and conceptions that psychoanalysts use and the hypotheses they resort to, the vehicle over which 
they are using them is that of speech, and indeed the field of speaking, a human being (a “subject”) 
speaking to another subject: As he said in 1953, the means of psychoanalysis 
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are those of speech, insofar as speech confers a meaning on the functions of the individual; its domain is that of 
concrete discourse qua field of the subject’s transindividual reality; and its operations are those of history, insofar as 
history constitutes the emergence of truth in reality.67 
Lacan never ceased returning to this point. He became, however, more and more clear about 
what speaking means. In 1970, he clarifies this: 
If you open a book of Freud, and particularly those books which are properly about the unconscious, you can be 
absolutely sure … to fall on a page where it is not only a question of words … but words which are the object through 
which one seeks for a way to handle the unconscious. Not even the meaning of words, but words in their material 
aspect.68 
The importance of this distinction, between the meaning of words and their “material” aspect 
(i.e., the words in terms of how they sound), was, in Lacan’s view, very well known to Freud, as 
evidenced by his speaking, for example, about object presentations in consciousness, consisting of a 
thing-presentation and a word-presentation.69 But Freud lacked the appropriate linguistic tools to 
make good and consistent use of the distinction. 
 
Signifiers, signifieds, signs 
Lacan drew on the work done in the early 20th century by the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, 
who had employed a very similar distinction. Saussure had called sign “the combination of a concept 
and a sound-image” and proposed “to retain the word sign to designate the whole and to replace 
concept and sound-image respectively by signified and signifier.”70 He described, that is, the words of 
a language as signifiers, i.e., as entities that can hold a meaning, called signified. For Saussure, every 
signifier has a signified; and even though their connection is an arbitrary one, it is also stable in the 
sense that the two are inseparable, which means to say that there is no signifier without a signified. 
“The two elements are intimately united, and each recalls the other.”71 Saussure believed that for 
humans sharing the same language, the most important part of a linguistic sign (i.e., a word) is that of 
the signified, i.e., the meaning conveyed by the sign to the other human beings sharing the language. 
All interaction and communication between humans takes place in a field of interconnected and inter-
referenced meanings and becomes possible by the exchange of signifiers. 
Lacan’s insistence on the material aspect of words made him reverse Saussure’s schema in order 
to stress that signifiers rather than signifieds are the most crucial factors in the mental phenomena 
that Freud discussed: the form of the words—i.e., their material aspect—and not their meaning. Thus, 
in contrast to Saussure, Lacan spoke about the primacy of the signifier over the signified—a 
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“dominance of the letter”72 as he put it—and argued that the unconscious is given a structure by the 
“letter”.  
Structure commits the human libido to the subject, commits it to slipping into the play of words, to being subjugated 
by the structure of the world of signs, which is the single universal and dominant Primat. And the sign, as Peirce put 
it, is that which is in the place of something else for someone.73 
Lacan’s reference here was to Charles Sanders Peirce’s definition of sign: 
A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It 
addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign or perhaps a more developed sign. 
The sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign.74 
What is interesting in Peirce’s definition is that he sees a sign as a ring in a chain of signs formed by the 
exchange of signs between their users. Peirce does not have a differentiation equivalent to signifier 
and signified. What he is interested in is how a sign (qua representamen) always brings on another sign 
(qua interpretant); i.e., a sign acts as a pointer to another sign. As we shall see below, Lacan’s crucial 
insight was that the mental phenomena studied by Freud involve processes that can be thought as 
operating on (Peircean) chains of signifiers (that is, signs) and their interconnections. 
Counterintuitive as it might at first seem, this insight—the primacy of the signifier—is 
compatible with a simple observation about our world: language is a human creation. It is not 
presented to human beings created by some other, non-human entity; it is the collective product of 
human interactions, interactions that began hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions of years ago. 
Human beings have created language, but each and every human infant is born into a linguistic world 
that is not of his or her making, was there from before and will continue to be there long after any 
individual’s demise. As Lacan put it,  
before strictly human relations are established, certain relations have already been determined. They are taken from 
whatever nature may offer as supports, supports that are arranged in themes of opposition. Nature provides … 
signifiers, and these signifiers organize human relations in a creative way, providing them with structures and shaping 
them.75 
This linguistic world is completely unintelligible to the human infant when first immersed in it, since 
the human infant does not have any means to “know” what the utterances exchanged by his or her 
carers “mean”, or even that they do “mean” something. The question, that is, is not what the signified, 
or meaning, of a given signifier is, but whether a meaning is to be expected, whether there is meaning 
as such. Accepting that this indeed is the case, i.e., that there is meaning, is an event of monumental 
importance for the human infant, the inaugurating event of becoming a subject of language. It has to 
be pointed out, of course, that I am not talking here about an isolated event as such. To be introduced 
to language, to acquire a language and learn how to speak, is a lengthy and complicated process that 
has been studied extensively by disciplines such as developmental psychology, neuropsychology, and 
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linguistics. From a structural point of view, however, being introduced to language is more like crossing 
a threshold, like opening a door, and it is in this sense that I referring to becoming a subject of language 
as an event. This expression, subject of language, when used in reference to a human being, is intended 
to indicate that this human being is a speaking human being—i.e., a human being that has already 
been introduced to language. 
Returning to the process of being introduced to language, it can be seen that human beings have 
no other way to establish in a strict and unambiguous way what the meaning of a given linguistic entity 
is—i.e., what the signified of a given signifier is—if not by reference to other linguistic entities 
(signifiers). This can be understood in the literal sense whereby a word can only be defined, explained, 
clarified, or enriched by reference to other words. This applies even to words whose meaning can be 
approximated by an act of pointing or showing.  
 
The Lacanian unconscious 
In January 1964, during a lecture in Seminar XI, Jacques-Alain Miller “questioned [Lacan] as to [his] 
ontology”.76 Lacan wondered a bit and then said: 
The gap of the unconscious may be said to be pre-ontological. I have stressed that all too often forgotten characteristic 
… of the first emergence of the unconscious, namely, that it does not lend itself to ontology. Indeed, what became 
apparent at first to Freud, to the discoverers, to those who made the first steps, and what still becomes apparent to 
anyone in analysis who spends some time observing what truly belongs to the order to the unconscious, is that it is 
neither being, nor non-being, but the unrealized.77 
As we have seen, the question of the unconscious is indeed one of the most heavily contested 
in debates about psychoanalysis. Even after having hypothesised about its locus, however, Freud did 
not really elaborate about the ontological status of this elusive entity. What would it mean to claim 
that the unconscious exists? What type of existence did Freud envisage? The unconscious seems to be 
a kind of container, not very dissimilar to a memory vault, only its contents are—for some reason or 
the other—not accessible. Freud tried to reverse-engineer, so to speak, the structure of the 
unconscious based on the clinical material at his disposal. He postulated different agencies (such as 
the Ego or the Id), defence mechanisms, instincts (or drives), and so on, but it all was quite obscure, 
almost inviting confusion and disagreements. Freud remained unabated, being satisfied that he did 
not need to have answers to all questions while the ideas, concepts, and models were still being 
worked upon. 
Lacan focuses on the original material presented by Freud, and reaches the conclusion that the 
question should not be whether the unconscious—or rather that what belongs to “the order” of the 
unconscious—exists (or does not exist). For Lacan, Freud discerned the workings of an “unconscious” 
not in what was there, but in what was not there. The unconscious was from the beginning conceived 
as a function, a function that manifests itself as a gap in what would otherwise be a rather ordinary 
chain of mental events. You see it in a slip of the tongue or memory, in a dream, in a symptom: there 
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the chain breaks. In this, the unrealised continuity of a chain, you’ll find the unconscious. This was an 
idea that he had expressed before: “The unconscious,” he said in 1953, “is that part of concrete 
discourse qua transindividual, which is not at the subject’s disposal in re-establishing the continuity of 
his conscious discourse.”78  
This discontinuity, what is not at the subject’s disposal—i.e., the locus of the unconscious—is 
not just an empty space, a void, or a gap; it informs and influences everything around it. The gap where 
the unconscious makes itself known is a structure. As Lacan puts it: 
A great part of the speculations of Freud is about punning in a dream, or lapsus, or what in French we call calembour, 
homonymie, or still the division of a word in many parts with each one taking on a new meaning after it is broken 
down.79 
Words or names are forgotten, confused, mixed up or replaced, but there is a logic to how this 
happens, there is a structure. Hence the famous Lacanian motto: “The unconscious is structured like a 
language.”80 It is this structure “that assures us that there is, beneath the term unconscious, something 
definable, accessible and objectifiable”.81 For Lacan, therefore, the unconscious is never seen as an 
entity that exists as such; it is not even a function or a process, in the same way that consciousness is. 
The unconscious is the name we give to a gap in a chain, and its claim on to the subject to see it, and 
do something about it, is an ethical claim. Lacan expressed this very clearly: “The status of the 
unconscious … so fragile on the ontic plane, is ethical”.82 What this means is simply that the 
unconscious invites the subject to make a choice. The choice is whether one will own the meaning 
carried by this or that manifestation of the unconscious.  
Lacan’s understanding of the Freudian unconscious is to a large extent compatible with what 
Freud himself thought. As I argued above, Freud does indeed understand the unconscious as that part 
of psychical life that is not immediately available to consciousness, and this non-availability can be 
thought of as a disruption. However, in his attempts to formulate a model of how this non-conscious 
entity works, Freud might have extended the concept further than Lacan was willing to go, causing him 
(Lacan) to wonder: “Does this mean that I hope to include the concepts introduced historically by Freud 
under the term unconscious? No, I don’t think so. The unconscious, the Freudian concept, is something 
different.”83 
A further notable difference between the two conceptualisations is related to the unconscious 
in relation to the sources of conflicts. For the early Freud, a symptom was a result of a conflict between 
an unconscious wish and the demands of the reality principle; however, after the introduction of the 
Ego, the Id, and the Super-Ego he understood that this was not the whole picture.84 Lacan’s formulation 
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had moved away from such a view considerably, to the extent that in 1979, he said that the Freudian 
unconscious was an “admittedly wild story … quite possibly a Freudian delirium.”85  
 
Quilting points 
The meanings of most words we use are given to us, and we need to conform. But these meanings are 
not set in stone; they are floating and malleable; they can even change, albeit slowly. To be a subject 
of language, then, means—among other things—to have constructed a personal network of 
interconnected signifiers and, parallel to it, a network of interconnected surmised meanings (or 
signifieds). These interconnected signifiers comprise a chain called the “signifying chain”, a term that, 
according to Lacan, “gives an approximate idea: links by which a necklace firmly hooks onto a link of 
another necklace made of links.”86 In Lacan’s view, this chain of signifiers—to be more precise, a 
network of signifiers rather than just a chain—and the network of meanings—i.e., of signifieds—can 
be thought as parallel to each other in a manner very similar to the one chosen by Saussure to describe 
the interconnections between “the indefinite plane of jumbled ideas (A) and the equally vague plane 
of sounds (B)” (Figure 1).  
Lacan described the meeting points between the two (i.e., the couplings between some key 
signifiers and signifiers) as quilting points (in French: points de capiton),87 a term he borrowed from 
upholstery, in order to create a metaphor to show how the network of signifiers is only loosely 
attached to the network of meanings. In the normal flow of one’s life events, signifiers are added and 
meanings shift; their respective networks are in a constant flux and continuously transform 
themselves—albeit slightly. 
Everything radiates out from and is organized around [a key] signifier, similar to these little lines of force that an 
upholstery button forms on the surface of material. It's the point of convergence that enables everything that 
happens in this discourse to be situated retroactively and prospectively.88 
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Figure 1: Saussure’s planes of jumbled ideas (A) and sounds (B). 
(Source: F.d.Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, p. 112) 
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The quilting points—i.e., a number of specific key signifiers, different from one person to the 
other—are less prone to change, and serve as a scaffolding of sorts for the overall structure of this 
person’s psychic space.89 
In Lacan’s view, Freud’s discovery was the fact that a person’s symptoms are articulated and 
conform to pathways between key signifiers within that person’s mental life. Freud postulated the 
system Ucs. (unconscious) to account for the fact that these dependencies—i.e., pathways of 
interconnection between signifiers—are unknown (and sometimes unknowable). Freud invented free 
association, a tool that would allow the analysand to map these pathways—which are not pre-given, 
formed as they are being formed in the frame of one’s own individual history—and bring the junctures, 
or intersections, between signifying chains to light. Free association within the analytic session brings 
the pathways into the light and allows the analysands to become aware of them and choose what to 
do with them. 
Becoming aware, in this context, refers to enabling the analysand to discern the quilting points 
that form the scaffolding of their own network of signifiers and to slightly reshuffle the associated 
network of meanings. Psychoanalysis, then, is a method that allows a person to reformulate their own 
personal networks of meanings by revealing their interconnections with the underlying network of 
signifiers. Is it adequate? Lacan, on this point, is very careful. As late as in 1978 he says, in connection 
with the unconscious: “[If the unconscious is] what one constructs with language, it is a fraud: the free 
association of ideas relies on the haphazard; it is haphazardly that we proceed in order to free someone 
from what is called the symptom.”90 
Psychoanalysis reveals that what is particular for any given individual qua subject of language 
lies in the ways the signifiers are connected with one another. It is for this reason that Lacan stresses 
the primacy of the signifier. “What I call the effect of the signifier”, he says in 1970, “does not 
correspond at all to the signified that linguistics grasps, but well and truly to the subject.”91 In fact, in 
Lacan’s view, the subject is revealed in the way the signifiers are interconnected. “My definition of the 
signifier (there is no other) is as follows: a signifier is what represents the subject to another signifier.”92  
There are two questions that can be raised at this point. The first question relates to signifier, as 
such: What are the minimum features a signifier can have? The other is related to the network of 
signifiers: If signifiers are interconnected with one another via pathways that relate to (and reflect) an 
individual’s personal history, where is the starting point? 
Regarding the first question, Lacan draws from linguistics, where signifiers are distinguished 
from one another via their minimum differences, or, in Roman Jakobson’s terminology, their 
“distinctive features”.93 
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The structure of the signifier is, as is commonly said of language, that it is articulated. This means that its units … are 
subject to the twofold condition of being reduced to ultimate differential elements and of combining the latter 
according to the laws of a closed order. These elements, the decisive discovery of linguistics, are phonemes; we must 
not look for any phonetic constancy in the modulatory variability to which this term applies, but rather for the 
synchronic system of differential couplings that are necessary to discern vocables in a given language.94 
Signifiers are “diacritical in nature” but never exist on their own; they “always and only [exist] in 
relation to, and in opposition to, other signifiers.”95 In other words, signifiers can be thought of as 
autonomous entities only within the particular signifying chains to which they belong. In fact, however, 
a signifier should be considered as a complex entity, comprising parts that might be found (by free 
association) to be part of different, completely independent signifying chains.96 
As for the second question, the answer is relatively straightforward. Any chain of signifiers must 
indeed be thought of as having a starting point, an origin. This cannot but be a signifier as well, one 
that sets it all “in motion”, so to speak. By convention, this signifier is called a master or unary 
signifier.97 Every other signifier in this specific signifying pathway can, less or more directly, be 
connected back to its master signifier, but this (local) master signifier cannot be connected back to 
anything. At the origin of the whole signifying network, then, there is a main master signifier that 
facilitates—and indeed guarantees—it and whose importance for the individual lies not in its meaning 
(its signified) but in the fact that it is there. In the words of Bruce Fink, “The subject … is eclipsed by a 
master signifier without meaning … In that sense the master signifier is nonsensical.”98 
 
Mirror stage and the subject of language 
From what has been outlined until now, it should have become apparent that the Lacanian concept of 
a subject is very different from the common conceptions of a human being as a person or an individual. 
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with someone he did not personally know. Both the embarrassment and the reluctance are reflected in this particular incident: the reluctance 
to speak about religious matters (“Signor”) having “caused” the replacement of the original name (Signorelli); and the embarrassment 
(associated with Traffoi) having found its way in the name Boltraffio. We observe that the name Signorelli apart from its ordinary 
signification—namely, the famous painter bearing this name—becomes, in the specific case of Freud, a compound signifier, comprising two 
parts, signor and elli; the first evokes religious questions through the signifier Herr, the German translation of signor, while the second evokes 
Botticelli. In his report, Freud does not tell us whether these are the only two signifying chains he can produce in association with the name 
Signorelli. He reports these two but he might have had a myriad other in his mind. See Freud, ‘The Psychopathology of Everyday Life’, pp. 37-
44. Lacan discusses the incident at length in Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I: Freud's Papers on Technique [1953-54], ed. 
Jacques-Allain Miller, trans. John Forrester (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1988), pp. 46-48. 
97 See Seminar XI, p. 218. See also below, pp. 128ff. 
98 Bruce Fink, The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 77. 
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For Lacan, the human being, qua individual, is subjected to a primordial alienation: language 
comes from outside it; it presents the human being with a dilemma or demand that cannot be resolved. 
As Lacan puts it, it’s a demand comparable to when someone asks you for “your money or your life.”99 
Indeed, you don’t really have a choice, as such. You are subjected to the framework of worldliness that 
language incorporates; you become a subject of language. When a person says “I want this”, this “I” 
serves as the placeholder of the enouncing subject. However this enouncing I is not identical to the 
speaking being qua subject. To put it differently, even though the terms “subject”, “person”, 
“individual”, etc., can all refer to the very same human being, they are not equivalent, synonymous, or 
interchangeable in their respective uses. The Lacanian subject is never considered as synonymous with 
the human being, as is the case with Descartes. Lacan’s take on the Cartesian cogito is radically 
different from Descartes’s own. For Lacan, the subject’s existence (“I am”) cannot be founded on the 
subject’s reflective certainty (“I am thinking”). “I am thinking where I am not, therefore I am where I 
am not thinking.”100 
According to Lacan, the recognition of the human being’s status as a subject of language is at 
the crux of Freud’s discovery. Lacan regarded Freud as the first thinker who could see the human being 
not as a master in his or her own house, but as a divided subject, a subject, that is, who is suffering 
according to the internal logic of their language—i.e., their own personal network of signifiers. 
Of course, Freud did not use terms like these. In his structural model of the mental apparatus, 
Freud used terms such as the Ego, the Super-Ego and the Id. Freud does, however, speak about a 
splitting of the Ego (in German: Ichspaltung) which can be thought of as connected to Lacan’s divided 
(or split) subject.101 The Freudian ego was always thought as a go-between of sorts, an intermediary 
agency that manages the relations and exchanges between the “individual” and an “external” reality. 
In classical Freudian theory, the individual human being is not thought of as having been born with an 
ego; rather, he or she is born with the potential to construct an ego in a process akin to the process of 
identification, whereby a person takes on or idealises attributes from other important individuals in 
his or her life.102 For Freud, the templates par excellence were the parents: the child identifies with 
them and strives to make his or her own ego similar to the Ideal Ego that he or she assumes they 
possess.103 For Lacan, as for Freud, the infant’s ego cannot be thought to even exist prior to this 
identification process: it is a product of a process, which Lacan called mirror stage.  
The suggestion of a mirror stage was one of Lacan’s earlier contributions to psychoanalysis. 
Having borrowed (and subsequently transformed) the notion from the psychologist Henri Wallon, he 
first spoke about it in August 1936, at the 14th International Psychoanalytic Congress in Marienbad, 
and again in 1949, at the 16th International Congress of Psychoanalysis in Zurich.104 The term refers to 
a stage of crucial importance in the development of a child, during which the human infant reacts 
                                                          
99 Lacan, ‘Position of the Unconscious’, p. 713/841. 
100 ‘Instance of the Letter’, p. 430/517. For Lacan and Descartes see also below, pp. 123-126. 
101 See Freud, ‘Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence’. 
102 See especially the section on Identification in ‘Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego’ [1921c], trans. James Strachey, in Angela 
Richards (ed.), Civilization, Society and Religion (Pelican Freud Library, 12; Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985), 95-178, pp. 134-140. 
103 For an elaboration see ‘The Ego and the Id’. 
104 See Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan, pp. 110, 195. 
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jubilantly when faced with the image of him/herself reflected in the mirror. According to Lacan, it all 
has to do with the biological fact that the human animal is prematurely born. Because of its feebleness 
and biological immaturity, which, consequently, mean complete dependence on a carer for survival, 
the human infant enters a stage during which his or her socialisation consists in a series of one-to-one 
interactions. These revolve around an axis consisting in the form of the human face, facial expressions, 
visual cues, vocal cues, tactile cues, and the image of the body. As Lacan explains, 
His lack of sensory and motor co-ordination does not prevent the new-born baby from being fascinated by the human 
face, almost as soon as he opens his eyes to the light of day, nor from showing in the clearest possible way that from 
all the people around him he singles out his mother. It is the stability of the standing posture, the prestige of stature, 
the impressiveness of statues, which set the style for the identification in which the ego finds its starting-point and 
leave their imprint in it for ever.105 
According to Lacan it is only through his or her identification with the image of another human 
being that the infant obtains a sense of self:106 
It suffices to understand the mirror stage in this context as an identification, in the full sense analysis gives to the 
term: namely, the transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes an image—an image that is 
seemingly predestined to have an effect at this phase … This form situates the agency known as the ego, prior to its 
social determination, in a fictional direction that will forever remain irreducible for any single individual or, rather, 
that will only asymptotically approach the subject’s becoming, no matter how successful the dialectical syntheses by 
which he must resolve, as I, his discordance with his own reality.107 
The human being is a subject, which means he or she is subjected to what comes from outside. The 
human being’s sense of self is an illusionary sense, created by a series of identifications and 
appropriations that form a patchwork identity. For Lacan, this identity is the product of an alienation: 
“We must absolutely define the ego’s imaginary function as the unity of the subject who is alienated 
from himself. The ego is something in which the subject cannot recognise himself at first except by 
alienating himself.”108 In the words of John Muller,  
subjectivity emerges first of all as intersubjectivity. The transmission of culture operates through the semiotic codes 
governing the rhythm of touching, gazing, and vocalizing of both mother and infant. The individual emerges in 
dialogue with another sign-using subject, through a process of mutual recognition and generalization.109 
And, in Lacan’s own words, “The subject identifies, in his feeling of Self, with the other’s image, and … 
the other’s image captivates this feeling in him.”110 
 
                                                          
105 Jacques Lacan, ‘Some Reflections on the Ego’ International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 34 (1953), 11-17, p. 14. 
106 It should be noted that with the mirror stage Lacan was providing his own answer to the “psychological, the psychological, concrete 
problem of the recognition of the Other” that Sartre had already identified. See Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 248; see also above, p. 31. 
107 Lacan, ‘Mirror Stage’, p. 76/94. 
108 ‘The Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real’, p. 24. 
109 John P. Muller, Beyond the Psychoanalytic Dyad: Developmental Semiotics in Freud, Peirce, and Lacan (New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 3. 
110 Lacan, ‘Physical Causality’, p. 147/181. 
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The three registers of experience 
As a biological organism, the human being operates and interacts with the world in ways that are 
determined by the organism’s structure and physiology. We need no special understanding of the 
particular interactions involved when we say that, upon being born, the human being is thrown into 
the world as “is”, i.e., as a biological organism. Indeed, even a simple reference to interactions, 
biological or other, would imply that a framework of understanding has been already put in place. We 
would then use notions such as “survival”, “species”, “environment”, “stimulus”, “response”, etc. For 
the purposes of what I am trying to describe here, the only extraneous notion I need is that of 
structure, and the phenomena I refer to can be thought as phenomena pertaining to a coupling 
between structures, or structural coupling. Structural events are occurrences pertaining to structural 
coupling.111 
The human being qua biological organism is subject to all the effects of its surrounding 
environment, effects that leave imprints on the body, in the sense that they affect it: whatever 
happens in the environment has repercussions on the body’s state at any given moment. For example, 
light falls on the eye and the eye’s pupil contracts; or a source of heat will cause a reaction by the 
nervous system which will be translated to a movement of specific muscles that will result in a 
movement which will bring a lessening of the excitation, or discomfort, caused by the heat. 
Talking generally, the world qua environment in which the organism is immersed is the source 
of all kinds of structural changes to the organism. The pre-verbal human infant who is thrown in the 
world is receiving all these structural events and has no agency for processing them. In other words, 
the world has effects on the body, it is the source of structural events for the body, and the infant 
cannot but experience them. 
Developing further the hypothesis of a mirror stage, and recognising that all the early 
identifications and early relations of an infant with their parents or carers that the mirror stage pertains 
to share a connection with image, in the sense of an actual or a mental picture, Lacan put forward the 
suggestion that they constitute a special register in the organisation of the psyche. He called it the 
imaginary, choosing the term carefully to play on the linguistic connection of the words image and 
imagination, and stressing its connection to an image, and the transformation “that takes place in the 
subject when he assumes an image.”112 The very decision to describe the imaginary as a register, rather 
than an agency or a function, could be thought of as reflecting Lacan’s insight that it involves a certain 
temporal constancy, and the emergence of increasingly complicated structures. 
As an illustration of this point, one could look a bit more closely at the process of identification. 
It is not possible to speak about identification unless there is something, an original entity that can be 
discerned and identified with. Furthermore, an identification that has taken place itself entails a more 
or less sustained alteration of a certain balance. If an entity is identified with another entity, either as 
                                                          
111 The term structural coupling has been introduced by the Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, and defined as “a 
phenomenon that takes place whenever a plastic composite unity undergoes recurrent interactions with structural change but without loss 
of organization, which may follow any changing or recurrent structural configuration of its domain of interactions (medium).” Humberto R. 
Maturana and Francisco J. Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1980), 
p. xxi. See also Humberto R. Maturana, Biologie der Realität, trans. Wolfram Karl Köck (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1998), pp. 104-105.  
112 Lacan, ‘Mirror Stage’, p. 76/94. 
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a whole, or in any of its specific aspects, this can only mean that the latter can stand as a “pointer” to 
the former, either as a whole or in that specific aspect, and a structure is formed—a dynamic, fluid 
structure. We can understand this process in terms of Peirce’s theory of the sign. The pointer can be 
thought of as a representamen; what is pointed to as an interpretant. Both the “pointer”, as well as 
what is “pointed to”, can change in time, some of them more readily than others. Importantly, 
identification, as a process, is less primordial than the process of “becoming a pointer to”. 
We can see, then, that being inscribed to the imaginary register is a structuring process, by which 
a second register emerges out of the imaginary, one that contains the more solidly structured elements 
of the imaginary, and the ways in which they act as pointers to each other. As Lacan explains, 
“imaginary effects, far from representing the core of analytic experience, give us nothing of any 
consistency unless they are related to the symbolic chain that binds and orients them.”113 This second 
register is the register of the symbolic, a register retroactively constructed out of elements of the 
imaginary that exhibit a temporal persistence and start acting as pointers to other elements of the 
imaginary that also exhibit a temporal persistence—a “subset” of the imaginary, if we may call it 
thus.114 
The creation of the symbolic register is spontaneous but not instantaneous. It’s a structuring 
process that may be exemplified in the process of the acquisition of language—also spontaneous but 
not instantaneous—but is not limited to it. One could say that language is a specific subset of the 
symbolic register. The symbolic comprises “signifiers”, interconnected in a signifying chain or network. 
In other words, it initially contains those elements of the imaginary that are taken by the human being 
to represent something to him or her, i.e., as signs in the Peircian sense. What is being represented, 
how a given sign is being “interpreted”—namely, its meaning—is initially private. The human infant 
has his or her own signifiers and invents his or her own significations in the course of time. 
Now, if the imaginary register is that what the infant can construct out of his or her experience 
via the help of the image of (an) Other—I am referring here to the mirror stage—and if the symbolic 
register is a subset of the imaginary that comes about when the human being enters “the significative 
system of interhuman relations as such,”115 then the question may be raised regarding their origins. 
This is where we can locate the third register that Lacan postulated, that of the real. 
The real, in accordance with what has been described heretofore, can be defined as the register 
of all the structural events pertaining to the body—in effect, a register of how reality is received by the 
individual human being in question. For example, an unexpected loud bang on our door in the night 
might be thought of as real in terms of waveforms and decibels, but it can only be part of our real 
insofar as it wakes us up. It becomes part of our own world (or reality) the moment we are drawn to 
account for it (e.g., “There was a loud bang. Someone must be at the door”). In a similar vein, an 
                                                          
113 ‘“The Purloined Letter”’, p. 6/11. 
114 I am using the term “subset” in a figurative rather than a strict mathematical sense. Admittedly I am twisting it somehow. Its applicability 
is limited: The symbolic can be said to be a subset of the imaginary only to the extent that it comprises temporarily persistent elements of 
the latter which become pointers, i.e. become signifiers. It can be thought, nevertheless, as much more extensive than the imaginary since 
it also contains chains, or networks of interconnected signifiers. See below, pp. 121-123. For a similar use of “subset” cf. Gerald Hall, ‘The 
Logical Typing of the Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real’ in Anthony Wilden, System and Structure: Essays in Communication and Exchange 
(London: Tavistock Publications, 1972), 274-277.  
115 Lacan, ‘The Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real’, p. 27. 
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unexpected bodily discomfort, such as a sharp ache in the arm, is part of our real, and can become a 
part of our reality when overlaid by a framework of explanations that would allow us to include it. It is 
in exactly this sense that Marcelle Marini writes that “language, the signifier, the letter, logic, the 
phallus, the Name-of-the-Father, etc., all become superimposed on the real and send it back to the 
position of the inaccessible.”116 
 
Real and reality 
The three registers of experience were presented here as if they had been introduced in stages; 
however, this was not exactly the case. Lacan first spoke about all of them, simultaneously, in his 
seminar of 8 July 1953, as “the three quite distinct registers that are essential registers of human 
reality.”117 Their conceptual origins, however, can be traced further back, albeit partially: As François 
Roustang notes, “if it can be definitely stated that the imaginary dates from 1936, and the symbolic 
from 1953, it could not be said outright that the real, given its name in 1953, actually came into its own 
from 1964 on.”118 Roustang—a former student of Lacan who became one of his more severe critics—
accuses Lacan of being deliberately obscure and incoherent, and, specifically in connection with the 
concept of the real, of introducing a contradictory term that “simply does not exist … or it simply does 
not exist as a concept, since it can go on drifting in all directions.”119 
It might be true that, at least in the beginning, Lacan used the term “real” almost 
interchangeably with the term “reality”. Gradually the differentiation between the two became more 
unambiguous and more pronounced and the importance of the real grew from the 1960s onwards. 
According to Tom Eyers the real has been “the central, determining concept of Lacan’s work, early and 
late”. Eyers argues that “every stage of his [Lacan’s] theoretical development can be understood as an 
attempt to delineate more precisely the real as the object particular to psychoanalytic inquiry.”120 
Lorenzo Chiesa, on the other hand, has pointed out that Lacan’s first attempts to openly tackle the 
notion of the real can be found in Seminar VII (1959–1960). According to Chiesa, in his early work Lacan 
had associated the real 
with both (1) objects as they are given to us in everyday reality; and (2) a rather vague notion of undifferentiated 
matter as it is in itself before the advent of the symbolic—or beyond the latter’s domain. … This inevitably gives rise 
to blatant contradictions insofar as the superimposition of the Symbolic onto the Imaginary is, according to Lacan, 
precisely what accounts for the filtering of our perception of everyday reality. Furthermore … the term ‘real’ is also 
understood in a third sense as a nonsymbolized Symbolic which should be located within language.121 
In my view the resisters of the imaginary and the symbolic would be completely unfounded if 
the real had not been already tacitly postulated as the necessary background from which they emerge. 
                                                          
116 Marini, Lacan, p. 72. 
117 Lacan, ‘The Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real’, p. 4.  
118 Roustang, The Lacanian Delusion, p. 59. 
119 The Lacanian Delusion, pp. 101-102. 
120 Tom Eyers, Lacan and the Concept of the 'Real' (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 1, 2. See also “The Real” in 
Glowinski, Marks, and Murphy (eds.), A Compendium of Lacanian Terms, pp. 154-155. 
121 Lorenzo Chiesa, Subjectivity and Otherness (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2007), p. 126. 
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As I wrote above, the real can be defined as the register of all the structural events pertaining to the 
body; in effect, the real can be thought of as the register of how reality—the term “reality” is used 
here in the sense of both worldly and bodily reality—is received by the individual human being in 
question.122 Seen in this way, the concept of the real can show its coherence in a way that would 
otherwise be impossible to achieve if one were to try to make sense of all of Lacan’s different attempts 
to elucidate it directly, from the ground up, so to speak. In other words, I am employing here a circle 
of understanding not very dissimilar (but not identical) to the one that Heidegger considers 
indispensable to philosophical thinking. What I mean is that in my view we cannot have a clear 
understanding of what Lacan says in order to introduce the real unless we have a prior conception of 
what the real might be. There lies the reason for contradictions and incoherencies that commentators 
like Roustang observe. 
Lacan thought of the real as something that is gradually being replaced, so to speak, by the 
imaginary and the symbolic—as the raw material out of which the imaginary and the symbolic are 
constructed, or the core that remains.123 Nonetheless, the real can never be fully taken over by the 
imaginary and symbolic registers, and it is in this sense that we see Bruce Fink writing that “the real is 
perhaps best understood as that which has not yet been symbolised, remains to be symbolised, or 
even resists symbolisation.”124 Rather than just a background against which the other two registers 
emerge, it is really a scaffolding framework—the most basic register of the psychic imprint of structural 
events involving the living body in its domain of interactions.125 It is in this that its fundamental 
difference from what we ordinarily call reality lies. “I am saying the real and not reality,” Lacan explains 
in 1959, “because reality is constituted by all the halters that human symbolism, in a more or less 
                                                          
122 In an earlier paper of mine I had described the body as “an ‘organ’ that comes into contact with the real, or rather is immersed in the 
real”, and had explained that “through the body the real produces an effect”. Christos Tombras, ‘On Being Human: An Attempt at 
Epistemology’ Journal of the Centre for Freudian Analysis and Research, 16 (2005), 81-101, p. 87. I no longer stand by this description, as it 
leaves room for confusing the real qua register (of effects) with the real qua source of effects. However, I did argue then, as I am arguing 
here, that the imaginary and the symbolic emerge out of the real. See ‘On Being Human’, p. 99n17. 
123 To bring just one example, in lesson VII of Seminar I, where Lacan speaks about the “original chaos” of the real, out of which the (imaginary) 
Ego may be born, and the position of the (symbolic) subject may be secured. See Lacan, Seminar I, pp. 73-88. Lacan returns to the question 
repeatedly until towards the end of his teaching. As late as in 1976 he refers to the real as “a core around which thought embellishes”. As he 
points out, “the mark as such of this real is that it doesn’t tie on to anything. This at least is how I conceive the real.” The Seminar of Jacques 
Lacan, Book XXIII: The Sinthome [1975-76], ed. Jacques-Allain Miller, trans. A. R. Price (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), p. 104. 
124 Fink, Lacanian Subject, p. 25. 
125 Slavoj Žižek has suggested a rereading of the concept of the real, claiming “that there are at least three notions” of it; he argues that “the 
very triad of real, symbolic and imaginary is in a way mapped onto or projected into the real itself” producing “[a] real Real, [an] imaginary 
Real and [a] symbolic Real”; he even extends this idea further to the other registers, describing the knotting between the real, imaginary and 
symbolic as a three-dimensional configuration, with “each of these categories … mapped onto all the others. … [They] are really intertwined 
in a radical sense; like a crystal structure in which the different elements are mapped onto and repeat themselves within each category.” 
Slavoj Žižek and Glyn Daly, Conversation with Žižek (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), pp. 68, 69. See also Slavoj Žižek, On Belief (London: 
Routledge, 2001), p. 82. In total, Žižek envisages nine different variations of the three registers, a combination of each one with each and 
every one. The idea is appealing, perhaps because of its internal symmetry, but apart from this I cannot see its usefulness. In my view the 
main purpose behind Lacan’s differentiation between the three registers was to enable three things: the structural modelling of the processes 
that are taking place in the human psyche as a result of the immersion of the body in the world (on which I will expand below), the 
construction of an imaginary identity (mirror stage), and the subjection to language. In other words, Lacan’s purpose was predominantly 
clinical. It is difficult to see the clinical relevance of Žižek’s innovation. I find it problematic and unnecessary. 
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perspicacious fashion, passes around the neck of the real in so far as it makes of them the objects of 
its experience.”126 
 
Jouissance, the body, the world 
With the real conceived of as the register of all the structural events pertaining to the body, Lacan 
employs an additional term to denote these events in reference to the experience of the human being 
involved. This term is “jouissance”. It comes from the French verb jouir, “enjoy”, and, indeed, it is 
sometimes translated as enjoyment.127 Its scope is much broader in comparison to its English 
rendering, though, and for this reason the term is usually left untranslated. 
Lacan first introduced jouissance in Seminar V, where he contrasted it with desire and 
presented, as its origin: 
That which maintains the originality which conditions the desire of man, [that which] represents for him this 
something which is always for you more or less implicated in the way you handle this notion of desire and which 
deserves to be distinguished from it. … It is called jouissance.128 
Lacan returned to it again and again, modifying it ever so slightly as he considers it in terms of the clinic 
and elaborates its interconnections with the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real.129 In 1970 he speaks 
of the human being as a subject of jouissance: “this fathomless thing, capable of experiencing 
something between birth and death, capable of covering the whole spectrum of pain and pleasure, in 
a word what in French we call the sujet de la jouissance.”130 
The concept of jouissance can be approached from several different angles, but the most 
straightforward one would be to consider it at the level of the real. Taken as such, the term could be 
thought of as representing the events pertaining to the various types of structural coupling of the body 
in the world. Whatever happens to the body gives rise to specific bodily effects, many of which are 
registered in the real. Jouissance (of the body) is the name one can give to such effects.131 In other 
                                                          
126 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VI: Desire and its Interpretation [1958-59], trans. Cormac Gallagher (Unauthorised 
translation from unpublished manuscript: www.lacaninireland.com), p. 342 (translation slightly modified). 
127 It was in this sense that Lacan first used the term (see, for example, ‘Function and Field’, p. 208/250), but gradually he allowed the scope 
of the term to change. According to N. Braunstein, the confusion of jouissance with satisfaction that can sometimes be observed, can be 
traced to the confusing subtitle given to a subsection of a particular lesson in Seminar VII (see Seminar VII, p. 205). See Néstor A. Braunstein, 
‘Desire and Jouissance in the Teachings of Lacan’, trans. Tamara Francés, in Jean-Michel Rabaté (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Lacan 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 102-115, pp. 104-105. 
128 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book V: The Formations of the Unconscious [1957-58], trans. Cormac Gallagher 
(Unauthorised translation from unpublished manuscript: www.lacaninireland.com), p. 181. 
129 Jacques-Allain Miller has identified six different “paradigms” in Lacan’s treatment of the concept of jouissance. They follow one another 
and replace each other more or less chronologically. See Jacques-Allain Miller, ‘Les six Paradigmes de la Jouissance’ La Cause Freudienne 
43(1999); <http://www.causefreudienne.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/JAM-Six-paradigmes-jouissance.pdf>, accessed 12 Dec. 2015 ; 
see also above, p. 87n14. 
130 Lacan, ‘Of Structure’, p. 194 (punctuation slightly altered). 
131 My reading of the concept of jouissance follows my understanding of Lacan’s own elaboration in 1972-73. See for example the points 
where he describes “the jouissance of the body … as asexual” and explains that he identifies “the reason for the being of signifierness in 
jouissance, jouissance of the body” (The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX: Encore. On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of Love and Knowledge 
[1972-73], ed. Jacques-Allain Miller, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1998), pp. 6, 71). See also J.A. Miller’s 
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words, if the real is the register of all bodily structural events, jouissance can be seen as that which is 
registered—the value, so to speak, of these events for the individual involved.132 An event of the body 
is not just the outcome of the functioning of the body qua biological organism in structural coupling; 
it is not to be confused with the stimuli that the body receives and processes. It’s rather a concurrence 
of specific bodily states that can be distinguished as such—i.e., as specific—either at the moment of 
occurrence or retroactively.  
 The concept of jouissance can be thought as something vaguely related to the concept of libido, 
on the one hand, and, on the other, to the stimuli that the human body as a biological organism 
receives from both the environment as well as from within itself. Both terms, “libido” and “stimulus”, 
are used here in a Freudian sense. Freud speaks about the task of the nervous system, which is to 
master external and internal stimuli,133 or about how libido is cathected onto “people or things in the 
external world” or to “others in phantasy.”134 We could account for both phenomena with the 
assistance of the term “jouissance”. However, there is a notable difference. Jouissance, by definition, 
is more basic, more primordial than the other two. This is to say that jouissance is pre-linguistic, or in 
fact non-linguistic, since, as we defined it earlier, it is only connected to the register of the real. This is 
meant in the sense that jouissance is an effect of the body. However, there is an equally notable 
similarity with Freud’s libido, namely its energistic aspect. Speaking in 1966, Lacan is quite clear on 
this: 
What I call jouissance—in the sense in which the body experiences itself—is always in the nature of a tension, in the 
nature of a forcing, of a spending, even of an exploit. Unquestionably, there is jouissance at the level at which pain 
begins to appear, and we know that it is only at this level of pain that a whole dimension of the organism, which 
would otherwise remain veiled, can be experienced.135 
Just as libido can be cathected, transformed, regressed or repressed, jouissance also is thought to 
undergo transformations, to be linked to specific parts of the body (e.g., phallic jouissance), and to be 
differentiated according to gender (e.g., feminine or other jouissance).136 
The most important aspect of jouissance, “important” in terms of its contribution to the overall 
Lacanian theory, is its connection to the signifier and to the signifying process. As we described earlier, 
some parts of the real become somewhat more stable through a process of retroactive 
identifications—a process whose pivotal stage is the mirror stage—which leads to the construction of 
the imaginary and symbolic registers. Putting jouissance in the picture, we can see that the process 
corresponds to a binding, moulding or crystallisation of jouissance. Both the imaginary and the 
symbolic can be thought as crystallised, signifierised or cadaverised jouissance—cadaverised in the 
sense that it is turned into a cadaver, a corpse.137 As Lacan had said before, “the symbol first manifests 
                                                          
commentary on Lacan’s “six paradigms” of jouissance, in which he explains how in Seminar XX Lacan presents language and structure as 
secondary and derivative of jouissance and lalangue (Miller, ‘Six Paradigmes’, pp. 21-22).  
132 This is linked to Lacan’s referring to the symptom as an “event of the body”. See Lacan, ‘Joyce le Symptôme’, p. 569.  
133 See Freud, ‘Instincts and their Vicissitudes’, p. 116. 
134 ‘On Narcissism’, p. 66. 
135 Lacan, quoted in Braunstein, ‘Desire and Jouissance’, p. 103. 
136 For a discussion of phallic and other jouissance see below, pp. 147-150. 
137 See Lacan, ‘Radiophonie’, p. 409.  
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itself as the killing of the thing, and this death results in the endless perpetuation of the subject’s 
desire.”138 
To use a more concrete example, one can take the case of a newborn infant. Feeding, be it from 
the breast or from a bottle, is clearly an important procedure for the infant—if only in terms of 
biological sustenance. However, the baby has no control over it and is completely “at the mercy” of its 
carer. During un-signifierised actual feeding, the human infant can be expected to experience all kinds 
of things, some pleasurable, some (perhaps) not. The exact details of what the baby experiences 
cannot be known. What is crucial here is that all these events are jouissance. Now, this procedure is 
repeated, more or less regularly. The baby becomes conditioned to expect to be fed more or less 
regularly, and learns to associate this event with other events—for example, the appearance of a 
friendly face and certain sounds. It learns to associate these events to a certain jouissance; a certain 
jouissance accompanies these events and becomes linked or “bound” to them. 
The similarity of this process to the process, described by Freud, of the investment or cathexis 
of libido upon objects is not coincidental. In contrast to Freud’s libido theory, however, whereby libido 
can be invested upon, of withdrawn from, objects,139 Lacan’s signifierised jouissance is taken out of 
circulation, so to speak. Binding—or signifierisation—of jouissance is accompanied by the emergence 
of the imaginary and symbolic registers. Signification, as such, brings a kind of order to the jouissance 
of the body: The world is much safer when its effects on the body (i.e., jouissance) can be incorporated 
into a network of signifiers. 
In a sense, human beings, in their dealings with the world, create more and complex networks 
of interconnected signifierised jouissance within which they dwell. The subject of language and the 
world it lives in are “products” of the signifierisation process. It is, in Lacan’s words, “this emergence 
which, just before, as subject, was nothing, but which, having scarcely appeared, solidifies into a 
signifier.”140 In this connection, Rik Loose writes: 
The moment the organism becomes a body is also the moment the signifiers of the demand of the Other begin to 
push the jouissance of the real body into the anatomical rims and sexual objects outside the body. Language 
‘phallicises’ the body by transforming this real jouissance into a sexual or phallic jouissance which is situated outside 
the body.141 
The world that the subject of language inhabits is a world revealed and guaranteed by the 
symbolic order and the signifier. It is a shared world, in the sense that each and every one of us is 
subjected to a symbolic order which was established beforehand; but it is also a private world in the 
                                                          
138 ‘Function and Field’, p. 262/319. Lacan’s conceptualisation of signifierisation as the killing of the thing was inspired by A. Kojève’s 
commentary on Hegel. “For example”, Kojève writes, “as long as the Meaning (or Essence) ‘dog’ is embodied in a sensible entity, this Meaning 
(Essence) lives: it is the real dog, the living dog which runs, drinks, and eats. But when the Meaning (Essence) ‘dog’ passes in to the word 
‘dog’ … the Meaning (Essence) dies: the word ‘dog’ does not run, drink, and eat; in it the Meaning (Essence) ceases to live—that s, it dies. 
And that is why the conceptual understanding of empirical reality is equivalent to a murder”. Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading 
of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Jr. James H. Nichols (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), p. 140.  
139 For Freud’s libido theory see indicatively Sigmund Freud, ‘Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality’ [1905d], trans. James Strachey, in 
Angela Richards (ed.), On Sexuality (Pelican Freud Library, 7; Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1986), 33-169, pp. 138-140. 
140 Lacan, Seminar XI, p. 199. 
141 Rik Loose, The Subject of Addiction: Psychoanalysis and the Administration of Enjoyment (London: Karnac, 2002), p. 183. For Lacan’s notion 
of the phallus and its connection to signification see below, pp. 128-131. 
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sense that each and every one of us, as a subject, is adding his or her own panoply of signifiers and 
retroactively creating his or her own network of meanings.142 In other words, for Lacan, our own 
private world is never completely private and our own, but also never completely shared and public.143 
There is a tension between what is private and what is shared that resembles the tension between 
authenticity and inauthenticity in Heidegger. Jacques-Alain Miller has pointed out that for Lacan ”the 
exterior is present in the interior. The most interior … has, in the analytic experience, a quality of 
exteriority.”144 Lacan tried to represent this tension with the help of mathematical entities such as the 
Möbius strip or the Klein bottle. As Kazushige Shingu explains, 
as a first approximation, we can say that that which is said in psychoanalysis is spoken within the subject who is doing 
the talking. It seems, therefore, as though a boundary exists between these things and the external, social life that 
the subject experiences from day to day. But in fact, the unconscious, which seems so clearly to be a place hidden 
within this internal discourse, is also a kind of secret passage leading back to the outside world. By slipping out through 
this passage, the subject manages to see herself from the outside, and gains the ability to speak of herself. The 
unconscious is thus structured like a Möbius strip; if you follow the inside to its very end, you find yourself on the 
outside.145  
 
Anxiety, Desire and object a 
This process of signifierisation of jouissance is never complete. There is always a part of jouissance that 
remains unbound, i.e., un-signifierised. This jouissance is experienced ‘as’ something that does not 
really belong in the subject’s world, as out-worldly. It is indeed out-worldly in the sense that, as we 
said earlier, a world is only constituted via the installation of the signifier. These leftovers of jouissance 
cause the human being to oscillate, so to speak, between meaning and anxiety. A way to understand 
anxiety, then, is to see it as the generic name we can give to all jouissance that does not quite fit in a 
network of signifiers. Obviously, in accordance with what we have already said, jouissance always 
begins like this.146 
Any event of the body and its associated jouissance can be a potential signifier. It becomes a 
signifier when it obtains the character of a pointer to another signifier, i.e., when it becomes part of a 
network of interconnected elements. Until this happens, an event of the body is just unsignifierised 
jouissance—a “trauma”, so to speak, or a source of anxiety or tension. Sometimes a tension is 
                                                          
142 I have presented and elaborated this distinction between a private and a public, i.e., shared, web of signifiers in Tombras, ‘Kicking Down 
the Ladder’, pp. 125-126. It is important to note, however, that the distinction has some usefulness only when one considers the structure 
of psychic life from a distance, macroscopically so to speak. When one looks closer at the phenomena the distinction is rendered irrelevant. 
As J. A. Miller has argued, for Lacan it was important to escape “the common ravings about a psychism supposedly located in a bipartition 
between interior and exterior.” Miller, ‘Extimité’, p. 75. See also below, p. 143. 
143 The argument here is similar to Wittgenstein’s Private Language argument. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations [1945], 
trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), §244-271.  
144 Miller, ‘Extimité’, p. 76. 
145 Kazushige Shingu, Being Irrational: Lacan, the Object a, and the Golden Mean [1995], trans. Machael Radich (Tokyo: Gakuji Shoin, 2004), 
p. 159. 
146 Jacques-Alain Miller describes this aspect of jouissance as jouissance One, stressing that at the beginning at least, it can do without the 
other. See Miller, ‘Six Paradigmes’, p. 25. 
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discharged, and in this respect the event can be experienced as pleasurable.147 It’s only after the 
installation of the signifier that the human being can really consider this or that influx of jouissance as 
pleasure: an event is not pleasurable or unpleasurable on its own. It only becomes such when 
considered within the network of interconnected signifiers that constitute the experience of this 
particular human being. In other words, there is nothing in jouissance that would allow an observer to 
predict whether this or that event of the body will be thought of as pleasant or unpleasant by the 
subject. Something that might be very pleasant for one might be considered as unpleasant or 
completely unwelcome by the other. And vice versa. And it is perhaps in this way that we can 
structurally understand behaviours such as masochism. What is pleasant or unpleasant is not so self-
evident or clear for the speaking being. It’s not a question of something that can be “objectively” 
measured or understood. Among the members of a community, of course, some common ground can 
be thought to exist, reflecting that part of each member’s world that is shared. This is less and less the 
case when we examine different or distant cultural communities. 
As described earlier, a side effect of the process of signifierisation is that the signifierised 
jouissance is removed from circulation. This jouissance is “deactivated”, so to speak. Where once there 
was an effect because of a body event, there is now a signifier as a pointer to it; the actual effect (i.e., 
the jouissance of the body event) is now missing. The pointer does not really replace the missing 
jouissance, i.e., it does not create a similar effect—or any effect, for that matter. A direct outcome of 
this is the emergence of desire—i.e., the desire to return to the original jouissance, which is actually 
not there anymore. 
It has to be stressed that the term “desire” is used here in an ontological rather than an ontic 
sense, i.e., without any reference to what is desired, what it means to desire, or how desire is 
articulated. This is what Lacan points out: “This is why desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction nor 
the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second, 
the very phenomenon of their splitting”.148 
Lacan summarises as follows: 
The unconscious does not exist because there would be an unconscious desire … that would be primitive and that 
would have to elevate itself to the superior level of the conscious. On the contrary, there is a desire because there is 
unconscious, that is to say language which escapes the subject in its structure and effects, and because there is always 
on the level of language something beyond consciousness, which is where the function of desire can be situated.149 
At the heart of the subject of language is a lack. When a signifier is established, when jouissance is 
made into signifiers, there is always something left over. Some jouissance that has not yet been 
signifierised. There are events of the body (which are already registered in the real) that have not been 
included in the network of signifiers: anxiety, for example; or orgasm. Lacan has given to this remainder 
                                                          
147 Compare, here, Freud’s attempt to speak about the origins of the pleasure principle. He outlined it in terms of mounting or discharging a 
tension resulting from a stimulus: “Unpleasurable feelings are connected with an increase and pleasurable feelings with a decrease of 
stimulus”. Freud, ‘Instincts and their Vicissitudes’, p. 117. 
148 Lacan, ‘Signification of the Phallus’, p. 580/691. 
149 Lacan in 1966, quoted in Dany Nobus, ‘A Matter of Cause: Reflection on Lacan's “Science and Truth”’ in Jason Glynos and Yannis Stavrakakis 
(eds.), Lacan & Science (London: Karnac, 2002), 89-118, p. 103. 
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jouissance the designation “a”—which, now, as object a, becomes a reference to this remainder 
jouissance: 
That is to say that [object a], the object of desire, in its nature is a residue, is a remainder. It is the residue which the 
being with which the speaking subject is confronted as such leaves to any possible demand. And this is the way that 
the object re-joins the real. This is how it participates in it.150 
Admittedly, object a is one of those Lacanian concepts that seem to be too difficult to pin down. 
According to Bruce Fink, Lacan considered it to be one of his most significant contributions to 
psychoanalysis.151 Its conceptual origin can be found in Karl Abraham’s conception of the part object, 
and in Winnicott’s transitional object; it reflected Lacan’s distinction between an object which is 
desired and an object that causes desire to emerge.152 In the words of Lacan, “Object a is a function I 
invented in order to designate the object of desire. Small a is what Winnicott calls the transitional 
object.”153 The fuel for this function—if I can use this expression—comes from the remainder (not yet 
signifierised) jouissance, which in a way becomes a surplus jouissance (in French: plus-de-jouir). As 
Nestor Braunstein explains, 
‘Satisfaction’ (of the need and of the demand) always leaves a trace of disappointment: there is something missing in 
the object that the other offers. … It is this unsatisfied remainder of ‘satisfaction’ that engenders an object: the object 
cause of desire, the object of a surplus of jouissance and, at the same time, a lost jouissance (plus-de-jouir) which 
Lacan calls objet a.154 
 
Drives 
One of Freud’s most easily misunderstood concepts is drive. Freud’s German term was Trieb, which 
was originally translated as instinct—a choice that gave rise to some confusion.155 The meaning Freud 
gave to the term was that of a motivating force or factor that would account for the observation that 
living creatures seem to be compelled to behave in a certain ways. He described drives 
as a concept on the frontier between the mental and the somatic, as the psychical representative of the stimuli 
originating from within the organism and reaching the mind, as a measure of the demand made upon the mind for 
work in consequence of its connection with the body.156 
Freud differentiated between two major groups of drives, the ones that have something to do 
with “life” (or Eros) and the ones that have something to do with “death” (or Thanatos). He speculated 
                                                          
150 Lacan, Seminar VI, pp. 341-342. For a similar argument see Tombras, ‘On Being Human’, pp. 90, 99n19. 
151 See Fink, Lacanian Subject, p. 83. 
152 See Lacanian Subject, pp. 83-97. For an extensive, book-length discussion of object a see Shingu, Being Irrational. 
153 Jacques Lacan, ‘At the Institut français in London (3 Feb. 1975)’ [1975], trans. Dany Nobus, Journal for Lacanian Studies, 3/2 (2005), 295-
303, p. 301. 
154 Braunstein, ‘Desire and Jouissance’, p. 110. 
155 J. Strachey, Freud’s main translator defended this choice and argued against the term drive. He noted the similarity between Tried and 
drive is superficial, and that in the literature and dictionaries there was no use of the word “drive” in the sense that Freud used the term 
“Trieb”. See James Strachey, ‘Notes on Some Technical Terms whose Translation calls for Comment’ in Sigmund Freud, Pre-Psycho-Analytic 
Publications and Unpublished Drafts (London: Hogarth Press, 1966), xxxiii-xxvi. 
156 Freud, ‘Instincts and their Vicissitudes’, p. 118. 
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that they reflect a deeper state of affairs within the universe. The life drive refers to the tendency of 
certain processes to create more and more complicated structures, such as life itself; and the death 
drive refers to processes that undo or counteract the first.  
 Having until then considered the pleasure principle to be the main driving force behind any 
human (and animal) action, Freud introduced the death drive in order to account for some clinical 
phenomena that could not fit with it. The aim of the pleasure principle was thought to be the reduction 
of tension “by the shortest route possible”.157 However, there were unaccountable phenomena, all 
falling under the rubric of a “compulsion to repeat”, that did not seem to conform to it—for instance, 
“the transference phenomena of neurotics”, “the dreams which occur in traumatic neuroses”, and 
“the impulse which leads children to play”.158 Melanie Klein embraced the concept of the death drive 
almost immediately because she saw that it could solve her greatest theoretical problem in relation to 
what she thought were very early manifestations of the Superego.159 Other psychoanalysts, however, 
were less convinced. The concept of the death drive remains the subject of debate.  
Freud himself writes that 
the theory of the instincts is so to say our mythology. Instincts are mythical entities, magnificent in their 
indefiniteness. In our work we cannot for a moment disregard them, yet we are never sure that we are seeing them 
clearly. You know how popular thinking deals with the instincts. People assume as many and as various instincts as 
they happen to need at the moment—a self-assertive instinct, an imitative instinct, an instinct of play, a gregarious 
instinct and many others like them. People take them up, as it were, make each of them do its particular job, and 
then drop them again. We have always been moved by a suspicion that behind all these little ad hoc instincts there 
lay concealed something serious and powerful which we should like to approach cautiously.160  
As Jonathan Lear comments, the death drive might reflect Freud’s “failure to understand the 
significance of compulsive repetition” and “raises the question of how we understand the 
phenomenon of human aggression.”161 
For his part, Lacan too suggested from the beginning that many mental phenomena that 
involved some form of aggression and were thought to be attributable to a death drive were instead 
indirect products of the process of construction of the imaginary via the mirror stage.162  
Returning to this issue in Seminar XI, he tried to combine the two drives into one: 
In this way I explain the essential affinity of every drive with the zone of death, and reconcile the two sides of the 
drive—which, at one and the same time, makes present sexuality in the unconscious and represents, in its essence, 
death.163 
And also, further down in the text: 
                                                          
157 Skelton (ed.), Edinburgh Encyclopaedia, p. 369. 
158 See Freud, ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, pp. 292-294. 
159 See “Death Instinct” in Robert D. Hinshelwood, A Dictionary of Kleinian Thought (London: Free Association Books, 1991), pp. 266-270. 
160 Freud, ‘New Introductory Lectures’, pp. 127-128. 
161 Lear, Freud, p. 163. 
162 See Lacan, ‘Aggressiveness in Psychoanalysis’.  
163 Seminar XI, p. 199. 
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The distinction between the life drive and the death drive is true in as much as it manifests two aspects of the drive. 
But this is so only on condition that one sees all the sexual drives as articulated at the level of significations in the 
unconscious, in as much as what they bring out is death—death as signifier and nothing but signifier, for can it be said 
that there is a being-for death?164 
In other words, Lacan would locate death at the level of the signifier, since, as we saw above, it 
is the signifier which deadens or cadaverises jouissance.165 
There is a crucial similarity in how the drives are conceived of in Freud and Lacan, namely that 
they are thought as some kind of background motivating factors. In Freud, they are conceived of as 
being like force field that change anything that falls within their scope of influence, while for Lacan 
they are more like vectors that connect one signifier to another. But here, on the other hand, lies the 
main difference between the two conceptualisations. The Freudian concept is ontic—in the sense that 
Freud sees in it a manifestation of a principle of biology166—while the Lacanian concept is, as Lacan 
says, ontological: 
The Trieb [or drive] can in no way be limited to a psychological notion. It is an absolutely fundamental ontological 
notion, which is a response to a crisis of consciousness that we are not necessarily obliged to identify, since we are 
living it.167 
Richard Chessick has described Lacan’s understanding of the death drive as an attempt to 
remove it “from its biological roots and yet preserve the concept as metapsychology and not a cosmic 
phantasy.”168 However, he remained unconvinced by Lacan’s conclusions, claiming that they stem from 
a “misreading” of Freud’s theory of the Ego “in order to negate it and justify a return to the topographic 
theory.”169 In my view, this argument is indefensible because it is based on a false premise. Even though 
it seems be true that Lacan had wanted to remove the drives from biology, he did not advocate a return 





                                                          
164 Seminar XI, p. 257. 
165 See above, p. 113. 
166 Cf. Freud’s explanation of his epistemological position in connection to his hypotheses—in this case the hypothesis of libido theory: “I try 
in general to keep psychology clear from everything that is different in nature from it, even biological lines of thought. For that very reason I 
should like at this point expressly to admit that the hypothesis of … instincts (that is to say, the libido theory) rests scarcely at all upon a 
psychological basis, but derives its principal support from biology. But I shall be consistent enough to drop this hypothesis if psycho-analytic 
work should itself produce some other, more serviceable hypothesis about the instincts. So far, this has not happened. … Since we cannot 
wait for another science to present us with the final conclusions on the theory of the instincts, it is far more to the purpose that we should 
try to see what light may be thrown upon this basic problem of biology by a synthesis of the psychological phenomena.” Freud, ‘On 
Narcissism’, pp. 71-72. 
167 Lacan, Seminar VII, p. 127. 
168 Richard D. Chessick, ‘The Death Instinct Revisited’ Journal of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis, 20 (1992), 3-28, p. 13. 
169 ‘The Death Instinct Revisited’, p. 14. 
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Chapter 5: Lacanian metapsychology 
Lacan insisted that he remained a Freudian until the end of his teaching. However, it would not be 
completely incorrect to say that Lacan remained a faithful Freudian in the same way that Einstein 
remained a faithful Newtonian; Freudian psychoanalysis is included in the Lacanian version of it, but 
the latter comprises much more than the former. For example, whereas Freud tried until the end of 
his teaching to defend psychoanalysis’ position within the sciences, Lacan positions psychoanalysis at 
a vantage point that allows it to discuss science rather than be a science. Still, in Lacan’s view this 
vantage point does not elevate psychoanalysis to the status of a fundamental ontology or a new 
epistemology. Psychoanalysis can speak about other discourses as it can speak about itself; but it never 
ceases to be one of the possible discourses. In this sense, the question of a post-Freudian—that is, 
Lacanian—metapsychology seems to involve a circularity. Strictly speaking, there can be no such thing. 
But it is useful, as it denotes an ontological thematisation of a set of ontic (i.e., clinical) observations.1  
As discussed in the previous chapter, the basic assumption of the whole Freudian enterprise is 
that the human psyche is seen as an intrinsically deterministic “mental apparatus” that can be studied 
scientifically: mental phenomena can, in principle, be explained, in the sense that there is a reason 
things happen in this or that way. We saw that for Heidegger, as well as for Wittgenstein, Freud had 
also made the error of overlooking the difference between understanding and establishing the 
continuity of causal connections. According to them, thinking of something as a reason for a given state 
of affairs, does not mean that it has caused this state of affairs. In light of these criticisms, Freud’s 
theory would emerge as rather unstable, without solid foundations.  
Lacan approached the whole issue from a different angle. Acknowledging that Freud’s method 
is Cartesian, Lacan stressed the fact that the Freudian subject, i.e., the human being as understood by 
Freud, is, just like the Cartesian one, a subject that seeks certainty—but cannot find it. Certainty is not 
a straightforward issue for the Freudian subject, because there is always something—a dream, a slip 
of the tongue, a neurotic symptom, or something like this—that gives reasons for doubt.2 For Freud, 
the source of this “something” was the unconscious. The unconscious would serve, as Lacan argued, 
as the foundation for Freud’s much sought-after certainty. Just like Descartes, who could establish the 
certainty of his existence by virtue of the fact that he doubts—that is, he thinks—in his own doubt, 
Freud could, Lacan says, be “assured that a thought is there, which is unconscious, which means that 
it reveals itself as absent”.3 This, of course, is linked to Lacan’s understanding of the unconscious as a 
gap, as a disruption in a chain of signifiers. 
                                                          
1 An argument about the need for a metapsychology from a Lacanian perspective has been presented in Paul Verhaeghe, On Being Normal 
and Other Disorders: A Manual for Clinical Psychodiagnostics, trans. Sigi Jottkandt (New York: Other Press, 2004). 
2 See Lacan, Seminar XI, p. 35.  
3 Seminar XI, p. 36. 
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Now, there is nothing that could allow us to predict the intricacies of the interconnections 
between signifiers. A chain of signifiers itself is unique for each individual and is constructed within his 
or her life—guided, so to speak, by the internal logic of this person’s language. 
 
The law of the signifier 
Language provides a frame within the limits of which signifiers are interconnected; still, the specificities 
of these interconnecting pathways cannot be determined beforehand. They are being laid 
retroactively, so to speak, as new signifiers are “added” and are connected to earlier signifiers—after 
the fact, or après-coup, as Lacan had it.4 
This is an effect of what Lacan called the Law of the Signifier, namely the law that governs the 
ways in which signifiers are linked to each other in a chain. These horizontal dependencies of signifiers 
are complemented by vertical dependencies according to two fundamental structures, metaphor and 
metonymy.5 The fact that the linking is only established retroactively renders this law non-predictive. 
You cannot outline the course these pathways will take. You can only back-trace the pathways already 
laid down, via free association.6 In other words, although the network of signifiers is governed by a 
law, there is nothing deterministic in its structure. Psychoanalysis, at least in its Lacanian rendering, 
does not claim—and cannot claim—that the human being is reducible to an effect of the workings of 
a law such as the law of signifier. It is only positing that the infinite myriads of possible configurations 
that one’s own network of signifiers can obtain are back-traceable—provided one is willing enough (or 
patient enough, one could add here) to enter into analysis. 
The implications of this crucial insight by Lacan is that criticisms concerning psychoanalysis’s 
alleged determinism are now fading in importance. The law of signifier is conceived of as a descriptive 
law. As such, it does not predict anything; rather, it just describes the sequence of a series of states of 
affairs in such a way that there is no gap between them. As an example, Lacan says, 
think of what is pictured in the law of action and reaction. There is here, one might say, a single principle. One does 
not go without the other. The mass of a body that is crushed on the ground is not the cause of that which it receives 
in return for its vital force—its mass is integrated in this force that comes back to it in order to dissolve its coherence 
by a return effect. There is no gap here, except perhaps at the end.7 
A law conceived in this way needs to be distinguished from a cause. In fact, as Bruce Fink points out, 
in Lacan’s view modern science always attempts to eliminate the content of the concept cause: 
“Causality in science is absorbed into what we might call structure—cause leading to effect within an 
                                                          
4 Après-coup is Lacan’s translation of Freud’s “Nachträglichkeit”, or retroaction. See ‘Position of the Unconscious’, p. 711/839. See also above, 
p. 95. 
5 Cf. ‘Direction of Treatment’, p. 517/618. For a discussion of metaphor and metonymy see below, pp. 126ff. 
6 See above, pp. 103-105. 
7 Lacan, Seminar XI, p. 22.  
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ever more exhaustive set of laws.”8 For modern science, as understood by Lacan, a cause is always 
something that intervenes and breaks a sequence of states of affairs. 
Whenever we speak of cause … there is always something anti-conceptual, something indefinite … a hole, and 
something that oscillates in the interval. In short, there is cause only in something that doesn't work.9 
For Lacan, this was where Freud’s discovery of the unconscious can be situated. The unconscious is a 
disruption in the law of the signifier. It presents itself as a gap, as a discontinuity: 
Discontinuity, then, is the essential form in which the unconscious first appears to us as a phenomenon—
discontinuity, in which something is manifested as a vacillation.10 
The concept of cause is quite an elusive one, and Lacan resorts to Aristotle’s theory of four 
causes, borrowing from him two concepts that Aristotle had used in his discussion of chance: tuché 
(sometimes spelled as tyché; in Greek: τύχη) and automaton (in Greek: αυτόματον).11 According to the 
British classicist W. K. C. Guthrie, Aristotle’s discussion focused on if and how chance events can be 
thought as the source of results that would otherwise be brought up by this or that cause. He discussed, 
in other words, chance as a type of (incidental) cause. The distinction between tuché and automaton 
is related to their respective scopes: “Tyché is confided to the world of adult human beings. 
Automaton, the wider term, is an incidental cause in the sphere of purposive events in general … It 
may apply to the behaviour of the lower animals or inanimate objects.”12 Aristotle’s conclusion was, 
Guthrie writes, that “chance is an incidental outcome of purposive actions or events” that were 
“directed at some other end.”13 
This specific aspect of Aristotle’s discussion is of particular interest for Lacan. It allows him to 
elucidate the question of cause in psychoanalysis by 
revising the relation that Aristotle establishes between the automaton—and we know, at the present stage of modern 
mathematics, that it is the network of signifiers—and what he designates as the tuché—which is for us the encounter 
with the real.14 
There may be questions in connection to Lacan’s use of the terms tuché and automaton. 
Malcolm Bowie, for example, comments that Lacan “may seem to have these terms the wrong way 
around,” since “’the real’ sounds rather like ‘nature’ and [talking about] ‘signifiers’ suggests the 
presence of a human subject.”15 However, the apparent confusion dissipates when one remembers 
that the Lacanian real, although sounding like “nature”, has little to do with nature, being a mental or 
                                                          
8 Bruce Fink, ‘Science and Psychoanalysis’ in Richard Feldstein, Bruce Fink, and Maire Jaanus (eds.), Reading Seminar XI, Lacan's Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 55-64, p. 64. 
9 Lacan, Seminar XI, p. 22. 
10 Seminar XI, p. 25. 
11 See Seminar XI, p. 21. 
12 Guthrie, Aristotle, p. 235. 
13 Aristotle, pp. 238-239, 240. 
14 Lacan, Seminar XI, p. 52. For a discussion see also Monica Errity, ‘Tyche and Automaton in Aristotle's Physics’ The Letter: Irish Journal for 
Lacanian Psychoanalysis, 51 (2012), 69-73. 
15 Malcolm Bowie, Lacan (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1991), pp. 102-103. 
Chapter 5: Lacanian metapsychology  123 
  
psychic register. The point that Lacan tries to make is that the contingencies of the network of signifiers 
can be thought of as corresponding to the Aristotelian concept of automaton, whereas the chance 
encounter with a disruption (i.e., the gap of the unconscious) can be thought of as corresponding to 
tuché. “Let me recall to mind here,” he says, 
the automatic functioning of the laws by which the following are articulated in the signifying chain: the substitution 
of one term for another to produce a metaphorical effect; the combination of one term with another to produce a 
metonymical effect.16 
The subject is under the sway of the contingencies of his or her own network of signifiers (automaton), 
while disruptions come as chance encounters (tuché) with the real: “The real is beyond the automaton, 
the return, the coming-back, the insistence of the signs, by which we see ourselves governed by the 
pleasure principle. The real is that which always lies behind the automaton.”17 Fink points out that 
Lacan’s discussion of the automaton evokes the (Freudian) concept of repetition: “What is commonly 
referred as repetition is nothing but the ‘insistence of signs’.”18 
It’s perhaps interesting to note here that in Seminar XX Lacan employs Aristotle’s four causes in 
order to present the signifier as a cause of jouissance: 
The signifier is the cause of jouissance. Without the signifier, how could we even approach that part of the body [that 
gave rise to the jouissance in question]? Without the signifier, how could we centre that something that is the material 
cause of jouissance? However fuzzy or confused it may be, it is a part of the body that is signified in this contribution. 
Now I will go right to the final cause, final in every sense of the term because it is the terminus—the signifier is what 
brings jouissance to a halt. … The efficient, which Aristotle proposes as the third form of the cause, is nothing in the 
end but the project through which jouissance is limited. … And the embrace, the confused embrace wherein 
jouissance finds its cause, its last cause, which is formal—isn't it something like grammar that commands it?19 
In other words, the signifier is that which allows jouissance to be revealed to the speaking being. It’s 
only because one is under the sway of the signifier that jouissance can be an issue. This, of course, 
does not mean that the signifier is the source of jouissance. It’s only that Lacan tries to bring into view 
the circularity that the signifier involves. Jouissance is crystallised (or cadaverised) as signifier, and in 
the process it comes into view because of the signifier. 
 
The subject of science 
A recurrent theme in Lacan’s teaching throughout the years was the relation of psychoanalysis to 
science. This theme—which was also inherited from Freud—ran along two different axes: one about 
the relation of psychoanalysis, as a method and a theory, to scientific methodology and objectives; and 
another about the emergence of the psychoanalytic field as such. 
Regarding the first, Lacan was unambiguous from the very beginning of his engagement with 
such ideas. In 1936 he stated:  
                                                          
16 Lacan, ‘Direction of Treatment’, p. 519/622 (emphasis added). For metaphor and metonymy see below, pp. 126-128. 
17 Seminar XI, pp. 53-54. 
18 Fink, ‘The Real Cause of Repetition’, p. 225. 
19 Lacan, Seminar XX, pp. 24-25. 
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For while I consider it legitimate to privilege the historical method in studying facts of consciousness, I do not use it 
as a pretext to elude the intrinsic critique that questions their value. Such a critique … will allow us to see why the 
late nineteenth century form of psychology that claimed to be scientific and forced itself even on its adversaries, 
thanks both to its apparatus of objectivity and its profession of materialism, simply failed to be positive, excluding 
from the outset both objectivity and materialism.20 
Lacan was much more interested in the second question. What was it that made possible the 
invention of psychoanalysis? 
This is not a simple question. Psychoanalysis would not be possible at all if people were not able, 
ready, or willing to consider the objects it studies—the manifestations of mental life—as objects that 
can be studied at all. Let us take dreams, for example. People have always been fascinated by dreams; 
but the idea that dreams follow a certain internal logic—albeit unknown—and can be objects of 
scientific study was novel at the time of Freud. Freud was not the only scientist who took dreams 
seriously. But as the first chapter of Interpretation of Dreams testifies, Freud was one of the few who 
decided to proceed further along this route.21 
In Lacan’s understanding, in order for psychoanalysis to be at all possible as a scientific discipline, 
a prior step had to have been already taken.22 As we saw earlier, Lacan stressed the fact that the 
Freudian subject—i.e., the human being as understood by Freud—is a subject that seeks certainty, just 
like the Cartesian subject. It was only after Descartes that phenomena of the mind became objects of 
scrutiny. 
Psychic phenomena, such as those that made Freud introduce the hypothesis of the 
unconscious, would not be perceived as phenomena that warrant further investigation were it not for 
Descartes’s revolution. This, of course, does not mean that they were unobserved before Descartes; 
the point rather is that before Descartes such phenomena were taken as evidence of interventions or 
interactions of a divine rather than a human nature; they were thought of as omens or messages 
carrying secret meanings. As Russell Grigg comments, 
Lacan may well have been echoing these remarks of Koyré’s when he declared that ‘Descartes inaugurates the initial 
bases of a science in which God has no part.’ But in Lacan’s view, what was decisive for the emergence of science was 
not just the constitution of a new object in the form of mathematized nature but also the emergence of the Cartesian 
cogito as the subject of science.23 
As Lacan explained, “it’s no coincidence that psychoanalysis appeared well after the appearance of … 
scientific discourse. Psychoanalysis does not cease to have a relation with the scientific discourse. They 
are of the same nature.”24 The unconscious speaks, said Lacan—it “tells the truth about truth”; and 
                                                          
20 ‘Beyond the "Reality Principle"’, p. 59/74. 
21 See Freud, ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’, pp. 57-168. 
22 As Russell Grigg points out, Lacan’s views on science were influenced by the work of Alexandre Koyré. See Russell Grigg, Lacan, Language, 
and Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008), pp. 141-142. For a discussion connecting Koyré with Lacan see Jean-
Claude Milner, ‘The Doctrine of Science’ [1995], trans. Oliver Feltham, in Joan Copjec (ed.), UMBR(a): A Journal for the Unconscious. Science 
and Truth (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), 33-63, p. 36. See also Grigg, Lacan, Language, and Philosophy, pp. 140-142. For 
A. Koyré and his discussion of ancient and modern science, see above, pp. 46-50. 
23 Lacan, Language, and Philosophy, p. 137. 
24 Lacan, ‘At the Institut français in London (3 Feb. 1975)’, p. 297. 
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Freud “knew how to let [this] truth … speak” and bring up all the “rhetorical effects that we can 
recognise only by means of the subject of science.”25  
I am saying, contrary to what has been trumped up about a supposed break on Freud's part with the scientism of his 
time, that it was this very scientism … that led Freud, as his writings show, to pave the way that shall forever bear his 
name.26 
It is in this sense that Lacan insisted that “the subject upon which we operate in psychoanalysis can 
only be the subject of science”; a position that, as he admits, “may seem paradoxical.”27 
A subject of science is neither a subject that adopts scientific methods—i.e., a scientist—nor the 
human being as a subject of scientific research. It is, rather, the subject that is surprised by the products 
of his or her own psyche, which he or she then considers as concerning himself or herself. The subject 
of science is the doubtful Cartesian subject who is perplexed—and sometimes disturbed—by their own 
desire.  
Freud’s originality, in Lacan’s view, was that he first took these mental phenomena to be 
individual products of the mind of this or that individual human being, as manifestations of the 
suffering of specific individuals. These individuals, the subjects of psychoanalysis, were invited, by 
Freud, to reflect upon their own suffering, via a dialectical process of questions and answers. At the 
root of Freud’s invitation was his belief that the subject held the keys to the meaning of his or her 
“unconscious formations”. And it is in this sense that Lacan equated the subject of psychoanalysis to 
the subject of science—namely, in the belief that the subject of psychoanalysis can be invited to take 
ownership of, and reflect critically upon, his or her own suffering. The tools for this reflection are 
language and speech.28 
To summarise, Lacan’s own originality in approaching the question about how psychoanalysis 
stands vis-à-vis science was, therefore, twofold. On one hand he argued that the emergence of the 
subject of psychoanalysis is a phenomenon parallel and intimately connected to the phenomenon of 
the emergence of the subject of science, i.e., of the Cartesian subject; that is, he showed that 
psychoanalysis as a discipline was only possible now (after Descartes) because it entailed a Cartesian 
way of engaging with the world (and consequently with one’s own suffering). 
He showed, on the other hand, how the recognition of this (Cartesian) connection between the 
subject of psychoanalysis and the subject of science renders the whole issue of the scientificity of 
psychoanalysis irrelevant: it is psychoanalysis that allows us to outline the emergence of the subject of 
science, and not the other way around. In other words, psychoanalysis allows us to see science as a 
discourse, the term “discourse” (in Lacanian theory) denoting, as we shall see, the structure of a 
subject’s emergence within a signifying chain.29 Reversely, it’s only psychoanalysis that allows us to see 
                                                          
25 ‘Science and Truth’, p. 737/868. 
26 ‘Science and Truth’, p. 728/857. 
27 ‘Science and Truth’, p. 729/858. 
28 In this connection, Juan-David Nasio writes: “If the unconscious exists, it can only exist within the field of psychoanalysis, and more 
precisely, within the field of the cure”. Juan-David Nasio, Five Lessons on the Psychoanalytic Theory of Jaqcues Lacan, trans. David Pettigrew 
and François Raffoul (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), p. 45. 
29 See below, pp. 141-145. 
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that psychoanalysis itself is a different kind of discourse, a practice of “chit-chat”, as Lacan says in 1977, 
in the inaugural lesson of his Seminar XXV:  
What I have to say to you, I am going to say it, is that psychoanalysis is to be taken seriously, even though it is not a 
science. It is even not a science in any way. Because the problem is, as someone called Karl Popper has 
superabundantly shown, that it is not a science because it is irrefutable. It is a practice that will last as long as it will 
last, it is a practice of chit-chat. … This does not prevent analysis from having consequences: it says something.30 
This brings us back to the question of language.  
 
Language, metonymy, metaphor 
Building on Freud’s realisation that language is related to suffering and has unexpected and surprising 
effects on the body, Lacan saw language not just as a system of communication adopted by human 
beings because of their need to co-operate and exchange information. He tried to formulate the whole 
process of becoming human as an effect of language. Becoming human, here, is meant in the sense of 
submitting to the symbolic order, and accepting the position of the divided subject:  
In its symbolizing function, speech tends toward nothing less than a transformation of the subject to whom it is 
addressed by means of the link it establishes with the speaker—namely, by bringing about a signifying effect. This is 
why we must return once more to the structure of communication in language and definitively dispel the mistaken 
notion of ‘language as signs’, a source in this realm of confusions about discourse and of errors about speech.31  
Language comprises an articulated network of signifierised jouissance, i.e., signifiers which carry 
signifieds. These signifiers do not exist in isolation. By stressing their interconnection and postulating 
the signifying chain, Lacan was able to describe the subject of language as that which is represented 
by one signifier to another signifier: 
My definition of the signifier (there is no other) is as follows: a signifier is what represents the subject to another 
signifier. This latter signifier is therefore the signifier to which all the other signifiers represent the subject—which 
means that if this signifier is missing, all the other signifiers represent nothing. For something is only represented to.32 
The subject is always under the sway of the law of the signifier; whatever is his or her very own is 
manifested as a surprise, a gap in the signifying chain. It is there that the unconscious is to be found. 
The gap, of course, is an empty placeholder that can only be occupied by a signifier. 
When speaking about the law of the signifier, one refers to the law that governs the ways in 
which signifiers are linked to each other in a chain. These horizontal associative dependencies of 
signifiers are complemented by vertical structures of dependency that govern the ways different 
signifying chains are connected one with another. Drawing on the work of the Russian-American 
linguist Roman Jacobson, Lacan recognised that these dependencies were akin to what in linguistics 
are called metaphor and metonymy. 
                                                          
30 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XXV: The Moment to Conclude [1977-78], trans. Cormac Gallagher (Unauthorised 
translation from unpublished manuscript: www.lacaninireland.com), p. 1 (translation slightly altered). 
31 ‘Function and Field’, p. 245/298.  
32 ‘Subversion of the Subject’, pp. 693-694/819. 
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Jacobson had described two main types of aphasia as failures in the relations of similarity or 
contiguity between signifiers, and had pointed out the parallelism between these phenomena to the 
linguistic devices of metaphor and metonymy: 
Every form of aphasic disturbance consists in some impairment … either of the faculty for selection and substitution 
or for combination and contexture. … Metaphor is alien to the similarity disorder, and metonymy to the contiguity 
disorder.33 
Familiar as he was with Freudian ideas, Jacobson saw that there are parallels between the devices of 
metaphor and metonymy, and the mechanisms of dream work. 
In an inquiry into the structure of dreams the decisive question is whether the symbols and temporal sequences used 
are based on contiguity (Freud’s metonymic ‘displacement’ and synecdochic ‘condensation’) or on similarity (Freud’s 
‘identification and symbolism’).34 
The function of the main tool of psychoanalysis, then—namely, free association—is to allow the 
subject to follow the different pathways as they are opened at every metaphoric or metonymic 
juncture. Lacan went one step further, suggesting that even symptoms are products of a metaphoric 
mechanism: 
Metaphor's two-stage mechanism is the very mechanism by which symptoms, in the analytic sense, are determined. 
Between the enigmatic signifier of sexual trauma and the term it comes to replace in a current signifying chain, a 
spark flies that fixes in a symptom—a metaphor in which flesh or function is taken as a signifying element—the 
signification, that is inaccessible to the conscious subject, by which the symptom may be dissolved.35 
In fact, as Grigg points out, “The theory of metaphor and, to a lesser extent, of metonymy does a lot 
of work for Lacan. … The subject is a metaphor the father of the Oedipus complex is a metaphor; the 
symptom is a metaphor; and love, too, is a metaphor.”36 
In an attempt to formalise the metonymic and metaphoric mechanisms in their most elementary 
(and condensed) form, Lacan constructed, in 1957, two formulas, two “mathèmes”,37 whereby 
metonymy and metaphor are represented by functions (f) operating on signifiers (S) and significations 
or signifieds (s).38 
                                                          
33 Jakobson and Halle, Fundamentals of Language, p. 90. 
34 Fundamentals of Language, p. 85. 
35 Lacan, ‘Instance of the Letter’, p. 431/518. 
36 Grigg, Lacan, Language, and Philosophy, p. 151. 
37 Lacanian “formulas”, or mathemes (in French: mathèmes), represent his attempts to inscribe in a most condensed way the structural 
interdependencies between two or more elements. The term matheme itself, introduced in 1973, is thought to be constructed on the basis 
of the phoneme (of linguistics) and mytheme, or part of a myth (of ethnology). See “Mathème” in Glowinski, Marks, and Murphy (eds.), A 
Compendium of Lacanian Terms, pp. 110-113. Lacanian formulas usually employ a notation that resembles a lot—but only superficially—our 
familiar algebraic notation: It has letters, symbols and operators which resemble the ones of normal algebra (such as: a, b, c, f, x, S, , Φ, Ɐ, 
ⱻ ,→, , e.tc.). However, Lacanian formulas do not belong to algebra at all, and normal conventions of algebra (such as simplification or 
factorisation) do not apply. For a discussion of Lacan’s use of mathematics see below, pp. 153-158. 
38 The two formulas for metonymy and metaphor are respectively the following:  
𝑓(S . . . S′)S ≅ S (– )𝑠 
and 
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Crucially, metaphor allows us to understand how new significations are being produced. As 
Lacan explains, 
we must define metaphor by the implantation in a signifying chain of another signifier, by which the one it supplants 
falls to the rank of the signified, and as a latent signifier perpetuates there the interval by which another signifying 
chain can be grafted onto it.39 
In other words, the structure of metaphor allows the subject to escape the restrictions of a signifying 
chain, by substituting a signifier (of a particular signifying chain) with another signifier (of a different 
signifying chain).40 “It is in the substitution of signifier for signifier that a signification effect is produced 
that is poetic or creative, in other words, that brings the signification in question into existence.”41 As 
Lacan explains,  
metaphor is, quite radically speaking, the effect of the substitution of one signifier for another in a chain, nothing 
natural predestining the signifier for this function of phoros apart from the fact that two signifiers are involved, which 
can, as such, be reduced to a phonemic opposition.42 
In other words, there is no restriction to the ways in which a signifier can be substituted for another 
other than the obvious requirement that the signifiers are distinguishable.43 
This analysis of metaphor leads us to the more important question of the emergence of 
signification. 
 
Emergence of signification: the phallus 
The observation that signifiers are inter-connectable in signifying chains, and that junctions between 
signifying chains are governed by mechanisms such as metaphor or metonymy, does not provide us 
with an answer to the question regarding the origins of signification. It only refers to the fact that 




) S ≅ S(+)𝑠 










See ‘Metaphor of the Subject’, p. 756/890. There Lacan applies his formula to an analysis of a specific literally example. His elaboration is 
rather cryptic, and Grigg has argued it appears incorrect. See Grigg, Lacan, Language, and Philosophy, pp. 167-169. See also Jacques Lacan, 
‘Preface’ in Anika Lemaire, Jacques Lacan (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), viii-xv, pp. xii-xiii. 
39 ‘Ernest Jones’, p. 594/708. 
40 It is interesting to note the similarities of this view regarding the creative aspect of metaphor, with the views of contemporary American 
pragmatist philosophers like R. Rorty. As Rorty writes, “to think of metaphorical sentences as the forerunners of new uses of language, uses 
which may eclipse and erase old uses, is to think of metaphor as on a par with perception and inference, rather than thinking of it as having 
a merely ‘heuristic’ or ‘ornamental’ function.” Rorty, ‘Philosophy as Science’, p. 14. 
41 Lacan, ‘Instance of the Letter’, p. 429/515.  
42 ‘Metaphor of the Subject’, p. 756/890. 
43 M. Marini has followed Lacan’s various discussions of metaphor in texts of this period and comments that “the heterogeneous character 
of the arguments suggests Lacan may not have been all that sure of his theory of metaphor.” Marini, Lacan, p. 183. 
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entities that could carry meaning are linked one with another in chains and that these chains are also 
interconnected. 
We saw, however, that one of the effects of the metaphoric structure is that it induces a 
signifying effect by making one signifier step in, so to speak, in the place of another signifier. What we 
would need here, then, is some insight relating to the inaugural moment during which the first 
metaphor is established.44 
Lacan approaches this in terms of what he calls the phallus. He defines the phallus as a signifier 
whose function is “to designate meaning effects as a whole, insofar as the signifier conditions them by 
its presence as signifier.”45 Lacan builds on Freud’s observation of the little game his grandson invented 
to account for the periodic presence and absence of his mother, which could not but be a source of 
anxiety that he would have to master in some way.46 In Freud’s (and Lacan’s) view, the matter is not 
just a question of a basic biological need (namely feeding) that has to be attended to. There is anxiety 
when the mother (or carer) is away, and there is joy (or pleasure) when the mother is there. All this 
anxiety and all this joy—in short, all this jouissance—overwhelms the infant and has to be processed 
in some way. 
The presence of the mother is linked to the care and pleasure that the infant begins to expect 
from her, in the sense that it becomes its cue (or sign); similarly the absence of the mother becomes a 
sign of the anticipated anxiety (because of the absence). The child needs to master these extremes, 
and in this it is helped by a third pole, which is supposed to account for the mother’s absence: if the 
mother is away, this can only be because she wants something that she lacks. 
The mother wants something, but what she wants is unknown to the child. The question, 
according to Lacan, “cannot be solved by reducing things to biological data; the very necessity of the 
myth underlying the structuring brought on by the Oedipus complex demonstrates this sufficiently.”47 
There is a clear difference between what one could call a biological need and a need that can be 
thought of as a demand or desire: 
Needs become subordinate to the same conventional conditions as does the signifier in its double register: the 
synchronic register of opposition between irreducible elements, and the diachronic register of substitution and 
combination, through which language, while it does not fulfil all functions, structures everything in interpersonal 
relations.48 
That’s where the phallus finds its place. 
The phallus as a signifier provides the ratio [in French: raison] of desire (in the sense in which the term is used in 
‘mean and extreme ratio’ of harmonic division). I shall thus be using the phallus as an algorithm … The fact that the 
phallus is a signifier requires that it be in the place of the Other that the subject have access to it. But since this 
signifier is there only as veiled and as ratio [raison] of the Other's desire, it is the Other's desire as such that the 
                                                          
44 By postulating an “inaugural moment” I make an implicit reference to a starting point in what is a signifying chain or a temporal sequence. 
45 Lacan, ‘Signification of the Phallus’, p. 579/690. 
46 See Freud’s account of his grandson’s game “o-o-o-o” and “da” (“fort”, and “da”) in Freud, ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, p. 284. 
47 Lacan, ‘Signification of the Phallus’, pp. 576-577/686. 
48 ‘Direction of Treatment’, pp. 519/618-619. 
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subject is required to recognize—in other words, the other insofar as he himself is a subject divided by the signifying 
Spaltung.49  
The phallus, then, is thought as the imaginary object of what the mother wants (i.e., lacks); as 
such it becomes the signifier of this lack, and inaugurates the whole network of signifiers that 
constitutes subjectivity and reveals (or represents) the divided subject. In short: the phallus is the 
signifier of a lack; a network of signifiers is created as a metaphor of lack; and the divided subject is 
represented by its network of signifiers. If, following Lacan, we use the symbol  to designate the 
divided subject, and 𝑆1 → 𝑆2 to designate the interconnection between signifiers, then the relation 




The connecting structure, as a scaffolding so to speak, represents the subject in his or her 
individuality. This formula is equivalent to Lacan’s referring to the subject of language—i.e., the divided 
subject, written here as —as represented by a signifier to another signifier and will be helpful for the 
discussion of Lacan’s discourse theory below.50  
Meaning comes as a secondary effect of the fact that there are signifiers and that these signifiers 
are interconnected. Lacan calls this signifierness (in French: signifiance). As Bruce Fink explains, 
When Lacan uses the term [signifierness], it is to emphasize the nonsensical nature of the signifier, the very existence 
of signifiers apart from any possible meaning or signification they might have; it is to emphasize the fact that the 
signifier's very existence exceeds its significatory role, that its substance exceeds its symbolic function, to signify.51 
For Lacan, signifierness is not installed via the establishment of a correspondence between a signifier 
and a signified: at the beginning, there were no signifieds as such. Any given signified was originally a 
signifier belonging in another chain of signifiers.52  
In Seminar XX Lacan had commented that the function of the phallus is “not unrelated” to the 




—were it not for which “nothing about language could be explained by linguistics. Were it not for this 
bar above which there are signifiers that pass, you could not see that signifiers are injected into the 
signified.”53 Lacan’s suggestion can perhaps be understood in the sense that the bar represents that 
which allows us to see that there are signifiers beyond (or, perhaps, over) the signified—in other words, 
the bar is representing the effect of signifierness, and as such it allows us to see language in its material 
aspect, namely beyond (or before) signifierness. That, as Lacan says, is “not unrelated” to the function 
of the phallus—it is because of a process akin to that of metaphor that the second signifier obtained 
                                                          
49 ‘Signification of the Phallus’, pp. 581-582/693. Spaltung is the term Freud used to indicate the splitting or division of the Ego because of 
internal conflicts. See Freud, ‘Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence’. 
50 See below, pp. 141ff.  
51 Lacan, Seminar XX, p. 19n12. 
52 The term “originally” needs to be understood here in a structural rather than a temporal sense. 
53 Lacan, Seminar XX, pp. 40, 34.  
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the structural position of what we call signified. This process is what Lacan calls function of the phallus, 
and it is in this sense that the phallus can also be understood as the metaphor of desire (as lack). 
In connection to this, Fink wonders: “How we could understand the bar or barrier between the 
signifier and the signified as being in any way related to the biological organ associated with the male 
of the species is truly difficult to see.”54 Fink’s comment is rather surprising in that the term phallus, as 
used by Lacan, is something very different from the biological organ. The barrier between signifier and 
signified is not thought of as related to a biological organ, but to a function. In my view, what Lacan 
tries to show is twofold: first, that signification emerges because of the phallus (i.e., because of the 
mother wanting something other than just the baby); and, second, that the event of this emergence 
remains hidden—pushed, so to speak, beyond signification, or lost. 
 
The corporeality of language: lalangue 
Lacan comments that linguistics has mistakenly spoken about the arbitrariness of the connection (or 
joiner) between signifier and signified—mistakenly, because it misses the point.55 It’s not the case that 
the interconnection is arbitrary but also stable; on the contrary, it only appears as arbitrary because 
it’s lost; and it’s lost because it’s not stable. Arbitrariness, in other words, comes as the result of the 
non-stability of the connection. 
Meaning effects seem to bear no relation to what causes them. That means that the references or things the signifier 
serves to approach remain approximate—macroscopic, for example. … At the level of the signifier/signified 
distinction, what characterizes the relationship between the signified and what serves as the indispensable third 
party, namely the referent, is precisely that the signified misses the referent. The joiner doesn't work.56 
In the previous chapter we saw how Lacan described the loose attachment of the network of 
signifiers to the network of signifieds as the quilting point. As we see now, signifieds and signifiers are 
entities of the same kind, the only differentiation between the two being their structural position. It is 
because of the function of the phallus that a signifier’s connection to another signifier becomes 
stabilised, allowing the second signifier to emerge as if it was the meaning of the first. The two signifiers 
are then connected with a quilting point.57 Elaborating on the quilting point, Lacan suggested that the 
concept can be thought of as a translation of the ancient Stoic “expressible” or “say-able” (in Greek: 
λεκτόν).58 The Stoics had advocated a materialist theory of the mind, and their conception of the say-
able was intended to explain how something immaterial (incorporeal) like meaning can come out of 
something material that can bear a meaning (a signifier).59 Lacan emphasised that the Stoics used the 
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58 See Lacan, ‘Préface à l'Édition des Écrits en Livre de Poche’, p. 390. 
59 See Dirk Baltzly, ‘Stoicism’ The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
<plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/stoicism/>, accessed 22 May 2016. 
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term “signifier” to refer to what, for them, is “most primordial” in language, and likened his own object 
a as “the major incorporeal of the Stoics”.60 For the Stoics, a signifier, which is always a material, or 
corporeal, entity, is thought of as bonded with the incorporeal world of meaning. This bond was 
conceived by the Stoics as a product of an act of saying, hence its designation as “say-able”. The 
similarity to Lacan’s conceptualisation of the quilting point is evident. 
One could say that Lacan’s own theory of language is materialistic, or corporeal, in much the 
same way as the theory of the Stoics. “Speech is a gift of language,” he says as early as in 1953, “and 
language is not immaterial. It’s a subtle body, but a body it is.”61 Some people have wondered whether 
these similarities do in fact reflect Lacan’s deeper adherence to the philosophical system of Stoicism;62 
in my view, however, this question is beside the point. It appears that Lacan draws all these parallels 
in an attempt to emphasise his divergence from any linguistic (and philosophical, for that matter) 
doctrine that lays more stress on meaning than it does on the elements that can carry meaning. 
One could take as an example Lacan’s insistence on the primacy of the signifier. In order to 
discuss language and speaking without reference to meaning he introduced the neologism lalangue—
a play on the words la langue (French for language/speech) written as one word.63 Lalangue is speaking 
with no regard for what is being spoken about—for example, words taken as their sound, as phonemes, 
or when babbling or speaking in tongues. His intention was to stress the bodily, corporeal aspect of 
being engaged in the activity of speaking and, in so doing, to recast as a recursive construction the 
distinction that linguists usually designate as duality of patterning.64 
In Lacan’s view, Freud’s discovery consisted exactly in acknowledging that where psychical 
phenomena are concerned, language and words become materials, building blocks, and that their 
morphological features are as important as, if not more important than, their signifying features. As 
far as the analysis of psychical phenomena is concerned, meaningless fragments of words are just as 
important as meaningful ones (words and phrases), if not more.65 Signifiers can be thought of as 
autonomous entities only within the particular signifying chains to which they belong. They comprise 
parts, each and every one of which can be found to belong in different, completely independent 
                                                          
60 See Jacques Lacan, ‘The Place, Origin and End of My Teaching’ [1967], trans. David Macey, in Jacques-Alain Miller (ed.), My Teaching 
(London: Verso, 2008), 3-55, p. 36; and also ‘Preface’, p. xiv.  
61 ‘Function and Field’, p. 248/301. 
62 For an interesting discussion see Kurt Lampe, ‘Lekta: Stoic “Sayables” and Lacan’ Stoicism & Continental Philosophy (posted on 7 Nov. 
2014), [Blog], <stoicisms.wordpress.com/tag/lekta/>, accessed 10 Apr. 2016.  
63 The term “lalangue” was first employed by Lacan in in his Seminar of November 4, 1971 at Sainte Anne Hospital. See Jacques Lacan, The 
Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XIX*: The Knowledge of the Psychoanalyst [1971-72], trans. Cormac Gallagher (Unauthorised translation from 
unpublished manuscript: www.lacaninireland.com), pp. I4-5. 
64 This term refers, as Andrew Carstairs-Mccarthy explains, to the fact that “linguistic expressions are analysable in two levels, as composed 
of meaningless elements (sounds, belonging to a finite inventory) and of meaningful ones (words and phrases).” Andrew Carstairs-Mccarthy, 
The Origins of Complex Language: An Inquiry into the Evolutionary Beginnings of Sentences, Syllables, and Truth (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), p. 8. Independently, the French linguist André Martinet has suggested the term double articulation, to describe the same 
phenomenon. See André Martinet, Elements of General Linguistics, trans. Elisabeth Palmer (London: Faber and Faber, 1964), pp. 22-24. This 
term was used by G. Deleuze and F. Guattari to describe in very generalised way phenomena of different types of organisation between what 
they called layers or strata. See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi 
(London: Athlone Press, 1987), pp. 40-44. 
65 As an illustration one can take the Signorelli incident. See above, p. 105n96. 
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signifying chains. All signifying chains and their horizontal or vertical associative dependencies are what 
philosopher and biologist Humberto Maturana has in mind when he describes a linguistic domain as 
“a domain of consensual coordinations of actions or distinctions … [arising as] a particular manner of 
living-together contingent upon the unique history of recurrent interactions of the participants during 
their co-ontogeny.”66 
 
Knowledge and truth 
 When signifierness and (eventually) meaning are installed, the signifying network becomes 
knowledge: at its core, knowledge as such is not dependent on the knower or on what is being known. 
For Lacan, knowledge is that which emerges when signifiers become interconnected in a network: 
Knowledge initially arises at the moment at which 𝑆1 comes to represent something, through its intervention in the 
field defined … as an already structured field of knowledge. And the subject is its supposition, its hypokeimenon, 
insofar as the subject represents the specific trait of being distinguished from the living individual. The latter is 
certainly its locus, where the subject leaves its mark, but it isn't of the same order as what is brought in by the subject, 
by virtue of the status of knowledge.67 
In other words, the living individual—the human being—is the locus of the subject, but they are not of 
the same order: the (structural) position of the subject has nothing to do the (structural) position of 
the living individual. 
Such a definition of knowledge brings to the fore the question of truth, and its relation to 
knowledge. In 1970 Lacan begins his Television interview like this: “I always speak the truth. Not the 
whole truth, because there's no way to say it all. Saying it all is literally impossible: words fail. Yet it's 
through this very impossibility that the truth holds onto the real.”68 For Lacan truth is something that 
is said in words (i.e., in a language); truth cannot be whole (because words fail); and truth is connected 
to the real—i.e., the source of the symbolic (and of words, for that matter). While it is not presented 
as a full, formal definition of truth, this small passage shows rather clearly that for Lacan truth is not 
conceived as a correspondence between a proposition and a state of affairs. 
Lacan’s conception of truth, then, is closely related to his assertion that there is no 
metalanguage. As discussed earlier, metalanguage is a term of logic and linguistics that describes a 
language that contains statements about another language. In Tarski’s theory of truth, a metalanguage 
contains statements about an object-language, in which states of affairs are described or postulated.69 
Not so for Lacan. He claims that in human language there is no vantage point from which one can 
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assert the truth value of a statement or a proposition. You can never escape the level of the language 
in which you speak: “No authoritative statement has any other guarantee … than its very enunciation 
… I formulate this by saying that there is no metalanguage that can be spoken, or, more aphoristically, 
that there is no Other of the Other.”70 
This assertion has implications for truth: 
Everything that can be said of truth, of the only truth—namely, that there is no such thing as a metalanguage, … no 
language being able to say the truth about truth, since truth is grounded in the fact that truth speaks, and that it has 
no other means by which to become grounded.71 
As is the connection of metalanguage and truth with being: “I am going to say once again … ‘There’s 
no such thing as a metalanguage.’ When I say that, it apparently means—no language of being”.72 
The question, of course, remains, regarding the origin of truth. If there is not such a thing as a 
metalanguage, and if no statement has any other guarantee than its enunciation, then truth as such is 
rendered unstable, impossible, or irrelevant. 
Lacan, however, draws on Freud’s observation that the function of negation (a judgement as to 
whether a state of affairs holds true or not) is subsequent to a more primordial affirmation (in German: 
Bejahung) on the part of the subject.73 Lacan sees Freud as arguing that “in a general way … the 
condition such that something exists for a subject is that there be Bejahung, this Bejahung which isn’t 
a negation of the negation.”74 In other words, Lacan reads Freud as claiming that truth as such is not 
founded on a judgement but on a primordial affirmation or acceptance.  
For Lacan, truth is related to speaking as such. As soon as I speak, I speak the truth (or, perhaps, 
truth is spoken through me). Truth, then, means that I accept that I am the subject of language. For 
Lacan, nothing is revealed to the human being, at least not in the Heideggerian sense; rather, 
something is missing from the human being, and in the place of this lack the divided subject emerges 
as a speaking being. Speaking represents an affirmation, i.e., truth. 
Lacan’s conceptualisation of truth as affirmation appears to be closely related to efforts in 
modern logic to escape the limitations of the distinction between an object language and a 
metalanguage, as in Jaakko Hintikka’s work, for example—with which Lacan was theoretically 
acquainted.75 Hintikka has developed a first order logic in which—contrary to Tarski’s conception—
truth is defined and expressed with no need to refer to a metalanguage. As Hintikka explains, 
to speak of truth is not to speak of any independently existing correspondence between language and the world. 
There are no such relations. Or, as Wittgenstein once put it, the correspondence between language and the world is 
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established only by the use of our language. … Truth is literally constituted by certain human rule-governed 
activities.76 
Hintikka manages this by help of what he calls “semantical games” (called thus in reference to 
Wittgenstein’s language games),77 in which winning strategies can be shown to exist, and by 
establishing an analogy “between the notion of truth and the existence of a winning strategy.”78 For 
Hintikka, “this kind of truth definition is not restricted to formal … first-order languages but … can also 
be extended to natural languages.”79 As he writes, “the idea of language games can be made a 
cornerstone of an extremely interesting logico-semantical theory. … The involvement of humanly 
playable language games does not make a concept of truth any less objective or realistic.”80 
But in this way, truth becomes connected with time.   
 
Logical time and temporality 
The first aspect of a Lacanian understanding of time is implicitly connected with signification. Time is 
implied by the very nature of the signifier: in order to have a signifier we need to be able to distinguish 
entities, i.e., to differentiate something from its background; in addition to this, we need to be able to 
differentiate between presence and absence, in the sense that a signifier can only become a pointer 
to something if the presence of this something can somehow be discerned and registered. These two 
aspects of mental functioning are central and unavoidable parts of signification as a process. So, for 
example, the very first signifiers for the human infant would be related to the mother (voice, breast) 
and to the body (gaze, faeces). It is clear, here, that an inability to register and discern these differences 
would make the human being incapable of becoming a subject of language. This does not mean that 
this particular human being would lose the ability to live. Life, at the level of the biological mechanisms 
involved, would continue without major issues. But the world inhabited by this human being would be 
an impoverished one, not shared with other humans.81  
These considerations do not provide us with a fuller understanding of how time is involved at 
the very basic level, that of perception (such as Freud was hoping to reach). One needs to differentiate 
between clocking the passage of time as a function of the human body as such, and of awareness of 
the passage of time on the level of our dealings with the world. Regardless of the depth of our 
understanding of this function, and of the tools and concepts we use to study it, we can accept that in 
order to sustain life the biological organism needs to have at least two abilities. The one is 
receptiveness to the periodicity of bodily functions and the other is receptiveness to the difference 
between presence and absence. These abilities represent the absolute minimum for the biological 
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organism, and they are not adequate to account for our concernful dealings with a world that has been 
already disclosed to us. We have a circle here: time needs to exist at some lower (ontic) level in order 
to have a living organism with or without the ability to enter the world of language, which would then 
unveil to the human being both ontic and ontological time. We can only postulate this “lower”, ontic 
time when we have already entered the world unveiled to us by language. 
This sharing of the world with other humans is at the heart of Lacan’s argument about the 
emergence of logical or objective time. Writing in 1945, he used the parable of a puzzle to show how, 
by means of a progression of logical steps, a progression of temporal moments is also implicitly 
created. In this “sophism” as he called it. Three prisoners are invited to solve a logical puzzle. Timing is 
crucial, because the first to solve the puzzle will be the first (and only one) to gain his freedom. The 
puzzle is designed in such a way that one cannot arrive at the solution in one step. Each of the prisoners 
needs to decide their own actions in connection to the others’ actions. In this way, Lacan is able to 
distinguish between three different aspects of time modulation: a) the “Instant of the Glance”; b) the 
“Time for Comprehending”; and c) the “Moment of Concluding”. This modulation allows him to 
describe how the subjective sense of time (the hesitation of each prisoner in the story) is de-
subjectified by the collective action of all three prisoners, resulting in the emergence of what Lacan 
calls “objective” time.82 
So in this early paper Lacan argued that objective time is a product of coordinated symbolic 
human interaction—that is, a product of language: As he himself commented some years later, he had 
attempted to demonstrate in the logic of a sophism the temporal mainsprings through which human action, insofar 
as it is coordinated with the other's action, finds in the scansion of its hesitations the advent of its certainty; and, in 
the decision that concludes it, gives the other's action—which it now includes—its direction [in French: sens] to come, 
along with its sanction regarding the past. … It is the certainty anticipated by the subject in the ‘time for 
understanding’ which—through the haste that precipitates the ‘moment of concluding’—determines the other’s 
decision that makes the subject’s own movement an error or truth. This example indicates how the mathematical 
formalization that inspired Boolean logic, and even set theory, can bring to the science of human action the structure 
of intersubjective time that psychoanalytic conjecture needs to ensure its own rigor.83 
By claiming that objective—i.e., intersubjective—time is a shared product of the coordination of 
human interaction, Lacan comes very close to what Heidegger calls the publicness of time, which is 
one of the specific characteristics of world-time, i.e., “the time which makes itself public in the 
temporalizing of temporality … because it belongs to the world”.84 And also he comes very close to 
Hintikka’s conceptualisation of truth in terms of a language game. 
The similarity I observe emerges on two levels: on one level, both Lacan’s and Hintikka’s 
conceptualisations involve some sort of rule-governed human activity-–a puzzle or a semantic game, 
respectively. Apart from this—and in fact because of this—both Lacan’s and Hintikka’s 
conceptualisations involve time.85 They are both discursive. In Lacan’s case, what is at stake is mainly 
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time. In Hintikka’s case, time is introduced to something traditionally thought to be time-independent, 
namely first-order formal logic. 
Lacan returns to the subject of time and temporality repeatedly. In Seminar VI, for example, he 
says: 
At a time when the whole of philosophy is engaged in articulating what it is that links time to being, that it is quite 
simple to see that time, in its very constitution, past-present-future (those of grammar) refers itself to the act of the 
word—and to nothing else. The present, is the moment at which I speak and nothing else. 
It is strictly impossible for us to conceive of a temporality in an animal dimension. Namely in a dimension of appetite. 
The abc of temporality requires even the structure of language.86 
For Lacan, the structure of the psyche is a set of timeless pathways interconnecting signifiers—
timeless, i.e., outside of time constraints. The present is related to speaking. Speaking discloses time 
to the speaking being by the very fact that the elements of a speech act (phonemes, words, sentences) 
cannot be delivered simultaneously.87 Time—or rather, temporality—remains, for Lacan, a linguistic 
construction, that is, a product of language, overlaid on the “now”, i.e., on the moment at which we 
speak. It follows from this that the relation to temporality of animals or pre-verbal humans—i.e., 
infants—is fundamentally different. All living beings are in time, as living, biological organisms, but only 
those who can share a world as revealed in the shared intersubjective coordination of human 
interaction can also partake in temporality. 
In Seminar XI, Lacan discusses time in connection to desire: 
Now, although desire merely conveys what it maintains of an image of the past towards an ever short and limited 
future, Freud declares that [desire] is nevertheless indestructible. Notice that in the term indestructible, it is precisely 
the most inconsistent reality of all that is affirmed. If indestructible desire escapes from time, to what register does 
it belong in the order of things? For what is a thing, if not that which endures, in an identical state, for a certain time? 
Is not this the place to distinguish in addition to duration, the substance of things, another mode of time—a logical 
time?88 
In other words, Lacan suggests here that temporality is installed by the signifier (“logical time”), 
in addition to duration (“the substance of things”) and explains that the motive force behind all this 
(“desire”) is in itself outside the signifier (i.e., “indestructible”). This formulation reveals a 
differentiation between time qua duration and time qua temporality. Duration, as such, is a compound 
notion, including the temporal aspect of presence, and the temporal aspect of speaking. Both speaking 
(as sound) and presence (of objects) reveal themselves to the human being in the real.89 I understand 
this as reflecting a differentiation between duration—as time in the real—and temporality, as a 
scaffolding of time relations in the imaginary and the symbolic.90 
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Adrian Johnston has commented that with his prisoner’s dilemma sophism Lacan attempts to 
overcome classical logic’s operation outside time—an operation which is thought to be unfolding “in 
a strictly synchronic fashion.” As such, the sophism can be read, in Johnston’s view, as “a challenge to 
the confinement of logic within spatiosynchronic organizations.”91 Johnston claims that the challenge 
fails because it only works in connection to the temporal dimension and not the spatial. More 
generally, Johnston believes that Lacan fails to reconcile the timelessness of the unconscious (as 
postulated by Freud) with his own attempt to derive temporality from the symbolic (logical time), and 
claims that the problem persists until the end of Lacan’s teaching, i.e., even until after Lacan decided 
to turn to mathematics and topology.92 As he writes: “The unavoidable question still remains regarding 
how Freud’s timeless unconscious and Lacan’s ‘temporal logic’ of the unconscious can or should 
reconciled with each other.”93 Johnston’s arguments are, however, weakened if, as suggested above, 
one considers Lacan’s conceptualisation of duration as time in the real; and of temporality as a 
scaffolding of imaginary and symbolic time relations. In my view, timelessness, in Freud’s sense, is not 
irreconcilable with Lacan’s “temporal logic”. Quite the contrary: the installation of the temporal logic 
(i.e., the installation of the signifying chain) gives rise to the emergence of signification, and from there 
to the function of the unconscious. It is exactly because Lacan is able to discern a temporal logic in his 
conceptualisation of the unconscious that he can describe the formations of the unconscious as gaps 
in a signifying chain. 
 
Establishing historicity 
We have seen how becoming human means submitting to the symbolic order and accepting the 
position of the divided subject.94 The symbolic order is a static, motionless structure. It is a web of 
pathways that interconnects meaning-enabled elements. The symbolic, just like the Freudian 
unconscious, is timeless. It is irrelevant whether certain signifiers are “older” than others; in fact the 
very notion of the “age” of a signifier is an oxymoron as far as the subject is concerned. The only 
pointers to temporal relations between signifiers are provided by their place within the whole web, by 
the pathways that interconnect them, and by the obstacles along those pathways. These pathways are 
constantly “renegotiated”, so to speak, and may bring alterations to the temporal relations pointed to 
by them—a process of retroaction that Freud first recognised.95 
This temporal essence of speaking, its temporality, is never lost. It is there when a speech act 
takes place, and it is there when it is recalled, i.e., when it is brought back from memory. Moreover, it 
is still there when a speech act is constructed or rehearsed, i.e., during the process of thinking. It 
doesn't really matter if we think in order to say something, or if we just think because we think. All 
thinking is discursive and time is always disclosed in thinking, as it is disclosed in speaking or listening. 
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When I speak about thinking, here, I mean conscious thinking, i.e., thinking of which the thinking 
subject is fully aware. However, this is not the only kind of thinking, as Freud discovered. “Thinking” 
happens in the unconscious, too. But that thinking is recombinatory, rather than discursive, and takes 
place with no reference to time.96 A dream is “presented before consciousness as an object of 
perception”,97 i.e., it is not recounted. For the dreaming subject, the process of secondary revision 
brings a narrative logic to dream material. 
Similarly, a kind of secondary revision brings “historicity”. I am using the term to denote the 
observation that human beings have an awareness of coming from somewhere, and going to 
somewhere, i.e., that they have a history and tend to let this history inform their future. History would 
not exist without time, or, rather, without awareness of time and temporality.  
The question, then, is how it’s possible to make this step from temporality to historicity. This is 
not a self-evident step. To have a history, you need something more than just time. You need 
something that would give a perspective within the symbolic—a signifier that would set the symbolic 
in motion, so to speak. This signifier would create arrows that would point towards what is not here 
yet. In a way, it would provide a direction and a sense. That signifier, for Lacan, is death, which he, 
following Heidegger, conceives of ontologically, and connects with Freud’s death drive: 
The death instinct essentially expresses the limit of the subject's historical function. This limit is death—not as the 
possible end date of the individual's life, nor as the subject's empirical certainty, but, as Heidegger puts it, as that 
‘possibility which is the subject's ownmost, which is unconditional, unsurpassable, certain, and as such 
indeterminable’—the subject being understood as defined by his historicity.98 
Because there is death, and death is always not here yet, the subject can differentiate in the most 
radical way between what is not here yet (the future) from what was here (the past). We could say 
that the introduction of the signifier death reveals time as something like a vector that starts from the 
past and points to the future: it provides this vector with a sense.99 
 
Psychic structures 
Lacan’s description of the Freudian unconscious in terms of gaps and interruptions in a signifying chain 
allowed him to consider psychopathology from a structural point of view, rather than one focusing on 
symptomatology. Symptoms are no longer seen as the most distinctive aspect of one’s “illness”, but 
rather as products of the specificities of one’s network of signifying chains; this is a structured network, 
reflecting a specific instance of psychic structure. The question of diagnosis, then, emerges as a 
question of differentiation between structural traits, rather than a question of clinically observable 
characteristics judged against an accepted notion of normality. 
                                                          
96 Cf. Freud, ‘New Introductory Lectures’, pp. 48-49. 
97 ‘New Introductory Lectures’, p. 50. 
98 Lacan, ‘Function and Field’, pp. 261-262/318. Regarding Lacan’s effort to link Freud’s theory of the drives to Heidegger see the discussion 
in Muller and Richardson, Lacan and Language, pp. 91-94. 
99 The term sense is used here in its mathematical meaning, to indicate that time goes from past to the future.  
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As Paul Verhaeghe writes, medical science understands psychic normality “in terms of average 
scores, standard deviation, and modal personalities. This implies that psychic characteristics can be 
mathematically calculated and then presented in the famous bell-curve of normal distribution.”100 In 
psychoanalysis, as Joël Dor explains, “the problem of diagnosis seems to depend on a new issue: What 
is the constancy—if it exists—of these structural traits that in turn presuppose a certain stability in the 
organisation of psychic structure?”101 
We saw above that the first signifier (the phallus) is understood as related to the mother in terms 
of her comings and goings and the anxiety they produce; a third pole—third in the sense that it is 
different from the two poles of the subject and the mother—comes in to play as the (possible) reason 
for the mother’s absence. This third pole has the function of a limiting point for the omnipotence of 
the mother, presenting her as lacking something that she desires (signified by the phallus qua signifier). 
In other words, this third pole allows the subject to negotiate his or her relation to the phallus. 
Describing the dynamics of these early phenomena, Freud used the term “Oedipus complex” to 
designate a child’s preference and attachment to the parent of the opposite sex. According to the 
orthodox Freudian theory, the boy wants the mother but is met with a prohibition by the father, who 
makes it clear that the mother is off-limits.102 The penalty, should the boy refuse to accept this 
prohibition, would be castration. The boy, then, is being obliged to give up his mother as an object of 
sexual attention for fear of castration. In the case of the girl, the simple fact of the anatomical 
distinction between the sexes leads her along a different pathway. There is no threat of castration; 
rather, there is a belief that castration has already taken place. The girl turns against the mother and 
continues to love her father, albeit secretly. 
Lacan looks at the Oedipal dynamic in terms of a dialectic of “being the phallus or having it”,103 
i.e., in terms of one’s position vis-à-vis the mother’s desire. What Freud called castration, i.e., the 
limiting of one’s access to the mother qua desired object, is seen by Lacan not as a threat or danger 
but, reversely, as a (reassuring) symbolic limit to the mother’s omnipotence. For this reason, this third 
pole is designated by Lacan as the Name-of-the-Father or No-of-the-Father (in French: nom-du-père 
and non-du-père respectively); and its function is called the paternal function (or metaphor).104  
As soon as it is installed, the network of signifiers obtains an anchoring point that supports the 
stability of the whole network. The Name-of-the-Father is the key in the whole process of stabilising a 
steady network of signifiers. If this is not established, then the stability is precarious. In Verhaeghe’s 
words, “we distinguish three different structures between the subject and the Other, each implying a 
specific way of being-in-language and a particular relation toward others.”105 
Fink explains that these three main diagnostic categories “are structural categories based on 
three fundamentally different mechanisms or what we might call three fundamentally different forms 
                                                          
100 Verhaeghe, On Being Normal, pp. 6-7. 
101 Joël Dor, The Clinical Lacan (Nothvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 1997), p. 16. 
102 For what follows here see Freud, ‘The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex’. 
103 Dor, The Clinical Lacan, p. 18. 
104 See “Name-of-the-father” in Glowinski, Marks, and Murphy (eds.), A Compendium of Lacanian Terms, pp. 119-120. 
105 Verhaeghe, On Being Normal, p. 285. 
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of negation.”106 If the unconscious, as discussed above, is the gap in any interconnection of signifiers, 
a gap that constitutes any subject as a divided subject, then in neurosis this split takes the form of 
repression (Verdrängung); in psychosis it takes the form of foreclosure (Verwerfung); and in perversion 
the form of disavowal (Verleugnung).107 
It would be outside the scope of this thesis to describe in full detail the intricacies of structural 
differentiation within a clinical analytic setting. The subject matter is vast and the available literature 
extensive.108 It suffices here to say that contrary to medical practice (and expectations), the analytic 
setting involves situations “in which we cannot make stable inferences from psychic causes to 
symptomatic effects in the determination of a diagnosis”.109 
 
Theory of discourses 
The theory of the discourses is introduced in Lacan’s teaching relatively late, in Seminar XVII (1969-70), 
as a solution to the question of the subject’s engagement within a signifying chain and with the 
symbolic Other. Lacan describes a discourse as a “necessary structure that goes well beyond speech … 
It subsists in certain fundamental relations which would literally not be able to be maintained without 
language.”110 As he explains “the notion of discourse should be taken as a social link, founded on 
language.”111 Social link or social bond (in French: lien social) is a term that Lacan had borrowed from 
Saussure, who used it to describe what constitutes the basis of a linguistic group.112 
The basic structure of a discourse has, according to Lacan, four elements, laid out as two rows, 
comprising each of the positions of two distinct elements, or like the four corners of a square—its 
“legs”, as he puts it.113 It is an extension of a simpler structure representing Lacan’s definition of the 
signifier as that which represents the subject to another signifier. As we said earlier,114 This relation 




This schema has only three legs, so Lacan suggests adding one more, at the bottom right corner, 
since, as he has explained elsewhere, “a quadripartite structure can always be required in a 
                                                          
106 Bruce Fink, A Clinical Introduction to Lacanian Psychoanalysis: Theory and Technique (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 
76. 
107 See Glowinski, Marks, and Murphy (eds.), A Compendium of Lacanian Terms, p. 64. 
108 See, for example, Fink, A Clinical Introduction to Lacanian Psychoanalysis: Theory and Technique; Dor, The Clinical Lacan; Verhaeghe, On 
Being Normal; Darian Leader, What is Madness? (London: Hamish Hamilton, 2011).  
109 Dor, The Clinical Lacan, p. 10. 
110 Lacan, Seminar XVII, pp. 12-13. 
111 Seminar XX, p. 17. 
112 “If we could embrace the sum of word-images stored in the minds of all individuals, we could identify the social bond that constitutes 
language.” Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, p. 13. 
113 See Lacan, Seminar XVII, p. 14. 
114 See above, p. 130. 
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construction of a subjective ordering.”115 This fourth leg he designates as object a, i.e., as the object 








This formula “locates a moment,” Lacan explains: 
It says that it is at the very instant at which 𝑆1 intervenes in the already constituted field of the other signifiers, insofar 
as they are already articulated with one another as such, that, by intervening in another system, this  which I have 
called the subject as divided, emerges. … Finally, we have always stressed that something defined as a loss emerges 
from this trajectory. This is what the letter to be read as object a designates.117  
The whole structure, therefore, represents both the way in which signifiers are interconnected 
within the subject’s own network of signifiers 
𝑆1 → 𝑆2 












In other words, it represents a discourse: The 𝑆1, the master signifier, is being connected to the 
signifying chain (𝑆2) and in this way the divided (or barred) subject emerges—or, to put it differently, 
the barred subject emerges at the moment that an agent (in this case 𝑆1, i.e., a master signifier) reaches 
out to the other (in this case 𝑆2, i.e., the already constituted field of the other signifiers). A discourse 
is established in reference to an object which is supposed to be at the side of the Other, and operates 
as the cause or at stake. This is Lacan’s object a.118 As Verhaeghe summarises, “The essence of 
discourse theory is as follows: the lack of object, that is, the object (a), is both the cause and the 
condition of possibility of every symbolic system.”119 








These four places are implied in any speech act, i.e., in every discourse; what changes is the 
arrangement of the four letters.120 The specific arrangement already described above is called the 
discourse of the master. It is, according to Lacan “a discourse that is already in the world and thus 
                                                          
115 Lacan, ‘Kant with Sade’, p. 653/774. 
116 See above, pp. 117-117. 
117 Lacan, Seminar XVII, p. 15. 
118 See above, pp. 115-117. 
119 Verhaeghe, On Being Normal, p. 57 (emphasis in the original). 
120 For a discussion of the quadripartite structure of the four discourses and its connection to Aristotle and Peirce see Ettiene Oldenhove, 
‘Carré Logique et Quadrant de Peirce’ Le Bulletin Freudienne, 11 (1989), 29-47. 
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underpins it, at least the one we are familiar with. Not only it is already inscribed in it, but it is one of 
its arches.”121 As Shingu points out, 
Of the four discourses, the master discourse … expresses the underlying relation between the subject and the signifier 
of the subject, and for this reason could almost be granted the status of the prototype—the fundamental form from 
which the other discourses derive.122 
It expresses, in other words, “not only the elementary structure of language, but also its 
imperative nature.”123 The structure represented by this formula reflects a tension between what 
traditionally—and perhaps naively—would be described as internal and external in a subject’s psychic 
life.  
From it, Lacan produces four other arrangements, or structures, each corresponding to a 
different kind of discourse, by applying an anti-clockwise quarter-turn operation. This is a purely formal 
operation, which Lacan stresses is not just accidental: 
I have been speaking about this notorious quarter turn for long enough and on different occasions—in particular, 
ever since the appearance of what I wrote under the title ‘Kant with Sade’—for people to think … that there are other 
reasons for this quarter turn than some pure accident of imaginary representation.124 
However, he says very little about those other reasons.125 
In any case, starting from the discourse of the master, and applying the anti-clockwise quarter-
























As can be seen, each of these four discourses is the inverse of another one of the four. The 
inverse of the master’s discourse, for example, is the discourse of the analyst (as implied by the original 
title of Seminar XVII, L’envers de la psychanalyse, where the four discourses are introduced), while the 
discourse of the hysteric is the inverse of the discourse of university. 
                                                          
121 Lacan, Seminar XVII, pp. 14-15. 
122 Shingu, Being Irrational, p. 170. 
123 Glowinski, Marks, and Murphy (eds.), A Compendium of Lacanian Terms, p. 64. 
124 Lacan, Seminar XVII, p. 14. In Kant with Sade Lacan had constructed a schema with four place holders representing, as he explained, the 
Sadean phantasy. Further in the text he transformed it by a 90-degrees rotation. See ‘Kant with Sade’, pp. 653/774, 657/778. 
125 Bernard Burgoyne explains that Lacan has formulated this anti-clockwise rotation as the result of operations on vectors in a two-
dimensional complex (“Argand”) plane. (Discussion with author of 1 Jul. 2016. Pers. comm.). It is possible that Lacan plays on the fact that 
operations involving complex numbers are symbolic operations on the complex plane that includes an axis of real numbers 𝑥 with an axis of 
imaginary numbers 𝑖𝑦, where 𝑖 =  √−1.  
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Lacan’s discourse theory was readily adopted by researchers and theoreticians working in the 
fields of political theory and social and cultural studies, and a lot of important work has been produced 
as a result. The apparent simplicity of the four formulas, however, facilitated their uncritical adoption 
and application to all kinds of contexts in such a way that it has become very difficult to judge whether 
there was any merit in doing so. This was aided by the apparent clarity of the names Lacan chose for 
his four discourses. It might be tempting, for example, to mistake the master’s discourse for a discourse 
of oppression, or to think that scientists engage in the university discourse, or even to believe that 
most neurotics—but not all of them—are operating within the hysteric’s discourse. This, however, is 
not the case. Each discourse represents a manner of engagement with the symbolic order (or big 
Other), and not the structure of the social field facilitated by it. So, for example, As Mark Bracher 
explains, 
the discourse of the Master promotes consciousness, synthesis and self-equivalence by instituting the dominance of 
master signifiers (S1), which order knowledge (S2) according to their own values and keep fantasy (  ) in a 
subordinate and repressed position.126 
The discourse of the university describes how, subjected “to a dominating totalised system of 
knowledge / belief (S2), we are made to produce ourselves as (alienated) subjects.” The hysterical 
structure of discourse characterises “instances of resistance, protest and complaint … [and] is in force 
whenever a discourse is dominated by a speaker’s symptom”; and the discourse of the analyst “makes 
it possible to produce a master signifier that is a little less oppressive” because it is “produced by the 
subject rather than imposed upon the subject from the outside”.127 
Still, misconstructions were anticipated. Lacan says, for example: 
My little quadrupedal schemas—I am telling you this today to alert you to it—are not the Ouija boards of history. It 
is not necessarily the case that things always happen this way, and that things rotate in the same direction. This is 
only an appeal for you to locate yourselves in relation to what one can call radical functions, in the mathematical 
sense of the term.128 
Lacan would prefer to leave open how his formulas are to be used, or how the rotation will operate, 
pointing out, however, that there is nothing deterministic in the transformation operation that 
produces the four discourses, i.e., there is no specific order or necessity in how they emerge. As Fink 
notes in this regard, 
other discourses than the four discussed here could be generated by changing the order of the four mathemes used 
here. … In effect, a total of twenty-four different discourses are possible using these four mathemes in the four 
different positions, and the fact that Lacan only mentions four discourses suggests that he finds something particularly 
important about the order of the elements.129 
Lacan gave no indication of what this important aspect might have been. The question was discussed 
by Oliver Feltham: What is it, he asked, that “determines the emergence of these ordered discourses 
                                                          
126 Mark Bracher, ‘On the Psychological and Social Functions of Language: Lacan's Theory of the Four Discourses’ in Mark Bracher et al. (eds.), 
Lacanian Theory of Discourse: Subject, Structure, and Society (New York: New York University Press, 1994), 107-128, p. 117. 
127 ‘Lacan's Theory of the Four Discourses’, pp. 115, 122, 124. 
128 Lacan, Seminar XVII, p. 188. For the reference to radical functions, see above, p. 143n125. 
129 Fink, Lacanian Subject, p. 198n5. 
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such that there are four of them and four alone?”130 Why not twenty-four, as the combinatory logic of 
the transformation would indicate? Feltham did also wonder about the historicity of the general 
structure of discourse. He concludes that “there is an absolute cut between each discourse, … [i.e.,] 
each discourse emerges unique, and the emergence of the discourses is absolutely contingent. … Any 
such transformation between systems is asystemic or astructural: there is no structural change.”131 
  
From jouissance to the speaking body 
Lacan’s introduction of the three registers—imaginary, symbolic, and real—and jouissance, which we 
have conceptualised as the effect of the world on the body in its structural couplings within this 
world,132 an effect that fuels these registers, makes it clear that a more careful consideration of the 
role of the body as such is needed. But first it would be necessary to clarify what we mean by this term 
“body”. 
A basic, everyday sense of the term, the one provided by dictionaries for example, takes body 
to mean the complete physical structure of a human being or animal, comprising a head, a trunk, a 
neck, legs, arms, etc. There is no doubt that this description is valid for most intents and purposes as 
long as the body is taken to be an object in this world. This means to say that “body”—taken in its 
simple dictionary sense—is an ontic term. It’s clear to see, however, that an ontic term is not 
appropriate when one wants to consider phenomena like the ones studied by psychoanalysis; for to 
say that one “has” a body involves adopting, unexamined, an understanding of both the body as such 
(i.e., as an entity in this world), as well as what it means to be an embodied subject.  
The body is a construction, namely a signifier referring to a collection of signifiers that obtains a 
place in the human world by its interconnections to other signifiers and collections of signifiers; but is 
also the agent through which signifiers are possible. The biological body—the organism—is a 
prerequisite of everything discussed until now. It’s only because we have a body—a biological body—
that there can be jouissance, and that the register of the real can be populated. But this biological body 
needs to be contrasted to the body we talk about when we consider our bodily existence as speaking 
beings—our language body, so to speak. As Colette Soler writes: 
One is not born with a body. In other words, the body is not primary. The living being is not the body. … There is a 
distinction to be made between the organism, i.e., the living being, on the one hand, and that which, on the other 
hand, is called the body.133 
In a similar vein, Rik Loose explains: 
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What is a human body? A human body is a ‘reality’. However, we are not born with the reality of the body, but as a 
living organism or real body … The only reality we have is the reality of language and if our body is a reality then it is 
a body of language.134 
Human beings obtain a body—i.e., a language body—through their introduction to language. In 
the words of Lissy Canellopoulos, “To make a body, we need an organism, language and the image. 
These three dimensions—the real, the symbolic and the imaginary—are tied together by the 
Borromean knot, constituting the act of the subject.”135 Language, as it was indicated earlier, comprises 
an articulated network of signifierised jouissance. It’s because these elements of signifierised 
jouissance qua signifiers point to other signifiers that the human being can keep the as yet non-
signifierised jouissance under control: the network of signifiers is being installed, and more and more 
of this non-signifierised jouissance becomes a part of it—that is, becomes increasingly signifierised. In 
the beginning, the body is experienced as fragmented and chaotic—the source of unsignifierised 
jouissance, i.e., anxiety. It only starts becoming whole via a process that Lacan described under the 
rubric of the mirror stage. But, as he writes, 
This illusion of unity, in which a human being is always looking forward to self-mastery, entails a constant danger of 
sliding back again into the chaos from which he started; it hangs over the abyss of a dizzy Assent in which one can 
perhaps see the very essence of Anxiety.136 
Jouissance becomes channelled and controllable only through a series of imaginary identifications and 
symbolic signifierisations, the result of which is the construction of an imaginary body and of a 
corresponding symbolic body made of linguistic signifiers. In Loose’s words, “the body is a coating of 
the real of the organism and its organs with the material of an image.”137 It is in this sense that we can 
say that the language body is very different from the biological body. And it is in this sense that Lacan 
says that “thought is jouissance.”138 It is hard to overestimate the philosophical implications of this 
assertion: If signifiers stem from jouissance, and if all thought is jouissance, then the traditional 
philosophical concept of being loses its place. At least in Lacan’s view. As he says, he opposes to this 
being, “the being of signifierness.”139 
The emergence of this symbolic, or language, body, as it could also be called, is at the heart of 
a myriad clinical and non-clinical phenomena, ranging widely in severity and urgency: from severe 
cases of schizophrenia and catatonia, to bodily dissociations, eating disorders, or addictions; from 
gender discomfort, or body dysmorphic syndromes, to hysterical conversions or various other 
psychosomatic ailments; and so on and so forth.140 What all these have in common is the fact that the 
body of the speaking being is marked and transformed by the symbolic in ways that go far beyond the 
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limits imposed by biology as such. In fact, introduction to the symbolic may have influenced human 
phylogeny itself.141 It is as if the body presents the human being qua subject (of language) with an 
insoluble enigma. The question is far broader from what a simplistic understanding of the important 
biological and other physiological issues at hand would entail. Questions of survival, sustenance, and 
procreation are common to all living beings qua living beings. You would not have to be concerned 
about them. As a human being, considered as a living being, you would behave in such way as to 
“guarantee” life to the greatest extent possible. But as a human being considered as a speaking being, 
or parlêtre, as Lacan puts it,142 you are concerned about what is happening, because everything that is 
happening—your world, your environment, your body as well—is a potential signifier. In other words, 
it is not speaking alone that establishes the speaking being qua parlêtre, but the network of signifiers—
i.e., language, or the big Other.143 Your body as a signifier represents you qua subject to another 
signifier. It’s not just about doing something as such with your body; it’s the further issue, What does 
it mean to have a body? What is the meaning of the body? In reference to what is this meaning 
established?  
The question of the body brings us now to the question of sexuation. 
 
The question of sexuation 
The term sexuation “refers to how the speaking being comes to acquire a sexual position from which 
to engage in a sexuality that never offers complete satisfaction. … Sexuation involves a choice, whereby 
a subject positions him– or herself within a particular sex.” 144 The question bothered Freud from the 
very early days of his teaching—when he spoke, for example, about the “polymorphously perverse 
disposition” of children and tried to account for the differentiation between men and women; or later, 
                                                          
141 This could allow us to understand how it became possible for human infants to be born “prematurely”. Researchers estimate that human 
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when he acknowledged the differing and complicated trajectories of men and women in their attempts 
to obtain and occupy their respective sexual identity.145 
In a Lacanian understanding of the issues, the starting point is jouissance. Jouissance, 
understood as the effect of the world on the body, is undifferentiated: Jouissance One. But as soon as 
the signifier is established, something changes: The human being obtains what we referred to earlier 
as a symbolic body and occupies, as a sexed being, a position related to this symbolic body. What we 
call male and female are constructs of language—and not categories of biology: 
Assuredly, what appears on bodies in the enigmatic form of sexual characteristics—which are merely secondary—
makes sexed beings. No doubt. But being is the jouissance of the body as such, that is, as asexual because what is 
known as sexual jouissance is marked and dominated by the impossibility of establishing as such, anywhere in the 
enunciable, the sole One that interests us, the One of the relation ‘sexual relationship’ (rapport sexuel).146 
Which is to say that the sexual relationship is impossible not because there are no human beings 
engaging in sexual activities but rather that what we refer to as a sexual relationship is a relationship 
between linguistic—i.e., symbolic—constructs:  
Has it not occurred to you that this ‘sexual reality’ … is specified in man in this, that there is no instinctual relation 
between male and female? … Man—when man is to be spoken about, I shout out—should be ok just to dream about 
it. He should be ok just to dream about it because it is quite certain that … The woman doesn’t exist. There are women, 
of course, but The woman is but a dream of man.147 
The signifierisation of (some of the) jouissance imposes a differentiation between phallic 
jouissance and other. The first is linked to the phallus, and hence to the signifier and to signification as 
such, while the other is linked to what is beyond that what can be signified. After the phallus has been 
introduced, phallic jouissance obtains a special position.148 In Lacan’s words:  
To one of these beings qua sexed, to man insofar as he is endowed with the organ said to be phallic—I said, ‘said to 
be’—the corporal sex or sexual organ of woman—I said, ‘of woman’, whereas in fact woman does not exist, woman 
is not whole—woman’s sexual organ doesn’t tell him anything, except via the body’s jouissance. … Analytic experience 
attests precisely to the fact that everything revolves around phallic jouissance, in that woman is defined by a position 
that I have indicated as ‘not whole’ with respect to phallic jouissance. … Phallic jouissance is the obstacle owing to 
which man does not come, I would say, to enjoy woman’s body, precisely because what he enjoys is the jouissance 
of the organ.149
As Fink explains, men are “wholly alienated within language” and “completely determined by 
the phallic function”. Women, on the other hand, are “not altogether subject to the symbolic order”; 
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148 See Glowinski, Marks, and Murphy (eds.), A Compendium of Lacanian Terms, p. 175. 
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for women “the phallic function has its limits” and “the signifier isn’t everything.”150 Lacan provides a 
schema that represents this configuration in Lesson VII of Seminar XX (see Figure 2). 
The two formulas on the left-hand side represent the male state of affairs, while the two on the 
right represent the female state of affairs.151 Transcribed in plain English, the two formulas for men 
say something like: every x (i.e., every man) is inscribed in the phallic function (∀x Φx) provided that 
there is a limit to that function, i.e., that there is at least one other x who is not bound by it (∃x Φx̅̅ ̅̅ ). 
This is nothing very new, really. The formulas represent Lacan’s understanding of the paternal function, 
that is, castration: every subject is submitted to the phallic function as long as there is a master who is 
above it, sets the law—namely, the name- (or the no-) of-the-father—and imposes it by threat of 
castration. 
The two formulas on the female side tell a somewhat different story. The starting point for the 
female subject is that there is an ambivalence about the limit to the phallic function. Jouissance is not 
limited to being merely phallic because—or since—there isn’t one x who is not subjected to it (∃x Φx̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ). 
If there was one such x, then it would play the role of the omnipotent master, and then the jouissance 
of the subject qua female would have to be under the phallic function (i.e., operating under the threat 
of castration). That would then bring this particular subject to the male side. To say that for women 
jouissance is not all phallic is equivalent to saying that the not whole of woman is under the phallic 
function (∀x̅̅̅̅  Φx)—“not whole” being the content of the rather uncommon notation ∀̅.152  
The lower part of the schema describes the position of men and women in connection to desire. 
Man, qua divided subject, aims at object a, which represents the function that causes his desire; it is 
                                                          
150 Fink, Lacanian Subject, pp. 106-107. 
151 It should be reminded here that this discussion has nothing to do with the biological sex as such. The symbol x represents in both formulas 
a human being with no reference to his or her biological sex. 
152 Cf. Lacan: “I write ∀x̅̅̅̅  Φx, a never-before-seen function in which the negation is placed on the quantifier, which should be read ‘not-
whole’”. Seminar XX, p. 72. 
 
Figure 2: Lacan’s formulas of sexuation 
(Source: Lacan, Seminar XX, p. 78) 
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in this sense that we can think of male jouissance as phallic jouissance, i.e., jouissance of the organ. 
On other side, the woman, written in this crossed-out way to indicate that the woman doesn’t exist, 
aims at either Φ (which indicates the symbolic phallus) or S() (a notation indicating the master 
signifier, alternative to 𝑆1).  
This very abstract formulation and its explanation are not intended to be read as some kind of 
magic mathematical recipe that sorts out the question of sexuation once and for all. It is, however, 
intended to provide some understanding of this very complicated state of affairs. Lacan’s position is 
grounded on Freud’s own: just like Freud, Lacan takes the castration complex as his starting point; just 
like Freud, Lacan recognises that being a man or a woman is not a question of biology. Lacan takes one 
more step by introducing the symbolic dimension of sexuation—that is, by approaching the question 
of the human being as a sexed being in terms of the signifier. The concept of jouissance plays a most 
important role here. Being at the source of signification, jouissance, which can also be understood here 
in the narrower sense of sexual enjoyment and has no direct equivalent in Freud, allows Lacan to 
discern more clearly the distinction between phallic jouissance and other—and thus to show in a 
concrete manner how the complexities of female sexuality could be approached.  
Lacan’s formulas of sexuation have continued to be baffling ever since he first introduced them. 
Fink, for example writes: “We need not assume that there is some sort of complete unity or consistency 
to his [Lacan’s] work, for he adds to and changes things as he goes along.”153 Be that as it may, the 
most important aspect of Lacan’s conceptualisation is his determination to thematise in a structural, 
i.e., ontological manner, the question of sexual difference.154 
 
Borromean clinic 
Just like Freud, who used schemata as simpler illustrations of complex ideas from as early as in his 
Interpretation of Dreams up to The Ego and the Id and later,155 Lacan’s concern was also to come up 
with appropriate schematic representations of his theoretical models. In contrast to Freud, however, 
whose topography, at least according to Lacan, was “not free of awkwardness”,156 Lacan seemed to be 
reading much more in his schemas. He had been thinking for some time that topology offers a “non-
metaphorical” way of exploring psychic structures. His hypothesis, as we shall see, was that there is a 
homeomorphism between the actual phenomena he is studying and his topological models, and that 
it is, therefore, possible to use them heuristically. 
As discussed earlier, the three registers of human subjectivity—imaginary, symbolic, and real—
are linked to each other, with the imaginary and the symbolic emerging, so to speak, from the real, 
i.e., the register of the effects of the world on the body. They are all dependent on each other, 
interconnected, in a psychic whole. The challenge, for Lacan, was to find a way to model this 
                                                          
153 Cf. here Fink, ‘Knowledge and Jouissance’, p. 40. 
154 In contrast to Heidegger, for example, who postulated the ontological neutrality of the Dasein, accepted the ontic reality of sexual 
difference, but was not able to speak about ontologically about it. See above, pp. 54-56. 
155 See for example, Freud, ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’, pp. 686, 687, 690; and also ‘The Ego and the Id’, p. 363. 
156 Lacan, ‘Overture’, p. 18. 
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interconnection and interdependence, and to represent it schematically. Lacan was trying to account 
for two seemingly contradictory features of the three registers: the first is that they all share their 
origin in unsignifierised jouissance; the second, that they become distinct from each other up to the 
point where because of the paternal function they emerge as three completely independent entities.  
In 1972, Lacan came up with the idea that the three registers are intertwined like rings forming 
a knot. He had a specific kind of knot in mind, called Borromean, since it was found on the coat of arms 
of the Borromeo medieval banking family.157 The Borromean knot, which very possibly symbolises the 
Holy Trinity, comprises three rings not tied with each other in any way, but linked so that if one of 
them is cut, all of them become free. Applying this configuration to the three registers, Lacan envisaged 
them as linked in such a way that if one of them is “cut”, all of them become separated—even though 
not one of them is tied with any other in any way (see Figure 3, left). 
The first question, however, remained: if the three registers appear as separate rings, how can 
we present schematically their common origin? In Seminar XXIII Lacan suggested that the Borromean 
knot begins as a ring that is gradually looped around itself before becoming a kind of a chain, out of 
which a so-called Trefoil Knot (Figure 3, right) is eventually generated.  
In most people the symbolic, the imaginary and the real have become intertwined to the point that each forms a 
continuation of the other, for want of any operation that would set them apart as in the link of the Borromean knot—
of what is claimed to be a Borromean know, because the Borromean knot is not a knot, it’s a link. [If this is true,] why 
not grasp that each of these loops continues in the next in a way that is strictly indistinct?158 
This particular transformation is not a straightforward one, since the trefoil knot has three 
crossings while the original ring has a crossing number of zero. It is even less easy to see how the 
transformation of the trefoil knot into a Borromean can happen. As Lacan was ready to admit: 
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158 Lacan, Seminar XXIII, p. 71. 
 
Figure 3: Borromean Knot (left) and Trefoil Knot (right) 
(Source: Wikimedia Commons / Public Domain) 
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I have told you, that this theory of knots is in its infancy, is extremely clumsy. And as it is fabricated, there are many 
cases where at the sight of simple figures such as the ones that I have made for you on the board, you could not in 
any way give an explanation for the fact, whether yes or no, the tangle that you have drawn is or is not a knot, 
whatever may be the conventions that you have given yourself in advance to account for the knot as such. The fact is 
moreover that there is something that is worth dwelling on. Is it because of an intuition?159 
Complications and uncertainties notwithstanding, the picture Lacan is drawing is an elegant one. 
Beginning from one “ring” comprising unsignifierised jouissance, a structuring process takes place that 
allows a final Borromean configuration to emerge. But then how can we include in this picture our 
understanding of clinical structures? For example, what is the Borromean equivalent of the 
differentiation between psychosis and neurosis, or of the three forms of negation about which we 
spoke earlier? Psychosis is understood as a failure of the paternal function; if the paternal function is 
the function that guarantees the separation of the three Borromean rings from each other, then 
psychosis can be understood in terms of an instability of the Borromean knot. In psychosis, the knot 
can be unravelled; in neurosis, this is not possible. In order to account for those cases where a 
triggering of psychosis appears imminent but is somehow staved off, Lacan suggested that there might 
be something that can keep the Borromean knot together. He called it sinthome (in French: sintôme, 
an older spelling of the word symptôme, or symptom) and pictured it as an additional ring that would 
hold the other three together. 
According to Lacan, the sinthome occupies for psychotics a place similar to the place the neurotic 
symptom occupies for neurotics—i.e., it is an attempt at a cure. Lacan chose the older spelling to 
indicate that the psychotic sinthome is more primordial than the neurotic symptom and undergoes 
different vicissitudes. As Lacan says, “I have allowed myself to define as a sinthome that which enables 
the trefoil knot, not to go on forming a trefoil knot, but rather to maintain itself in a position that looks 
like it is forming a trefoil knot.”160 The form of this additional ring (the sinthome) is, as its name implies, 
circumstantial—in the sense that the way it can manage to preserve the knot can vary widely from 
individual to individual. 
The introduction of the sinthome raises a number of questions in connection to clinical practice. 
A neurotic symptom is situated somewhere in the three registers, and can be taken as a cipher to be 
deciphered. As Lacan points out, for the neurotic subject “there is consistency between the symptom 
and the unconscious. Except for the fact that the symptom cannot be defined otherwise than by the 
way in which each one enjoys the unconscious in so far as the unconscious determines it.”161 A 
psychotic subject, on the other hand, is as if it does not have an analysable symptom. It will not 
recognise a symptom as a cipher, and will not be able to engage with any invitation by an analyst to 
decipher it. The sinthome, understood as what holds the three registers together, is thought of as 
situated outside the three registers as such, and is for that reason unreachable by any discourse. For 
all intents and purposes, then, the psychotic subject is unreachable by analysis. With a psychotic, it 
would perhaps be preferable to talk of a treatment instead of analysis. This is how Jean-Louis Gault 
puts it: 
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In neurosis, the point is to decipher the symptoms, moving from the symbolic to the real. It is this deciphering that 
the very word ‘analysis’ aims at. In psychosis, on the contrary, the idea is to go from the real to the symbolic, and to 
construct a symptom. This is where the term ‘treatment’ is justified.162 
Further questions could be raised in connection to its applicability: are sinthomes restricted to 
psychotic subjects or is there a space to think of them as concepts relevant to neurotics as well? Is the 
concept really useful at all? Is it justified? Is it necessary? 
Such questions bring us to the more general issue of the status of mathematical and topological 
formalisation in Lacan’s work.  
 
A method of discovery or of exposition? 
During the later years of his teaching, Lacan became more and more engrossed by topology and 
especially by the theory of knots. As Dany Nobus writes, attendees at his seminars would see him 
spending 
 hours and hours weaving ends of rope and drawing complicated diagrams on small pieces of paper. … During his 
seminar of 1978-79 he even silenced his own voice in favour of the practice of writing and drawing, treating his 
audience to the speechless creation of intricate knots on the blackboard.163 
This labour did not produce very specific fruits. Many dismissed this topological period of his teaching 
altogether, or interpreted it as a metaphor—a prop for the imagination, as it were. Joël Dor, for 
example, has argued that Lacan’s “idiosyncratic use of these topological objects involves a 
metaphorical illustration” and that “even if they do not constitute the proof of a mathematisation of 
psychoanalytic theory” they can support “the idea of a matheme allowing for the transmission of 
psychoanalysis.”164 Jacques-Alain Miller, on the other hand, disagrees, insisting that for Lacan topology 
“is not metaphor, it represents a structure.”165 Drawing on Lacan’s texts from throughout his teaching, 
Miller points out that for Lacan his schemas were never considered to be illustrations. Topological 
objects always represent or show something.166 Still others, like David Corfield, have been negative: 
Lacan never reached the point where his symbolisation could provide sufficient guidance to further theory 
construction. The symbolisation never put up any resistance to its author’s intentions, and so his theory has not been 
able to achieve the kind of liberation from authorship we see in the mathematical sciences.167 
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In a Q&A session during Seminar XI, a member of the audience asked Lacan: “Is topology for you 
a method of discovery or of exposition?” Lacan responded: “It is the mapping of the topology proper 
to our experience as analysts, which may later be taken in a metaphysical perspective.”168 Admittedly 
this is a rather vague response. 
Confronted with a similar question some years later, however, Lacan was less vague:  
[Q] May I ask if this fundamental arithmetic and this topology are not in themselves a myth or merely at best an 
analogy for an explanation of the life of the mind? 
[A] Analogy to what? ‘S’ designates something which can be written exactly as this S. And I have said that the ‘S’ which 
designates the subject is instrument, matter, to symbolise a loss. A loss that you experience as a subject (and myself 
too). … Where is the analogon? Either this loss exists or it doesn’t exist. If it exists it is only possible to designate the 
loss by a system of symbols. In any case, the loss does not exist before this symbolisation indicates its place. It is not 
an analogy. … It is not even an abstraction, because an abstraction is some sort of diminution of reality, and I think it 
is reality itself.169 
In other words, Lacan makes it very clear here that for him the existence of topology, as a system 
of symbols and relations between symbols, is of the same order as the existence of the subject of 
language: indeed, the subject of language is a symbol as well, a symbol of a loss. When we speak about 
reality or about the human being as a divided subject, we are referring to constructions that already 
belong to the order of the symbolic. In this sense, Lacan argues here that there is a homeomorphism 
between two structured systems, one being what we describe as psychic reality, the other being 
topology. 
This hypothesis of a homeomorphism between structures of the psyche and structures of 
mathematics has been taken up by psychoanalysts and mathematicians. Bernard Burgoyne, for 
example, works on the hypothesis that clinical phenomena can be studied in terms of topology and 
topological spaces. He credits the Hungarian psychoanalyst Imre Hermann as the originator of the idea 
that psychical structure has its parallel in the domain of mathematics, and adds that Lacan knew of 
Hermann’s work.170 Burgoyne argues for a homology—or parallelism—between the domain of 
mathematics and the domain of what he calls sexual love. As he explains, the strong version of this 
“parallelism thesis” appears in one of two forms: 
(I) for all structures in the domain of mathematics (where a structure is a number of sentences together with their 
consequences) there exists a corresponding structure in the domain of sexual love; and (II) for all structures in the 
domain of sexual love, there exists a corresponding structure in the domain of mathematics.171 
An example would be the Freudian theory of defence, which, according to Burgoyne, “can now be 
tested, in terms of the differentiations of structure that it proposes, by means of structures of 
separation in topological spaces.”172 Burgoyne writes that “we know four themes where such relations 
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between psychoanalysis and mathematics exist” involving “the concepts of connectivity, compactness, 
order relation, and separation”.173 
 
Mathematic formalisation and discourse 
All thinking and discussion about the speaking being, the parlêtre, takes place in language. But if, 
following Lacan, we see language as a construction, as a network of signifiers, i.e., signifierised 
jouissance, which the speaking being is subjected to, and if we understand that the meanings of 
words—i.e., the network of signifieds—is loosely applied to the network of signifiers, which means 
that the meaning of words are floating, malleable, changeable, then language cannot “escape” itself. 
It is not able to stand beside itself and study itself. How is it possible, then, to develop a formalisation 
that would break through the confines of the signifier and play the role of a metalanguage, if, as Lacan 
asserts, there is no metalanguage? 
Lacan, as we saw, turned to mathematics. He claimed that the problems of psychoanalysis are 
formalisable and that the tool to study them is mathematics. Admittedly, his approach to mathematics 
was far removed from what one ordinarily associates with this term, but still it was mathematics. Lacan 
allowed himself a liberty in adopting, manipulating, and reinterpreting mathematical notation or 
conventions, a liberty that has confused many of his readers, both followers and opponents. Lacan 
always presented himself as bemused (or slightly amused) by their confusion and only occasionally 
appeared less certain. In 1975, for example, during a visit to the United States, he stated, “I have tried 
to condense, to formulate as regards our practice something that would be coherent. It has led me to 
wild imaginings that worry me a lot.”174 In general, he did not show any willingness to change his 
approach in any way.175 
Lacan thought of mathematics as “just” a process of manipulating letters on a piece of paper, 
according to certain rules for their exchanges, transformations, and arrangements. Mathematics alone 
could obey the rules of the symbolic order, with the added privilege that they do not depend on the 
imaginary individualities of the people involved: 
What is at stake for us is to obtain a model of mathematical formalisation. Formalisation is nothing other than the 
substitution of what is called a letter for any number of ones. … Whatever the number of ones you place under each 
of those letters, you are subject to a certain number of laws—laws of grouping, addition, multiplication etc. … 
Mathematization alone reaches a real—and it is in that respect that it is compatible with our discourse, analytic 
discourse—a real that has nothing to do with what traditional knowledge has served as a basis for, which is not what 
the latter believes it to be—namely reality—but rather fantasy.176  
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 Mathematisation, in the sense that Lacan understood the term, is not supposed to give us 
access to reality, as a more traditional understanding of the concepts involved might have wanted it. 
It is not because “the great book of the universe is written in mathematical language,” as Galileo 
argued,177 that Lacan was seeking mathematical formalisation; it’s rather the access it gives to the 
real—i.e., to the registry out of which the imaginary and the symbolic are formed. Lacan did not claim 
the self-adequacy of mathematics. In his view, mathematics always needed language: 
No formalization of language is transmissible without the use of language itself. It is in the very act of speaking that I 
make this formalization, this ideal metalanguage, ex-sist. It is in this respect that the symbolic cannot be confused 
with being—far from it.178  
In contrast to Galileo’s, then, Lacan’s approach was not Platonic. Mathematical entities are not thought 
of as existing independently of the humans using them; mathematical entities were not thought of as 
comprising the deeper structure of the world—or of the human psyche, for that matter. It is only by 
speaking that the knots, schemas, or formulae that Lacan introduces stand outside their imaginary or 
symbolic register.  
We would need to refer here once more to Hintikka’s work—a work in the philosophy of logic 
and mathematics—and point out an important similarity that it has to Lacan’s.179 Both Lacan and 
Hintikka were faced with a metalanguage-related problem. Lacan understood that there is no 
metalanguage and needed a different way to secure the foundations of psychoanalysis; Hintikka 
wanted to free logic and mathematics from the severe limitations of Tarski’s “impossibility result”, 
which, as he explained, states that “a truth definition can be given for a language only in a stronger 
metalanguage.”180 Both Lacan and Hintikka chose to see their respective problems in terms of a 
language, or a semantic, game, or, more generally, in terms of a discourse—the term taken here in the 
sense of a series of utterances, i.e., sayings.  
Even though there is no metalanguage, one can speak; discourse reveals truth. It reveals Being 
as well. As Lacan explains,  
when I say [there is no metalanguage], it apparently means—no language of being. But is there being? … What I say 
is what there isn’t. Being is, as they say, and nonbeing is not. There is or there isn't. Being is merely presumed in 
certain words—‘individual’, for instance, and ‘substance’. In my view, it is but a fact of what is said.181 
In short, mathematics only subsists if we employ it. Mathematics is a fact of what is said. Just as being. 
Lacan’s position here is remarkably close to Heidegger’s when we see him claiming that 
“Language is the house of being”,182 the main difference between the two being that Heidegger refers 
to language in an ontological sense, while for Lacan language is material, bodily, corporeal.  
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Lacan refers to saying—the term understood literally, i.e., as the action of articulation, with all 
the movements of the throat, the mouth, the lips involved.183 Saying, seen thus, is always something 
that pertains to the imaginary register: saying, as such, is inadequate to grasp the phenomena at hand 
on its own. It obeys an internal logic, namely the logic of the chain of signifiers. But it also reveals this 
logic, it makes it visible. 
To put it a different way, both Lacan and Hintikka coincide in their insight that only a discourse 
can allow truth, time, and being to ex-sist, without making necessary the resort to metalanguage.  
This brings the question of an apparent circularity to the fore. The human being is not in 
language from the beginning. Lacan’s claim is that language plays a fundamental role in opening up 
the world for the human being, and that the law of the signifier—or, in a more general sense, a 
discourse—is imposed on any engagement with what is at stake. How is it possible, then, to use 
language to formulate a discourse in lieu of a metalanguage, to avoid falling into the trap of conceptual 
circularity? This is the exact same problem of the circle of understanding that Heidegger had 
encountered. There is indeed a circle involved when one needs to use language in order to speak about 
the introduction of the human being to language. There is no way one can avoid this circularity, and in 
fact, as Heidegger has argued, in trying to avoid it one “misses the decisive issue here, which is an 
insight into the centre of the circle as such … for the centre only manifests itself as such as we circle 
around it.”184 Rather than a circle, it would be better thought of and considered as a spiral. Some 
concepts need to be introduced or defined from the beginning—such are, for example, jouissance and 
the real. Using these concepts, then, one can get a clearer view of the phenomena in question, which 
in turn will allow one to return to the original concepts and define them better. 
This problem, however, has a further aspect. If we follow Lacan’s argument that the network of 
signifiers is a system of symbols, just as mathematics is a system of symbols, and if we accept his insight 
that there is a psycho-mathematical homeomorphism, then a question can be raised in connection to 
time. Objective—i.e., intersubjective—time is, according to Lacan, a product of speaking. If language, 
i.e., the symbolic, is a final product of a process that begins with the signifierisation of jouissance, then 
we seem to encounter one more circularity here, namely that time seems to be a product of a process 
that implicates time at its very core, i.e., signifierisation and the handling of the lack. Signifierisation is 
a way for the human being to manage what is not there. We saw Lacan claiming that “being is, as they 
say, and nonbeing is not. There is or there isn't.”185 However, both being there and non-being have 
time as a prerequisite. Heidegger addresses the problem by introducing the event. Lacan accomplishes 
the same thing by introducing the object a and thematising desire as that which fuels the emergence 
of signifierness. 
The challenge is, rather, to decide whether it is possible at all to look closely at phenomena that 
pertain to the speaking being; and, if it is possible, to find an appropriate way to study them. Lacan’s 
position is tantamount to claiming that mathematical formalisation, especially in set theory and 
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topology, is the only tool that ex-sists—i.e., the only tool that can stand beside the phenomena—
allowing us to study them for what they are, in an unmediated way.186 He employs mathematics in an 
attempt to study the human psyche in the potentiality of its associative chains; his claim is that 
mathematics provides a robust foundation for the deeper understanding of psychic structures, 
subjective positions in the world, and psychopathology—an understanding that makes possible the 
development of tools for differential diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment. 
 
From “anti-philosophy” back to philosophy 
There has been a lot of discussion regarding Lacan’s stance in connection to philosophy. It is taken as 
a fact now that his turn to mathematics and the increasing obscurity of his teaching signalled a turn 
against philosophy, whatever the term “philosophy” is taken to mean. In his later period, Lacan is 
thought to have been an anti-philosopher, but what this means is not very clear either. True as it might 
have been that Lacan appeared to be engaged in an increasingly intense polemic against traditional 
metaphysics and ontology, in my opinion his position was exactly this—but not more than this: a 
position of forceful opposition against specific ideas and a specific tradition in philosophy. 
Lacan’s first use of the term “antiphilosophy” appears in a 1975 text in which he presented the 
conditions required for the teaching of psychoanalysis: “Antiphilosophy”, he writes, 
this is the name I’d like to give to the investigation of what university discourse owes to its ‘educational’ supposition. 
It is not the history of ideas, sad as it is, that will be able to face up to the challenge. A patient collection of all the 
idiocy that characterizes it will, I hope, allow to highlight it in its indestructible root, in its eternal dream. Of which 
there is no other awakening if not one’s own.187 
If we refuse to identify the term “philosophy” with any specific philosophical tradition, then Lacan’s 
position is no more anti-philosophical than the position of, say, the later Heidegger. 
 In Lacan’s view, the main lesson that could be learned from Freud was the importance of 
language, or rather, words: “not even the meaning of words, but words in their material aspect.”188 
Looking at it from the vantage point of temporal distance, Lacan’s four-plus decades of teaching seem 
to follow a rather clear trajectory.189 Having initially focused on phenomena that he would eventually 
group together under the term “imaginary”, he turned after 1953 to language and to the symbolic 
dimension of human experience, emphasising their centrality to human experience (and, of course, 
psychoanalysis). The 10 years after 1963 were a period of clarification and recapitulation, during which 
Lacan focused on terms and concepts he had introduced earlier and elaborated on them. And finally, 
from 1974 until the end of his life, he returned to the triad of registers introduced earlier (real, 
                                                          
186 By formulating Lacan’s project in this way I make here an implicit reference to Heidegger’s conception of phenomenology as a method of 
study. 
187 Lacan, ‘Peut-être à Vincennes...’, pp. 314-315 (my translation). See also Marini, Lacan, pp. 242-243. For a discussion of Lacan’s alleged 
antiphilosophy and how it is understood by A. Badiou and J.C. Milner see Adrian Johnston, ‘This Philosophy which is not One: Jean-Claude 
Milner, Alain Badiou, and Lacanian Antiphilosophy’ Journal of the Jan van Eyck Circle for Lacanian Ideology Critique, 3 (2010), 137-158. 
188 Lacan, ‘Of Structure’, p. 187. 
189 I am following here the periodisation from Michael Clark, Jacques Lacan: An Annotated Bibliography, Vol. I (New York: Garland Publishing, 
1988), pp. xxxiv-lxxii. 
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symbolic, imaginary) in an attempt to study their interrelations further, with the help of topology, the 
theory of knots and symbolic logic. This period of increased abstraction was also marked by his 
increased attention to the concrete reality of the body as the source and locus of the experience of 
the speaking being. 
Thus, Lacan began by studying the human being and its obtaining an identity and a body by 
submitting to the other of language and the symbolic, and returned to the body by studying the 
fundamental role played by the real (i.e., the register of the unsignifierised effects of the world on the 
body) in what it is to be a human. Lacan’s almost exclusive preoccupation with his mathemes and his 
knots during the latter part of his career was seen by many as a failure. As Roudinesco writes, “his 
entry into the world of knots led him to the destruction of what the matheme claimed to build. Lacan 
… finally dissolved into the silent stupor of a Nietzschean aphasia.”190 
Admittedly his teaching during this last period became more and more opaque—to the point 
that it appears as completely incomprehensible, if not incoherent and mystical. This might be so, 
especially when thought of in terms of the relative absence of concrete results. But it should not, in 
my view, distract our attention from Lacan’s intention, which was to express issues of signification, 
history, suffering, and symptoms in the most unmediated way possible, in full recognition of the 
problem that there is no vantage point of metalanguage to facilitate this. To put it in somewhat 
Heideggerian terms, Lacan was attempting to formulate a fully ontological account of what a speaking 
being is (in the sense of parlêtre), what its structure is, and how it relates to other speaking beings in 
the world. His project, in other words, is consonant with Heidegger’s in more than a few cursory or 
superficial ways. In the next and final chapter, I will focus on the points of contact as well as on areas 





                                                          
190 Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan, p. 359. 
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Chapter 6: Towards a conceptual synthesis 
With Being and Time Heidegger invited us to rethink the question of the meaning of being, an obscure 
and confusing question of metaphysics, a question of limited interest for everyone except those 
studying the history of philosophy. Heidegger’s insight was that our engagement with the world and 
the entities we encounter in it is never transparent. The world, ourselves, other entities, and beings—
everything appears to us—human beings—in ways which are determined by, and dependent on, a 
historically determined framework of understanding that we have already and uncritically accepted. It 
was this that he called being. Accordingly, the question about being was mainly a question regarding 
our terms of engagement with being—i.e., a question of world-disclosure, historicity, and, most 
importantly, language. 
In his critical discussion of science, psychology in general, and Freudian psychoanalysis in 
particular, Heidegger revealed what he saw as their limitations and naivety. For Heidegger, psychology, 
psychiatry, and psychoanalysis fail to think critically about their conceptual premises, and therefore 
unwittingly obscure and distort the phenomena they are trying to study.  
Lacan, with Freud’s discovery as his starting point, and with a research programme quite unlike 
Heidegger’s—namely, to reread this discovery in such a way that one remains faithful to its novelty, 
and yet avoids its misconceptions and pitfalls—had also turned to language in order to address the 
question of the human being’s suffering. For Lacan, just as for Freud, the human being is not a master 
in his or her own house. The human being is a subject of language, a divided subject, subjected to the 
symbolic order—i.e., the law of the signifier. Language is both that which brings the subject into the 
human world and that which makes the subject suffer. But first and foremost, language, or rather 
speaking, is a ritualistic behaviour, an imitation game, a halter for jouissance and the real. The signified, 
or meaning, is always floating, unstable, and established retroactively.  
Lacan turned to topology and knot theory in an attempt to formulate a non-regional post-
Freudian discourse “metapsychology”, which would not be limited by the impossibility of reaching a 
proper meta-level of description. His attention became more and more withdrawn from the study of 
language and turned to the body and the real. Mathematics, set theory, and topology were for him 
symbolic systems that can ex-sist beside the phenomena of the human psyche and facilitate their 
study.  
The difficulty of bringing Heidegger together with Lacan lies not only in the enormous 
differences in the two thinkers’ terminology and fields of research, but also in the apparent 
disinclination of either of the two to lay the foundations for such a work. Notwithstanding this, a first 
obvious element connecting them is the importance they accord to language. For Heidegger, language 
is a special kind of equipment, both ontic and ontological, which discloses the world to Dasein. For 
Lacan, language qua symbolic order provides a scaffolding for the subject who is represented in the 
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chain formed by the signifiers comprising language. Differences in terminology notwithstanding, the 
parallels, as we have seen, are clear. The two thinkers talk about something similar—namely the 
constitution of a world through language—and have the same starting point, that of the individual 
human being who is thrown into this world and subjected to language. Most importantly, they coincide 
in their abandonment of the tools of tradition—that is, in their belief in the sheer inadequacy of 
traditional ontology and metaphysics. 
With Being and Time, Heidegger set out to deconstruct traditional metaphysics in an attempt to 
raise again the question of being and construct a new, post-Cartesian fundamental ontology. This 
would serve as the foundation of all other regional ontologies—for example, those studied by 
traditional metaphysics, or those of the sciences. This project was, however, abandoned; in fact, 
Heidegger stopped using the term “ontology” altogether because he felt it was inadequate and 
misleading. He ceased conceiving of the question of being as a question of an ahistorical fundamental 
ontology and began approaching it as a question regarding the historicity of being (or beyng). Even 
though the principal themes of his research programme remained the same, Heidegger became more 
and more disillusioned with regard to the possibility of providing a comprehensive answer to it, 
deciding instead to focus on what he considered to be a major failure of modernity and an imminent 
danger to Dasein. 
Lacan shared Heidegger’s distrust of traditional metaphysics. In his “return to Freud” the 
Heideggerian perspective was rather evident, even though he was not interested in constructing a 
post-Cartesian fundamental ontology as such. He did not specifically refer to Heidegger’s critique of 
Freud, but seemed to be aware of Heidegger’s arguments against Freud’s scientism. Lacan began by 
studying the human being and its attainment of an imaginary identity and a “language” body by 
submitting to the other of language and the symbolic; and he returned to the body by studying the 
fundamental role played by the real (i.e., the register of unsignifierised effects of the world on the 
body) in what it is to be a human. 
 
Points of contact and divergence 
Lacan and Heidegger knew each other, as we saw, and met more than once. But the details of an actual 
dialogue between them—if it ever took place—have not been made known. We know that Lacan 
remained full of respect for Heidegger, being “very fond of him” as he himself had put it.1 His research 
led him to the core of issues that Heidegger too was interested in. For Lacan, as well as for Heidegger, 
the world is not a given. It is something that is opened to the human being through language. However, 
in contrast to Heidegger, Lacan is not at all interested in the meaning of being as such—or in any 
meaning, for that matter, insisting as he does on the primacy of the signifier over the signified. On the 
other hand, we know that Heidegger was not too impressed by Lacan’s “obviously baroque” style,2 
and that he remained unconvinced by his theories. It appears as if he had no patience with Lacan.  
                                                          
1 See Lacan, Seminar XXII, p. 137. 
2 See Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars, p. 279. 
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In other words, it is obvious that the obstacles keeping the two thinkers apart cannot be 
underestimated or brushed aside easily.  
It seems probable that Heidegger would still argue that psychoanalysis, even in its enhanced, 
Lacanian form, is a limited enterprise, able at best to help establish a regional ontology, but of no real 
use in addressing the questions that Heidegger was interested in: an explication of the source of 
meaningfulness for Dasein—being—and its historicity. 
Such a criticism might appear convincing, but on closer inspection its scope appears limited. It 
fails to consider the bigger picture. Lacanian models and hypotheses—such as the three registers, the 
networks of signifiers, his theory of discourse, his attempts at mathematical formalisation—amount to 
something much broader than a regional ontology. They are not ontic descriptions of specific entities. 
Lacan’s eventual aim, at least in connection to this issue, was not so very different from Heidegger’s. 
But his trajectory—which led him to formal logic, topology, and knot theory—could not distance him 
further from Heidegger. 
As we discussed earlier, Heidegger did not believe that mathematics is at all equipped to address 
the questions he was mainly interested in. For him, mathematics and logic could only contribute to a 
derivative understanding. Lacan’s turn to mathematics and logic could only be understood by 
Heidegger as tantamount to claiming that they can stand transcendentally vis-à-vis the world, i.e., as 
little more than an uncritical conformance with the modern, Cartesian worldview of calculability. Faced 
with Lacan’s mathematical formalisations, Heidegger would still probably either dismiss them as 
derivative and ontic—acknowledging in them not much more than a very a limited claim for a regional 
ontology—or reject them altogether as fascinating but arbitrary by-products of an artificial idealism 
very far distanced from the phenomena at hand.  
Still, as we saw, Lacan’s approach was not Platonic. He did not think of mathematical structures 
as existing independently of the humans using them; they were not thought as comprising the deeper 
structure of the world, or the human psyche; they were homeomorphic to them. It is only by speaking 
that the knots, schemas, or formulae that Lacan introduces ex-sist outside their imaginary or symbolic 
register. 
For his part, Lacan would most probably be critical about Heidegger’s research for the same 
reasons that impelled him to criticise the whole of philosophy. The crucial insight that Lacan brought 
to the table is that the subject of language, the speaking being, is under the sway of the signifier, and 
that meaning is always unstable, negotiable, subordinate to the law of the signifier, and retroactively 
established. Building on Freud’s discovery—and in contrast to Heidegger—Lacan focused on the origins 
of signifierness, i.e., on the fact that there are signifiers and that these signifiers are interconnected. 
Indeed, one can read Lacan’s whole theoretical work as an attempt to explain the emergence of 
signifierness, and to reach behind meaning, behind language, even behind speaking and speech. In a 
sense, he was trying to run counter to meaning—and he said as much.3 
In Lacan’s view, philosophers and metaphysicians are confused when discussing the question of 
being because they fail to see it as a product of signifierness. “Being is merely presumed in certain 
                                                          
3 Cf. Seminar XX: “The mathematical formalization of signifierness runs counter to meaning”. Lacan, Seminar XX, p. 93. 
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words,” he said—“‘individual’, for instance, and ‘substance’. In my view, it is but a fact of what is said.”4 
One could imagine then that, even if he had not made it explicit, Lacan would have counted Heidegger 
as just another confused philosopher. He would think of the Heideggerian attempt at a fundamental 
ontology, or at an exploration of the meaning of being, as trapped on the imaginary axis and therefore 
limited.  
However, there might be a difficulty here. Lacan’s concepts appear to lack a proper foundation 
and it is necessary to clarify whether or not this is in fact the case. Richardson had written that Lacan’s 
interpretation of the Freudian discovery “desperately needs a philosophical base that mathematical 
formalism and all the topology in the world cannot give him.”5 In Richardson’s view, without a solid 
philosophical grounding, Lacan’s theoretical constructions would appear as magnificent but arbitrary 
constructions simply hanging in the air, just like some of the great philosophical systems of the past. 
Lacan’s project would run the risk of being eventually left behind as nothing more than a failed 
metaphysics. 
Lacan’s insistence on the primacy of signifier, his insight regarding signifierness, and, 
accordingly, his unconcern for the signified are but conclusions, theoretical results, corollaries. They 
are related to the phenomenon under study, but they are not it, that is, they are not primary data. The 
same can be said about functions such as metaphor and metonymy, the three registers, the theory of 
discourse, and the Borromean clinic: all these hypotheses and theoretical models do not form part of, 
nor are they identical with, the phenomena as such. Lacan’s apparent circularity is connected to his 
employment of mathematics according to which certain structures of topology are homeomorphic to 
the deep structure of three registers; but you need the signifier in order to employ mathematics, 
consider the issues, and reach conclusions. The conceptual necessity of turning to mathematics is, in 
itself, a hypothesis, or a research programme, or at best a conclusion. It does not form part of the 
phenomena. In short, Lacan’s project seems to entail a circularity, similar to the circularity that 
Heidegger had in mind when he spoke about the circle of understanding.  
Heidegger avoided this trap by asserting the sterility of such reasoning when studying first 
principles, in terms of both its formal and its factical validity. Would a similar argument be enough for 
Lacan? He certainly thought so, as his increasing reliance on the demonstrative qualities of his knotting 
models testifies. Lacan was very aware that there is no metalinguistic vantage point from which one 
can see the issues at hand more clearly, and he attempted to respond to the problem by showing how 
the structures of the psyche are homeomorphic to structures of mathematics, revealed within a frame 
of a language or semantic game, i.e., of a discourse. 
In other words, considered from Lacan’s point of view, Richardson was wrong. Imposing a 
requirement for Lacanian metapsychology to have a solid philosophical base is, in this sense, 
problematic—as problematic as it would be to interrupt Heidegger’s project because of an alleged 
failure to recognise the essential circularity of Dasein’s comportment towards being. 
Heidegger attempted to approach the question of being and construct a new post-Cartesian 
fundamental ontology. But he gave up this specific aspect of his project and began to focus on the 
                                                          
4 Seminar XX, p. 118. 
5 Richardson, ‘The word of Silence’, p. 182. See also above, p. 82. 
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various ways in which being reveals itself to Dasein. This led him to what he called forgetfulness of 
being. He considered this as something that needs to be condemned and avoided. For Heidegger, 
adopting the modern worldview entails a discarding of fundamental aspects of Dasein’s comportment 
towards being; accordingly, he made it his task to bring this question back to the fore, in an attempt 
to forewarn his readers. This was the attempt of a moral, or rather, of a deontic philosopher.  
Heidegger’s philosophy represents the next necessary cut with the world of modernity and 
paves the way for the emergence of the post-Cartesian subject. Lacanian metapsychology would not 
be possible were it not for the preparatory work that Heidegger has done with his questioning 
regarding the meaning of being. Heidegger’s discussion of time and temporality cannot but be at the 
foundations of such a task. Being requires time, and without a primordial event of appropriation, there 
can be neither presence nor absence, and, in the same vein, no lack, or desire. Without time, there 
would be no signifiers, no signifying chain, no law of the signifier. This “time” that we are talking about 
here lies at a more basic level than Lacan’s logical time, which is at the level of the (Lacanian) symbolic. 
Is Lacan’s introduction of a language or semantic game, or more generally, of a discourse, enough to 
sidestep this limitation?  
Further to this, Lacan’s justification for using mathematics and topology would perhaps need to 
be rethought vis-à-vis a Heideggerian conceptual framework. As mentioned above, Heidegger would 
be critical of Lacan’s approach. He would see it as representing the Cartesian point of view of modern 
science and sharing the ideal of mathematisation. However, for Lacan mathematics is not a formal 
system of representation but rather a structure homeomorphic to the psyche, one that can only be 
revealed in a fact of saying. In other words, mathematics for Lacan is not a metalanguage of the psyche. 
If, for Heidegger, language is the house of being, for Lacan saying (or speaking) reveals the plan of how 
this house was built. 
 
On the possibility of a conceptual synthesis 
In his later thinking, Lacan is moving away from language and meaning, and turning towards the real. 
As mentioned earlier, if this discussion is to be taken as something broader than a derivative regional 
ontology, it does indeed need to be founded on a robust base. One would first need to establish how 
a world is opened to the human being through language and what the source of world’s meaningful 
presence is; it’s only then that it would become possible to see that the human being, the subject of 
language, is in fact a decentred subject, a semblance, a product of recursive retroactive overlapping 
identifications, a made-up being. The first part of this task is accomplished by Heidegger. But Heidegger 
doesn’t proceed as much as to provide a full account of the relation of language to the body. This is 
the task of Lacan. 
It is conceivable, then, to see Lacan’s theories as not incompatible with, but as complementary 
to, Heidegger’s research programme. But this needs to be articulated properly. Lacan’s project cannot 
(and should not) be fully wrapped in a stifling Heideggerian philosophical/phenomenological envelope. 
It is not a case of incorporating one system of thought in the framework of the other, nor it is a case 
of “translating” terms and concepts of one to that of the other. The paths of the two thinkers do not 
move parallel to each other; their divergences are as important as their convergences, at least in terms 
of the foundations of their respective conceptual constructions. What the two do share is their having 
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left traditional metaphysics and Cartesian dualism behind. Both represent a rupture with the past, “the 
closure of an entire epoch of thought and its concerns” as Badiou writes.6 
At certain points, Lacan’s path appears to cross Heidegger’s, but they actually had very different 
agendas. Heidegger’s deontic worries and focus are far removed from Lacan’s concerns. Heidegger 
bemoaned the prevalence of the modern, scientific worldview. Lacan, on the other hand, could not 
but welcome its emergence and be “happy”, since it was the advent of the Cartesian subject—the 
subject of science—that made psychoanalysis possible. Crucially, Lacan was not a moralist; he was not 
interested in discussing human experience in a deontic framework, and was rather sceptical about 
attempts to rebel against the regime, seeing it as an attempt to replace a master’s discourse with 
another master’s discourse.7 In many respects Lacan was a pessimist who became less and less 
interested in politics or current affairs. He was only interested in showing in his mathemes the 
phenomena in the very way in which the phenomena show themselves from themselves. His teaching 
was a work in progress—a work that was destined to remain largely unfinished, as he himself was 
acutely aware.8 
For these reasons, I think that a deeper dialogue between the two thinkers would be difficult. 
On the other hand, Heidegger’s work is propaedeutic to Lacan’s. To use Wittgenstein’s analogy,9 
Heidegger provides a “ladder” that allows Lacan to climb up and see that the whole of philosophy is 
nonsensical, and justifies his turn way from meaning, towards the real. For this reason, an attempt at 
considering together some of the concepts, questions, hypotheses, and conclusions of the two would 
be perhaps useful. In this conceptual synthesis, some aspects of Heidegger’s analytic can be used to 
inform and support Lacan’s discourse metapsychology.10 On the basis of what has been discussed until 
now, I would see it as informed by the terminology, insights, concepts, hypotheses and conclusions of 
both Heidegger and Lacan, and involving a discussion about the human being as a being which is being 
there in language; about the world into which the human being finds itself thrown and about the ways 
of its comportment towards this world; about the ontological construction of a shared ontic world; as 
well as about the limits and the historicity of this world. 
I suggest that it be provisionally called Discourse Ontology (of the Speaking Being). 
I choose to call it an ontology because it will be focusing on being, the term used here in 
Heidegger’s understanding, i.e., as the open space where a world can present itself as intelligible to 
the human being. I use the designation discourse in order to indicate the source of this intelligibility, 
on the basis of Lacan’s insight that truth, the world, and being are opened up to the human being 
                                                          
6 Badiou, Being and Event, p. 1. 
7 See Lacan, ‘Impromptu at Vincennes’. 
8 In 1957, he adds at the end of one of his papers the obscure abbreviation “T.t.y.e.m.u.p.t.” (See ‘Instance of the Letter’, p. 439/528.) This, 
as the translator of the Écrits in English reports, was explained by Lacan to mean, “’Tu t’y es mis un peu tard’, loosely translated as ‘You got 
down to it a bit late’.” Écrits, pp. 810n(528,6). 
9 See proposition 6.54, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. Mcguinness (London: 
Routledge, 1997), p. 74. 
10 I am using the term synthesis here in its ordinary dictionary sense, i.e., as “the combination of parts, or elements, in order to form a more 
complete view or system”. See “Synthesis”, Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica Ultimate Reference Suite (Chicago: 
Encyclopædia Britannica, 2015). 
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through a language game, i.e., a discourse.11 Finally, I qualify it as a Discourse Ontology of the Speaking 
Being to emphasise and acknowledge the circularity involved: There is no way one can formulate an 
ontology that can ex-sist alongside the phenomena at a “meta” level unless one sees it as a product of 
a discursive activity. To paraphrase Lacan, just as there is no metalanguage, there can be no 
metaphysics. It all is “a fact of what is said”.12 
In what follows I will first interject a preliminary discussion of five subthemes that are directly 
related to the questions Heidegger and Lacan were engaged with: the question of being; the question 
of time; the unconscious; the body and mind split; and the question of discourse. After this, I will 
present and discuss five basic themes of this conceptual synthesis. And at the end I will also append 
some indications of further lines of discussion that are opened up. Throughout this discussion, I will be 
referring to themes from Heidegger and Lacan as needed.  
All this will inevitably involve some repetition, in the sense that several themes need to be 
approached from different angles, in a recursive or reiterative manner. Let me also emphasise that I 
do not intend to provide a full outline of a complete philosophical system; such an undertaking would 
be well beyond the scope of this thesis—and, indeed, quite premature. 
 
Preliminary considerations 
The question of being 
According to Heidegger, reflecting on Dasein’s concernful comportment towards the entities it 
encounters is tantamount to acknowledging the question of being and reflecting on its meaning. Lacan, 
for his part, claims that there is no question of being as such. For him, being “is merely presumed in 
certain words … It is but a fact of what is said.”13 In other words, being is nothing more than a 
designation for this linguistic space, or field, which is formed just by the very fact of speaking. For 
Heidegger, however, the question regarding the meaning of being is a question that refers to the 
foundations of the (human) world: being cannot be thematised except through language. 
The difference is subtle but its repercussions are important. The world of beings is opened to 
Dasein as long as Dasein is thrown into language. It is language that that allows the world to uncover 
its worldly character to Dasein through being. But the thematisation of being, as well as language itself, 
are both historical; likewise, the question in connection to the meaning of being, which Heidegger 
raises, is also historical. Heidegger is very concerned and critical about our current epoch of modern 
science and technology, and argues that it comes with a set of unexamined presuppositions regarding 
being, which puts limits on the ways Dasein encounters being as well as other beings in the world. 
One could paraphrase Heidegger here and claim that signifierness is the house of both being 
and time. But this would not be entirely accurate: Heidegger’s understanding of Dasein’s comportment 
                                                          
11 Which is to say, that this is not an attempt to link Lacanian ideas with what is called discourse analysis in psychology. For such an attempt 
see Ian Parker, ‘Lacanian Discourse Analysis in Psychology: Seven Theoretical Elements’ Theory & Psychology, 15/2 (2005), 163-182 or David 
Pavón Cuéllar, The Conscious Interior to an Exterior Unconscious: Lacan, Discourse Analysis and Social Psychology (London: Karnac, 2010). 
12 Lacan, Seminar XX, p. 118. 
13 Seminar XX, p. 118. 
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towards being involves an articulation of meaning. When Heidegger says that language is the house of 
being, he wants to show the historicity of the ways in which Dasein opens itself to being. This installs 
immediately a hierarchy of sorts, a moral hierarchy even, according to which certain ways of 
comportment are more complete, more rich, or even better than others. It is on this basis that 
Heidegger considers the adoption of the modern scientific worldview as an impoverishment. 
Heidegger’s criticism reflects, as we said above, the deontic aspect of his thinking, an aspect that 
is ontologically immaterial, especially when one considers the questions from a Lacanian point of view. 
For Lacan, the question is not whether one type of comportment is preferable to the other. The 
answers to such questions are given, according to Lacan, retrospectively, and are fleeting and 
changeable: they are confined to the level of the signified (qua meaning) and are, therefore, imaginary. 
In short: for Lacan, meaning is always an imaginary construction. It is circumstantial, malleable, 
unstable, and always retroactively renegotiable. 
Indeed, Lacan is much more agnostic with regard to the meaning accorded to being by any given 
epoch. Lacan is not concerned about the particulars of meaning—in fact, he is not concerned about 
meaning at all. For Lacan, meaning is something disposable, a malleable “layer” that is retroactively 
established and made to correspond to the network of signifiers of a given speaking being. Lacan 
refrains from any value judgement about our current, or any other, epoch. What is important, for him, 
is what we could call the deep structure of the signifying network—which he considers to be 
homeomorphic with structures of topology or knot theory.  
 
The question of time 
Heidegger thinks of time as the horizon of being and explains that being and time determine each 
other reciprocally. He describes their being revealed together as an event of appropriation. 
At the ontic level, time obtains a sense (i.e., a direction) via Death. At the ontological level, the 
sense of time is provided by the event which, itself, can be thought of as a-temporal. The ontic presence 
of beings before Dasein implies, and requires temporality, i.e., that what can allow them to “step 
outside” themselves, expanding into the three ecstases—or ex-stases—future, present and past. For 
Heidegger, Dasein is fundamentally oriented in time as a being-towards-death. Death, as the absolute 
possibility of the impossibility of any existence, provides Dasein with a trajectory and an end. Historicity 
is only possible because of the world and Death. Historicity allows Dasein to make something of 
oneself, in the sense that it provides Dasein with a history and a trajectory. These are unique for each 
and every human being; the present, however, is always shared. 
For Lacan, objective time is a product of the function of the signifying chain. But time itself is a 
prerequisite for the differentiation between presence and absence, which, in itself, is the necessary 
step required for the establishment of signifiers. So time, in Lacan, is both a presupposition and a 
construct (qua temporality). In connection to its being a construct, Lacan stresses the discursive aspect 
of time in terms of a series of steps that cannot be arbitrarily ordered. It is this logical time that creates 
what humans perceive as the arrow of time, with the help of which they situate themselves and 
formulate their history. 
One can distinguish, therefore, at least four aspects of time. 
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First is a primordial sense of time that is necessary as a backdrop, so to speak, on which all other 
kinds of time can be thematised. This is time as a horizon of being. Presence, absence, and repetition 
cannot be thematised without it. All further discussion is impossible unless this aspect of time is seen. 
Then comes time as flow. This is the minimum required to conceptualise living as such. All living 
happens in a configurational frame of relations which we can, perhaps usefully, call “now” or “instant”, 
provided that we remember that what we designate as “now” or “instant” is ex-static, rather than 
static, referring to other adjacent configurational frames of relations. Duration is a derivative of the 
flow of time. 
Time as temporality. This is the aspect of time that allows the thematisation of present, past, 
and future. Temporality might refer to minimal temporal differences such as the ones that we could 
describe, for example, with the words “now”, “earlier”, and “in a bit”; or to longer differences—for 
example, “these days”, “when I was young”, or “after the summer”. 
Time as historicity. This refers to the characteristically human quality of having an awareness of 
coming from somewhere (the past), and going towards somewhere (the future), with an end point that 
is unavoidable, but just not here yet, namely death. 
 
Unconscious and Psychoanalysis 
Human beings qua subjects of language are under the sway of something that only makes itself seen 
through the disruptions it creates: this is what psychoanalysis calls the unconscious.  
Designating something as “unconscious” is just assigning a name to an observation: Unconscious 
is a description of a mental function. The Freudian “revolution” entailed the recognition that the 
human being is not the master in his or her own (mental) house. He postulated the unconscious as this 
agency which could help re-establish a continuity for the fragmented data of consciousness. Lacan 
thought of conscious thinking as belonging in the realm of the law of signifier, of the Aristotelean 
automaton. In it, jouissance is deadened—in the sense that it has become fixed and presents no further 
surprises. The speaking being, qua divided subject, is only heard when there is a disruption of the chain 
of signifiers, where there is a gap. The gap, revealing desire, can surprise the speaking being and make 
it stop and think, as it were. 
The unconscious, as a function, makes itself manifest via its functioning—the gap in the 
signifying chain, the interruption having been brought about by desire or lack. Its status, as Lacan 
claimed, is ethical: after Descartes we cannot avoid referring to it as that which breaks down the law 
of the signifier; we cannot avoid being taken aback by desire. Desire, however, can never be articulated 
as such. It can only be seen as the drive behind the functions that govern the interconnections between 
signifiers, i.e., metaphor and metonymy. 
Heidegger criticised Freud’s reasons for postulating the unconscious by pointing out that it is 
necessary only when one is trapped in a naïve Cartesian subject–object understanding of the human 
being. In Heidegger’s view, all “conventional, objectifying representations of a capsule-like psyche, 
subject, person, ego, or consciousness in psychology and psychopathology [was to be] abandoned in 
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favour of an entirely different understanding.”14 This would involve the recognition that factical Dasein 
can be absorbed in its engagement with whatever it is engaged with; it’s only when something 
temporarily interrupts this absorption, that Dasein is forced to adopt an attitude that Heidegger 
described as circumspective or theoretical.15 In other words, and paraphrasing a bit, in Heidegger’s 
view you are only thinking “consciously” about something when there is an interruption of your 
absorbed involvement that forces you to change your attitude. 
Heidegger’s criticism does not seem to apply to Lacan’s own understanding of the human being 
as a divided subject of language. For Lacan, the reflective subjectivity of human being, which is 
designated as “Ego, is an imaginary construction, a product of identification processes related to what 
he called the mirror stage. The Lacanian subject—a subject of language—is not identical with the 
subject as conceived by Freud or by Descartes.  
Freud’s discovery allowed the psychic suffering of the human being to be properly thematised 
as a suffering dictated by language. Lacan’s reading of Freud enabled him to see that there is no 
foundation of truth other than that of what he called the real and jouissance, and that the world is 
created and inhabited by men “captured and tortured by language”.16 For as long as human beings are 
surprised by this fact, and feel the need to reflect on and articulate their surprise, approaching it as 
something that concerns them, psychoanalysis will continue to exist. 
 
Beyond the body and mind split 
The conceptions of Dasein and being-in-the-world were among Heidegger’s conceptual tools in his 
attempt to eliminate the problematic body-mind split argued by Descartes. For Heidegger, accepting 
this split reflects one’s uncritical adoption of the modern scientific, or Cartesian, worldview, according 
to which the body, or soma, needs to be differentiated from the mind, or psyche, because this is the 
only way it can be measured and studied scientifically, i.e., as an object. Sometimes this may be 
necessary, e.g., when thinking from the point of view of medical science or physiology; but many times 
it is tantamount to reducing the phenomena to something much more narrow—only because it’s more 
convenient. 
In a similar vein, Lacan too rejects the naïve division between the somatic and the psychical by 
showing that the psychical is first and foremost somatic, corporeal, in the sense that it is there where 
its origins lie (i.e., jouissance and the three registers, real, imaginary and symbolic). Things become 
much more complicated, however, when one considers that the human being qua divided subject 
becomes alienated from the biological body it occupies. The human being obtains a language body 
through its introduction to language, and this language body is very distinct from the biological—in a 
way, it is the only body that ex-sists. In this sense it could be seen as if Lacan’s conceptualisation re-
introduces the mind–body split—from the back door, as it were. But for Lacan this split is an imaginary 
                                                          
14 Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars, p. 4. 
15 See Being and Time, pp. 408-410/356-359; and Dreyfus, Commentary, pp. 72-74. 
16 Lacan, Seminar III, p. 243. 
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rather than a proper split—a semblance of a split, so to speak, which is only reflecting the 
differentiation between bodily jouissance and the signifier. 
 
Discourse 
Heidegger’s insight that Dasein’s comportment towards being is historical is correlative to Lacan’s 
theory of the four discourses. Speaking generally, discourse is a term that describes the internal 
structure of the speaking being’s comportment towards being, i.e., the structure of the signifying 
chain. The world a speaking being inhabits is reflected in the structure of the signifying chain, but the 
structure itself conforms to the specificities of a discourse. To be a subject of language always involves 
a specific discourse in which the human being participates. To speak of consciousness or of an 
unconscious only became possible because of the emergence of a specific discourse; it can only make 
sense to participants in a specific discourse, namely the hysteric and the analytic discourse 
respectively—the hysteric discourse being the discourse of the subject of science, and the analytic 
discourse being the one that allows the cause of desire to be thematised. 
Lacan’s theory of the four discourses and his other, later theoretical constructions, such as 
topology or the theory of knots, are a-historical—i.e., ontological—attempts to study the phenomena 
at hand. They are a-historical in the sense that they are non-factical. They are independent of specific 
discourse configurations and structures. 
At any given moment, every speaking being participates in a number of discourses. But one of 
these discourses predominates, providing a common backdrop, something like a zeitgeist, which can 
be called a historical epoch. The distinction between the ancient and the modern worldviews reflects 
an underlying periodisation of discourses. The emergence of the modern world can understood better 
if we think that there was a change in the way the predominant discourse thematises truth and 
science.17 
It is important to stress in this connection, however, that for Lacan there is no temporal or other 
hierarchy between the discourses. Each discourse represents a formulation of what is at stake for the 
speaking being and the general outline of how this happens. In other words, Lacan, in contrast to 
Heidegger, is rather agnostic in regard to the way things evolve. He acknowledges that the emergence 
of what he called the subject of science was made possible by the modern, Cartesian worldview; he 
acknowledges further that it is because of this that psychoanalysis itself was made possible—namely, 
because of the emergence of the analytic discourse. Nevertheless, there is no inherent reason for this 
state of affairs to persist. The future of psychoanalysis is not dependent on some truth that was 
revealed and should now be guarded; it’s only dependent on those speaking beings who will desire to 
keep it going. 
 
                                                          
17 This would perhaps allow us to understand why there are cultures less favourably disposed towards psychoanalysis: they might be 
conforming to a different kind of predominant discourse. 
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Five themes of a Discourse Ontology  
I will discuss now five basic themes of the conceptual synthesis that I have provisionally called 
Discourse Ontology (of the Speaking Being), referring again to concepts and formulations from 
Heidegger and Lacan as needed. Each theme is distinct and yet overlaps with the others. The themes 
are: Speaking being; Language; Body; World; and Truth. 
 
Speaking being and the emergence of signification 
The starting point will be the human being in its being human. Heidegger’s term Dasein—i.e., the 
human being considered ontically, in its factical existence, and ontologically in its concernful 
comportment towards being and the world it creates—is very close to, but not identical to, Lacan’s 
parlêtre (or speaking being). By choosing to use the term “Dasein”, Heidegger drew on a linguistic 
tradition that took the term as synonymous with “human being”, drawing a measure of attention to 
the spatial aspect of being human. For Heidegger, the human being, qua Dasein, is (ontically) a localised 
being, a being (in German: Sein) that is here (in German: da): Da-Sein. He identified inquiring “as one 
of the possibilities of its being,”18 and described as “care” Dasein’s concernful comportment towards 
the beings it encounters.  
Lacan’s term, parlêtre, draws attention to the fact that the human being is a being that speaks 
and has a world because it speaks. For Lacan, speaking as such is a “behaviour”, characteristically—but 
not uniquely—human. What is unique, for the human being qua speaking being, is that speaking 
involves a domain of recursive consensual coordination of distinctions, actions, or interactions with 
other human beings—i.e., a big Other, or, to put it differently, a discourse. Every speech act takes place 
within a domain that gives a sense to this act—the term “sense” being understood here both as 
meaning and as direction. If there were no speaking, there would be nothing to comport concernfully 
towards, i.e., there would be no being.  
 Speaking as such is a specific type of intentional coordinated bodily activity, the “prototype” of 
which can be found in the intentional consensual interaction between two or more speaking human 
beings. This interaction creates a field where further consensual interaction (speaking, talking, doing) 
is possible. This field provides the backdrop for the emergence of meaning. “Meaning” is a consensual 
retroactive attribution of relations of inter-correspondence between chunks of speech qua lalangue: 
any given chunk of speech becomes a signifier, i.e., becomes a word. 
By stating that the attribution of meaning is consensual, I am simply stressing the fact that the 
meaning of an utterance is implicitly reaffirmed every time it brings about consistent—i.e., not 
unexpected—results.19 The stream of utterances (i.e., lalangue) is retroactively being cut into 
identifiable speech elements called words, which become signifiers and are consensually made to 
correspond to other identifiable speech elements as their definitions, descriptions, etc. Establishing a 
                                                          
18 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 27/7. 
19 For instance, a human infant might at some point say something like mah-mah-mah-mah; it is in the possible reaction of the primary carer 
that this utterance will become, for the infant, a reference to the carer and obtain the meaning “mother”. In other words, from some moment 
onwards, the babbling mah-mah will be taken as the word (or signifier) mama, and will be accepted as referring to that woman, i.e., to 
“mother”.  
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correspondence is tantamount to saying that the signifier obtains a signified; thus a linguistic sign is 
created. To generalise a bit, this is both how language seems to have been created and how it is 
acquired by the newborn human infant: by establishing inter-correspondences between chunks of 
speech, i.e., rendering them into signifiers. And it is in this where Heideggerian being is to be found, 
namely in that, speaking qua coordinated interaction between human beings creates a field where the 
emergence of significations, i.e., meaning—or to put it more generally, signifierness—is possible. In 
other words, in Lacan’s view, language—more precisely: speaking—brings being by giving it a 
(linguistic) space, or field, where it can be presumed. This process is transparent and spontaneous, and 
readily recedes into the background. We, as human beings participating in it, lose sight of it. It is in this 
sense that Heidegger speaks of the “forgetfulness of being”. 
Signifierness involves desire, and desire is founded on lack. Signifiers are chunks of jouissance 
that stand as pointers to other signifiers, and eventually to a lack. In the process of signifierisation, 
jouissance is taken out of circulation: it is crystallised or cadaverised in the form of a signifier. In their 
dealings with the world, human beings create increasingly complex networks of interconnected 
signifierised jouissance, with multiple levels of overdetermination. These networks are unique to each 
human being in such a way that we can say that in the interconnections between signifiers—the chain 
of signifiers—the individual speaking being is represented. In short, the subject, as well as its world, is 
a “product” of the signifierisation process. 
For each and every individual human being qua speaking being, signifiers form a network It is in 
this sense that Lacan defines a signifier as that which represents the subject of language to another 
signifier. If we recall that desire is involved in every signifier, then we can reformulate this by saying 
that the speaking being is represented by a unique configuration of desire—a desire to return to the 
original jouissance, which is actually not there anymore. 
 
Truth as a rule-governed activity 
Truth can be defined as that which is given or accepted as given. It is, in other words, an ontological 
concept that should not be confused with the concept truth in its ontic sense, i.e., in the sense of the 
truth value—or veracity—of a statement. Ontological truth is correlative to signifierness; it always 
involves the field of consensual interactions between speaking beings and always reflects the “sense” 
that something is “at stake”; it does not have much to do with the veracity of statements or veracity 
as such. It is not a correspondence of a statement with a state of affairs. Drawing on the work of 
Hintikka, we can say that ontological truth is constituted as a language game or, rather, as a game of 
speaking—i.e., a discourse. In other words, truth is always involved in any structure of discursive 
relation and can be thought of as its backdrop (or point of reference). In their interactions, speaking 
beings always have recourse to this truth and refer to a lack in order to create a symbolic system that 
provides the framework for a social bond. Ontic truth becomes an issue when speaking beings are 
involved in the same “type” of discourse and “agree”, so to speak, with the terms or rules of a “game”. 
A statement is validated or accepted as (ontically) true when the game can be “won”. States of affairs 
are aspects of being and as such cannot be thematised unrelatedly to language. Both a statement and 
a state of affairs are on the same level. In other words, truth value, or veracity, is defined within the 
boundaries of a discourse, without any need for resort to a metalanguage. 
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Truth conceived thus is not far from Heidegger’s conception of truth as a-letheia, in the sense 
that for Heidegger, too, truth is not understood as correspondence between a language and a world, 
but rather as an acceptance and an appropriation of being—i.e., of a world and whatever it 
comprises—and time. What brings them together is that, for both Heidegger and Lacan, truth is not 
seen as the product of a judgement but rather as an acceptance, which, for Heidegger, constitutes 
what he calls an event of appropriation, and, for Lacan, has the form of what Freud had in mind when 
he spoke of a primordial affirmation. 
The two men’s conceptualisations of truth are not identical either. Their main difference seems 
to be related to the function attributed to truth: For Heidegger, truth qua a-letheia is related to being 
and its opening up to Dasein. For Lacan, truth is related to speaking as such. As soon as I speak, I speak 
the truth (or, perhaps, truth is spoken through me). Truth, then, means that I accept that I am the 
subject of language. For Lacan, nothing is revealed to the human being; rather, something is missing 
from the human being, and in the place of this lack the divided subject emerges as a speaking being. 
Speaking represents an affirmation, i.e., truth. 
From this simple conception of ontological truth as acceptance, and of ontic truth as the 
outcome (“win” or “lose”) of a game within a given discourse, we can preliminarily describe knowledge 
as that set of ontic narratives that are, or can be, accepted, believed, confirmed, or debated on a field 
of exchanges by speaking beings. Knowledge, in other words, can be thought as a set of articulated 
narratives that refer in various different ways (acceptance, belief, verification, etc.) to states of affairs. 
On the level of the individual speaking being, knowledge is a recursive construction—a kind of 
systematic and articulated lalangue, one might say—that involves a recursive self-referential network 
of signifiers and some of their interconnections.  
 
From language and speaking, to time 
The question of speaking—both in the obvious, ordinary sense of the term as well as in the sense of 
the term described immediately above, i.e., of speaking as a type of intentional coordinated activity—
is closely related to the question of language. When human beings speak, they intend to convey 
something; language is the guarantor, so to speak, of speaking as such—the consensual backdrop that 
gives a sense (or a meaning) to the activity of speaking.20 What is at stake, when there is speaking, is a 
way of engaging with the other—i.e., other human beings—as well as with the (big) Other. This is what 
discourse is—the internal structure of the subject’s submission to language and of the constitution of 
social reality.  
Language is a structure that all human beings are thrown into. We can describe language, in 
general, as a formal system of interconnected signs of a specific nature. In the case of natural, human 
language, the signs are linguistic and defined as comprising a signifier and a signified. The meaning of 
the signifier—i.e., its signified—is unstable, unclear, movable, flowing. 
The world is opened via the signifier. What is revealed is the possibility of a meaning, not a 
specific meaning itself. Lacan calls this signifierness and says that to the traditional being of philosophy 
                                                          
20 Cf. Lacan, ‘Function and Field’, pp. 227-229/274-276. 
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he opposes the “being of signifierness”.21 The signifier, of course, can be seen as an ontic as well as an 
ontological concept. Ontologically, it corresponds to signifierness—i.e., the establishing of consensual 
inter-correspondences between words, qua signifiers, and signifieds. 
Speaking is a bodily activity. It involves jouissance. The emergence of signifierness imposes a 
structure on jouissance by enforcing the distinction between signifierised and not-yet-signifierised 
jouissance. At the heart of the subject of language is a lack. When a signifier is established, when 
jouissance is made into signifiers, there is always a leftover, a “remainder” jouissance that has not yet 
been signifierised. Signifierised jouissance is always pointing to an absence, namely the absence of 
what is being signified. This means that, for every speaking being, the very activity of speaking brings 
to the fore an absence (or a lack, as Lacan would put it). The corollary of lack is desire. Any signifier 
that points to an absence—i.e., to a lack—refers to a desire which is caused by the remainder, not-yet-
signifierised, jouissance, or its object: object a. 
Speaking happens in time. I use the term time here in the most primordial sense of a backdrop 
according to which any activity—speaking, in this case—has a beginning, a duration, and an end. The 
emergence of signifierness makes this temporal aspect of speaking visible in that the speaking being 
needs to wait until the “end” of a clause of speech in order to get to what is intended by it, i.e., to its 
meaning. Signifierness presupposes time and involves it ontically in the sense just mentioned—
namely, that of time as duration—as well as ontologically. 
The later Heidegger understood being as the opening, or clearing, where entities are 
encountered; and time as presence. What Lacan brings to this is an understanding of how presence 
can be thematised vis-à-vis absence. In fact, to say that presence can be thematised is tantamount to 
saying that signifierness is possible. If presence can be thematised, then time—as well as being—can 
also be thematised. Signifierness—and retroaction—give direction to time and allow the present, the 
past, and, by implication, the future to be thematised.  
 
Body and sexuation 
For Lacan, the body is the locus where all happens. There is a specific aspect of Lacan’s discussion of 
the body’s engagement with the world that in Heidegger is not at all thematised. It pertains to what 
Lacan presents under the rubric of jouissance: jouissance is the (traumatic) product of the body’s 
structural coupling in the world. As a concept it is both ontic and ontological; it’s ontic in the obvious 
sense of the circumstantial details of the specifics of this or that event of the body that gave rise to it, 
but also ontological in the sense that it gives rise to signifierness. 
The material body qua biological organism is not identical to the body as conceived or 
experienced by the speaking being. In order to “obtain” a body, the human being qua divided subject 
needs to “be given” an image (mirror stage) and language (the symbolic order). 
Jouissance is a correlative of Dasein’s being-in-the-world: The human being qua Dasein cannot 
but be-in-the-world. And being-in-the-world cannot but mean that there is jouissance. It is precisely 
because there is jouissance that the human being is opened up to signifierness. Signifierness is that 
                                                          
21 Seminar XX, p. 71. 
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what opens the clearing for a signifier to be installed, and a signifier is what allows jouissance to be 
thematised. It appears, then, that Lacan, having conceptualised jouissance, allows for a discussion of 
the primordial revelation of being that Heidegger envisages, without recourse to the meaning of a 
world that—for Heidegger—being entails.  
Jouissance populates the register of the real. By submitting to language, the human being 
obtains an image of the body and an identity with which the human being occupies or inhabits it. In 
the process, some of the body’s jouissance freezes, populating the imaginary and symbolic registers. 
The remainder jouissance becomes a cause for the emergence of desire. 
In becoming a subject of language—i.e., a speaking being— the human being remains tormented 
by a tension between the body as an ontic entity (i.e., a thing) and the body as an imaginary entity that 
the speaking being inhabits. This tension could be understood as correlative to Heidegger’s insistence 
that the body is far away from Dasein despite appearing to be very near to it. 
For Heidegger, the question of the body is extremely important but obscure. According to 
several of his critics, his treatment of the question leaves much to be desired. It is, however, clear that, 
from Heidegger’s point of view, his ontological project would be incompatible with a discussion of the 
question of the body as such, which verges on the ontic. He sees space as something that is disclosed 
to Dasein through its bodiliness, and points out that even though the actual (ontic) body is a corporeal 
thing with specific dimensions, Dasein is not confined in it; it rather, Dasein is beyond the limits of the 
corporeal thing. Heidegger says little about the ontic aspects of the body (especially sex), struggling, 
apparently, with how to approach it without falling in the trap of the Cartesian mind/body distinction. 
Also, he does not seem at all interested in studying (or being able to see) the role sex plays in shaping 
Dasein’s picture of the world. Dasein is conceived as ontologically neutral; its neutrality is, of course, 
broken as soon as we consider Dasein in its factical concretion, but ontologically Dasein is neither 
masculine nor feminine. This is Heidegger’s premise, and his analysis proceeds from there. 
This, clearly, is very different from Lacan’s view. For Lacan, the question of sexual position, or 
sexuation, is crucial ontologically. For Lacan, the two positions, feminine and masculine, are 
fundamentally different. Granted, jouissance is asexual, at least in the beginning, but as soon as some 
of it is signifierised, it becomes differentiated in phallic jouissance and other jouissance. The difference 
between the feminine and masculine positions represents a difference in the manner of a subject’s 
alienation in language, and its submission to the phallic function—it is not a biological reality. 
 
World 
The speaking being is concerned about being, in the sense that Heidegger gives to this term. Being, as 
we said, can only be an issue when signifierness has emerged, a process that, for the speaking being, 
is equivalent to the emergence of what we call world. Of course, these are phenomena that take place 
equiprimordially: the world emerges together with signifierness and is revealed together with being. 
We spoke earlier about the creation of a field where signifierness is possible. The world is this field. 
This process too is transparent, in the sense that the emergence of the world becomes invisible and 
forgotten. 
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For Heidegger the world is not an empty container that Dasein inhabits. Dasein is fundamentally 
in the world, as denoted by the compound expression being-in-the-world, in the sense that there is no 
ontological (or ontic, for that matter) way to separate one from the other. In fact, the human being is 
essentially a world-forming being; being is opened to human beings via language. Material objects, 
such as a stone or a chair, do not have a world (they are “worldless”); animals are “poor in world”; and 
human beings are “world-forming”, and their world is a shared world.22  
The question of the world is thematised by Lacan indirectly. The world that the subjects of 
language share is a world revealed and guaranteed by the symbolic order and the signifier. It is an ontic 
world of signifierised jouissance, and as such it is not primarily a world of meaning: its “meaning” is 
established retroactively, in a sort of a secondary revision, whereby the network of the signifiers is 
being interconnected with the network of signifieds via quilting points. The world is shared, in the 
sense that each and every one of us is subject to a symbolic order that was established beforehand, 
but also private in the sense that every subject has added his or her own signifiers and has created his 
or her own network of meanings (signifieds). 
 
Some further themes 
Further to the five basic themes presented above, we are now brought face to face with some further 
themes that are opened up on the basis of the discussion thus far. I intend to outline some of them 
here, and discuss them, albeit cursorily, but it has to be emphasised, however,that there are many 
more lines of discussion that are opened and could be followed. 
 
Mathematics as discourse 
Lacan thought of mathematics as a process of manipulating symbols on a piece of paper according to 
certain rules for their exchanges, transformations, and arrangements. The symbols are not imitating 
any objects or entities of the world. They are completely detached from their origins, in the sense that 
their origins, i.e., what they are meant to represent—for example the divided subject (written as ), 
the master signifier (written as 𝑆1, or the symbolic phallus (written as Φ)—do not affect what you can 
do with them. So, for example, having introduced the matheme of the discourse of the master, Lacan 
applies an anti-clockwise quarter-turn operation on it, and in the process constructs three other 
formulas. He does not take into account what the features of the entities represented by his symbols 
are—admittedly, they are very different from one another—and he doesn’t explain why he suggests 
this transformation instead of any other; he simply asserts that “there are other reasons for this 
quarter turn than some pure accident of imaginary representation”,23 and leaves it there. 
Mathematical formalisation creates a semblance of transparency, abstraction, and 
transcendence. Lacanian mathemes are thought of as illustrating specific structures, relationships, and 
dependencies that emerge in the real, and they do so in an entirely symbolic manner. The twist lies in 
that whatever the matheme may be, you still need a human being to talk about it. Lacanian mathemes, 
                                                          
22 Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts, p. 177. 
23 Lacan, Seminar XVII, p. 14.  
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in all their abstraction, cannot be thought of independently of human beings engaging with them. In 
general, the mathematics that Lacan is interested in—set theory, topology, knot theory—is always 
something that is written and spoken about; it is a human activity in time, a kind of discourse. It cannot 
be thought of independently of this discourse. In this sense, Lacan’s views could be described as a type 
of discursive formalism.24 
 
Derivation of spatiality 
Heidegger had originally attempted to derive human spatiality from temporality, but later he admitted 
that this was untenable. 
For Heidegger, space is thematised by Dasein via the body. The body is in space in an ontological 
sense: space is opened, or disclosed, to Dasein through Dasein’s bodiliness and not the other way 
around. This involves the human being in its localised sense (the “Da” or “here” of Dasein) as well as 
its reach beyond corporeal limits, via the gaze and also via sound. He criticises the naïve 
conceptualisation of being-in-the-world in terms of a distinction between a bodily/psychic interior (i.e., 
subjectivity) and an exterior (i.e., objectivity), and stresses the “ecstatic” aspect of bodiliness.25 And 
there he remains: he does not seem willing (or prepared) to look into this phenomenon more closely. 
Lacan attempts to tackle the superficiality of the interior/exterior distinction with the help of 
quasi-paradoxical mathematical objects such as the one-sided, one-edged Möbius strip or the closed-
surfaced Klein bottle, which has no inside or outside. However, Lacan did not seem willing or prepared 
to recast his own research in terms of a systematic phenomenological exposition. He employs his 
mathematical objects and insights as partial suggestive illustrations and nothing more.  
It seems, in other words, that both Lacan and Heidegger set out from a similar starting point, 
their rejection of the naïve subject–object distinction of tradition, but they decide to look at different 
facets of the same issues. It would be important, then, to formulate a proper post-Cartesian 
phenomenology of the speaking being’s spatiality as a being-in-the-world, focusing on aspects of the 
speaking being qua body, such as the use of the bodily functions (eating, breathing, defecating, 
urinating), orifices (oral, anal, genital), or organs (eye, ear, nose, skin), etc. 
 
The ontological difference revisited: Primary, and second-order phenomena 
Based on Lacan’s insight into meaning as being established in consensual retroactive attribution of 
relations of inter-correspondence between chunks of speech, one could formulate hypotheses with 
profound repercussions both for our understanding of phenomena that involve meaning in some 
way—such as (conscious) reflection, conscious thinking, re-cognition or memory—and also for our 
understanding of mental deficiency or illness. 
We can only think consciously of conscious thinking because we already operate in language, 
i.e., in a field where consensual linguistic interaction is possible. Conscious thinking is public despite 
                                                          
24 It has to be clarified here that I am only using this term because I want to emphasise the (circular) constitution of Lacan’s formalism within 
a discourse—as understood by Lacan. 
25 See for example Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars, p. 91 
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the fact that it takes place in private. It follows from this that attempts to study it in vitro, as it were, 
i.e., with no reference to the public field where it becomes possible, are unavoidably incomplete and 
destined to fail. 
The first step here would be the recognition that these are not primary phenomena. Indeed, 
they cannot be considered outside the framework established by the meaning that has been 
retroactively attributed to them: one could more accurately describe them as second-order 
phenomena, underlying which one or more other, first-order phenomena can be observed, postulated, 
or hypothesised. What this means, in practical terms, is that a complex second-order phenomenon 
(such as, for example, speaking) cannot be adequately understood unless thought of in terms of a 
number of more elementary first-order phenomena (such as hearing, breathing, articulating), which 
are intertwined and interconnected. This, of course, is meant to be just an indication of the approach 
to be followed, and not a complete inventory of the steps involved, which would remain within the 
remit of an appropriate regional ontology.  
In an case, it is necessary to see that these phenomena and the underlying first-order 
phenomena stand in a type of relation similar to the one that linguists designate as duality of 
patterning. This relation, or rather the distinction it implies, needs to be read in connection to 
Heidegger’s ontological difference. It is only after establishing that second-order phenomena are 
exactly that—namely, second-order and not first-order—that we can begin to account for the role 
played in them by retroaction and thus avoid conceptual pitfalls. 
As an example, we could focus on our current difficulties in properly understanding the impact 
of gradual mental impairment or dementia on personality, sense of identity, and “character”. Rather 
than regarding the variety of clinical manifestations of mental deficiency as the more or less direct 
behavioural result of pathological processes involving one, two, or several hypothetical brain 
subsystems, one could see them as the result of the individual’s attempt to retroactively undo the gaps 
that appear in their thinking because of their illness, in much the same way that people attempt to 
smooth out the gaps they observe when they think of one of their dreams (i.e., what Freud called 
secondary revision).  
It is conceivable that many phenomena of cognitive and thought decline—phenomena that 
result from organic damage traceable to illness such as, say, vascular dementia or Alzheimer’s 
disease—could be better understood if studied in the same way as those psychopathological 
phenomena that Freud focused on: namely as increasingly failing attempts by the suffering speaking 
being to retroactively establish a second-order discursive coherency in an ever more fragmented 
mental space. 
These are but preliminary thoughts. The implications of such an approach could well prove to 









Lacan was a medical doctor who trained as a psychiatrist. Influenced by the intellectual climate of early 
20th century, he turned to Freud in an attempt to further his understanding of what we could vaguely 
call mental illness or suffering. Widely read in philosophy, the sciences, literature, and other fields, 
Lacan remained until the end of his life dedicated to issues pertaining to psychic life and suffering.  
Heidegger was planning to become a priest, but, after changing his mind, went on to study 
mathematics and then turned to philosophy. He remained dedicated to philosophy until the end of his 
life. Heidegger was very sceptical of the course that metaphysics had taken since the time of the 
ancient Greeks and, with a view to challenging tradition and deconstructing Western philosophy, 
sought to bring back some of the originality and incisiveness of their questioning. 
We saw how Lacan drew on philosophy initially, and then on mathematics, in order to find the 
conceptual tools he felt he needed in order to develop his ideas further and bring them together in a 
coherent and robust conceptual structure. His theories always had the air of a work in progress. It is 
evident to anyone looking more carefully at the content of his teaching and the style of his delivery 
that he felt he did not have enough time to bring everything to a proper closure.  
If Lacan was becoming more and more anxious to proceed with his work and less and less willing 
to be concerned about possible misunderstandings on the part of his audience, Heidegger moved in 
the opposite direction, gradually distancing himself from teaching and only writing and presenting 
increasingly short papers. 
Heidegger rejected the naïve Cartesian view of the human being as a subject standing vis-à-vis 
the world as object by pointing out that such a view neglects and distorts phenomena. For Heidegger, 
the human being qua Dasein is the clearing in which a world is opened as truth and shared: in its 
concernful comportment towards beings, Dasein allows being to be opened up and shared, and in this 
way undertakes a task that Heidegger called the task of thinking. 
Heidegger criticised Freud on the basis of what he took to be Freud’s uncritical adoption of a 
naïve scientism, directly inherited from the 19th-century worldview that Freud presumably shared. For 
Heidegger, the belief that science progresses by collecting “objective” data, formulating hypotheses, 
and creating testable theories has limited scope and fails to question the presuppositions, foundations, 
and historicity of any scientific method. What is missing from the 19th-century view is, according to 
Heidegger, an understanding of the question of being, i.e., a careful reconsideration of the ways in 
which the world is opened up and revealed to human beings (to Dasein). It is this consideration that 
would reveal science as a historical enterprise and expose its limitations in connection to the 
applicability of its methods to the study of Dasein. The question of mental determinism, which lies at 
the heart of Freud’s project, is in that sense a question that is formulated in a problematic way. It 
involves the uncritical adoption of an inapplicable research programme—the intention to study the 
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psyche as if it were an independently existing and observable object—with the help of inapplicable 
hypotheses. For Heidegger, the issue is a non-issue, and therefore the whole theoretical structure of 
psychoanalysis collapses. 
As I have argued here, Heidegger’s critique of modern science and psychoanalysis is something 
that psychoanalytic theory cannot afford to ignore. Psychoanalytic metapsychology is vulnerable to it 
and needs to be able to respond. 
Approaching Lacan’s work, it becomes evident that he took Heidegger’s critique very seriously. 
Lacan, a student of Koyré, shared with Heidegger a theoretical understanding of the historical nature 
of science. He recognised that Freud’s research programme would not have been possible prior to the 
advent of what he (Lacan) called the “subject of science”. Contrary to how it would appear at first sight, 
however, for Lacan a subject of science is neither a subject that adopts scientific methods—i.e., a 
scientist—or the human being as a subject of scientific research. It is, rather, the subject that is 
surprised by the products of his or her own psyche, which he or she then considers as concerning him 
or herself. The subject of science is the doubtful Cartesian subject who is perplexed—and sometimes 
disturbed—by his or her own desire. Becoming a subject of science involves, in Lacan’s view, a change 
in one’s relationship to one’s jouissance. It was this that made Freud’s discovery possible. In Lacan’s 
understanding, Freud did not uncover for us the workings of a fully deterministic “mental” apparatus 
that had previously remained hidden: what he discovered was that the human psyche is subject to the 
law of the signifier. The importance of this law, however, does not lie in its determinism. On the 
contrary, it becomes important at the loci where it breaks down.  
Lacan too rejected the Cartesian view on the basis that the subject of thinking (the ego of cogito) 
never occupies the same place as the subject of language. Lacan showed that the speaking being is not 
a Cartesian subject that can find certainty and truth. As a subject of language, the human being is a 
decentred subject, a semblance, a product of recursive retroactive overlapping identifications, a made-
up being that goes around pretending to be what it is not. 
Both thinkers represent a cut with the past. In repositing the ontological question and 
demonstrating its historicity, Heidegger revealed the limitations and impasses of modernity, and 
opened a clearing in which truth, knowledge, science, and the human being can be thought of and 
thematised anew. In outlining the discursive structures in which the speaking being partakes and 
deconstructing the foundations of subjectivity, Lacan broke with the traditional approaches of 
philosophy. Ontology and metaphysics are not feasible. The traditionally conceived truth of 
correspondence and adequation is a myth, a result of a compromise—a language or discursive game. 
This leaves us with psychoanalysis, Freud’s invention, which allows us to see that there is no 
foundation of truth other than that of the real and jouissance, and that the world is created and 
inhabited by men “captured and tortured by language”.1 
In this thesis, I attempted to address the question of whether a theoretical convergence 
between Heideggerian philosophy and Lacanian psychoanalysis is possible or useful. In addition to 
having similar understandings of the historicity of science, Lacan and Heidegger coincided in their 
contempt for traditional metaphysics and ontology. Towards the end of his teaching, Lacan advocated 
                                                          
1 Lacan, Seminar III, p. 243. 
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a kind of anti-philosophy, while Heidegger, after his so-called turn, abandoned both the traditional 
vocabulary of metaphysics and his attempt to formulate a post-Cartesian fundamental ontology. 
I have concluded that even though Lacanian metapsychology can be seen as not incompatible 
with Heidegger’s research programme, and that there are quite a few points where the path of Lacan 
crosses that of Heidegger, the two do not coincide. Lacan and Heidegger agree on what language 
does—it discloses/constructs a world—but they diverge in their understanding of what it all means. 
For Heidegger this question presents itself as the most essential in any kind of thinking—in effect it 
becomes a task for Dasein, a moral telos. Lacan, on the other hand, believes that meaning is volatile, 
overdetermined, and “decided” retroactively. 
In many respects Heidegger shows himself to be a moralist, while Lacan appears as an agnostic 
cynic, and this makes futile any direct attempt at reconciling their differing opinions and at making 
their conclusions fully compatible. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that Lacan’s and 
Heidegger’s aims and objectives were openly different. Lacan was a psychoanalyst, and his theoretical 
efforts were meant to help him and his students in their clinical work. Lacan’s seminar, even though 
open to the public, was a seminar designed to teach and orient clinicians who practiced or intended to 
practice psychoanalysis. Heidegger, on the other hand, was not a clinician. He was a philosopher who 
decided to address clinicians only because he thought that they were using unexamined concepts and 
methods, to the detriment of their subject matter and their patients.  
And yet, as I have argued, a conceptual synthesis is possible. The name that I gave to it is 
Discourse Ontology (of the Speaking Being). As explained above, it is an ontology—in the sense that it 
concerns being, i.e., the open space where a world can present itself as intelligible to the human 
being—with the designation “discourse” indicating the source of this intelligibility, and the qualification 
“of the Speaking Being” serving to emphasise and acknowledge the circularity involved. It is informed 
by the terminology, insights, concepts, hypotheses, and conclusions of both Heidegger and Lacan, and 
entails discussions about the human being as a being which is being there in language; about the world 
into which the human being finds itself thrown and about the ways of its comportment towards this 
world; about the ontological construction of a shared ontic world; and about the limits and the 
historicity of this world.  
This Discourse Ontology provides us with the tools we need to understand how psychoanalysis 
became possible, what psychoanalysis reveals about the speaking being, and what its limitations are. 
Freud had wanted his theory to be accepted and respected as a new science, but now we can see that 
even though psychoanalysis is indeed a product of the modern worldview, it is one that allows us to 
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